in 208 BC. The author comes to the conclusion that Antiochus managed to defeat Arshak II and restore his power in Parthia and Hyrcania.

Key words: Antiochus III, Arshak II, Parthiene, Hyrkania.

In 209 BC, after the suppression of the Achaean revolt in Asia Minor and the subjugation of Sophene (Polyb. VIII. 17-23, 25), Antiochus III began to restore Seleucid power in the east in full. The first goal of his campaign was to be Parthia. But before describing the course and results of the Parthian-Seleucid war, it is necessary to determine which territories were in the hands of the Parthian ruler Arshak II at the beginning of it.

I'll start with the east. Polybius reports (Polyb. X. 49. 1) that after the end of the Parthian campaign, during the war with Euthydemus of Bactria in 208 BC, Antiochus besieged a city three days ' march 2 west of the Arius River (Gerirud-Tejen). This circumstance does not allow us to agree with those authors who believe that the border of Parthia and Bactria passed along this river [Walbank, 1967, p. 265; Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, p.26]. If we take into account that Aria, which was part of Greco-Bactria (Walbank, 1967, p. 232), included the Keshefrud Valley and bordered Parthiena along the Binalud ridge (Balakhvantsev, 2005, p. 183), then the latter should also be considered the eastern limit of Arshak I's conquests.

What was the state of affairs in Nesaya, a region located in the region of modern Ashgabat? I have already had occasion to refer to the discovery of two lead tetradrachms of Antiochus III of local coinage on the Old Nisa [Balakhvantsev, 2005, pp. 185-186]. Judging by the fact that the portrait of the king on these coins belongs to the so-called type A, which was used in 223-211 BC [Houghton and Lorber, 2002, p. 466], and lead was used for minting only in the most extreme circumstances, we can conclude that the Old Nisa up to the campaign In 209 BC, it remained loyal to the Seleucids, but the Parnians were threatened from the west and the Bactrians from the east.

As for Hyrcania, Parthiene, and the Hoarena and Comisene lying to the west of the latter, Polybius ' biography of Antiochus (Polyb. X.28.7, 29.2) clearly states that these lands were taken by the Parnae3. The greatest controversy is caused by a certain-

1 Hereafter, Parthia refers to the state that emerged as a result of the conquest of the Seleucid satrapies in the north-east of Iran, including Parthia, by the Parnian leader Arshak I.

2 Given that the entire army travels a maximum of 31 km per day [Engels, 1978, p. 20], the distance from the unnamed city to the river was approximately 93 km.

3 The claim that the Parni only invaded these areas for the sake of plunder [Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, 1993, p. 197] has no support in the sources and is subject to fair criticism [Bernard, 1994, p. 495; Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, p.25, note 8].

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study of the western limits of the Parnean expansion. A number of scientists believe that by 209 BC the Arsacids had occupied the entire Mussel or its northeastern part [Rawlinson 1873, p. 54; Tagp, 1932, p. 576; Debevoise, 1969, p. 16; Sellwood, 1980, p. 20, 27; Sherwin-White and Kuhrt, 1993, p 197; Wolski, 2003, p. 68; Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, p. 25]. Proponents of this point of view refer to the sacking of Ecbatana by Antiochus III (Rawlinson, 1873, p. 54) and the renaming of the Median city of Ragi to Arsacia (Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, p.30).

In this regard, it can be noted that the statement about the sack of Ecbatana does not agree with the information of Polybius: he only reports that Antiochus confiscated the temple treasures there in order to replenish the treasury (Polyb. X. 27. 13). Similarly, the king tried to act in relation to the temple of Bel in Elimaida (Diod. XXVIII.3, XXIX. 15; Strab. XVI. 1.18; Just. XXXII.2.1), which belongs to the Seleucid empire is beyond any doubt. Thus, the action of Antiochus in Ecbatani cannot serve as proof of the capture of the city by the Parnae.

As for Arsacia, Strabo (Strab. XI. 13.6) and the next Stephen of Byzantium (Steph. Byz. s.v.' Pάγα), noting the fact of renaming the city, do not say when it happened. G. A. Koshelenko and V. A. Gaibov believe that this happened in the first years of Arshak's reign II, when the latter, taking advantage of the struggle of Antiochus III with the rebellious satrap Molon (222-220 BC), captured the eastern part of Media (Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, pp. 29-30) .4 However, it is not possible to agree with this hypothesis. Indeed, the story of Molon's rebellion is described in detail in Polybius (Polyb. V. 40-54). If the Parnae had invaded Media at the same time, it would certainly have influenced the actions of the rebellious satrap and was reflected in the narrative of Polybius. But the historian's account does not hint that Molon was in any trouble from the east. Moreover, immediately after the victory, Antiochus ordered his generals to take the former soldiers of Molon to Media and put the affairs of this region in order (Polyb. V. 54. 8), and he first set up the upper satrapies (Polyb. V. 54. 9-13), and then invaded Atropatene (Polyb. V. 55.1-2, 6-10). Such actions would not be possible if the Ragas were captured by the enemy. Therefore, I am inclined to agree with those researchers [Walbank, 1967, p. 232; Bernard, 1994, p.495] who limit the limits of Arshak I's conquests in the west to the Caspian Gate (the Sar-i Dara mountain pass, 12 km southeast of Eyvaneka). As for Arsacia, in my opinion, this name owes its appearance to the Parthian king Mithridates I, who after the capture of Media renamed the city in honor of his great-grandfather Arshak I (Balakhvantsev, 2009: 96, 100).

The eastern campaign of Antiochus III began in 209 BC. e. It is believed that the king did not leave Ecbatana until spring [Walbank, 1967, p. 232], but already in the era of the Diadochi, generals seeking to take the enemy by surprise began the campaign in winter (Nep. Eum. 8; Plut. Eum. 15). The Seleucid army passed through the Caspian Gate and entered Hoarena (the area of Eradan). From the first phase of the campaign, only one detail has come down to us - Polybius ' mention of the city of Calliope (Polyb. X. 31. 15). This polis, founded by Seleucus I (App. Syr. 57), was located in Hoaren (Plin. NH. VI.44) 5 and was occupied by the troops of Antiochus. In the course of a further march, the Seleucid army, without encountering any resistance, penetrated into Siena.

The reasons for Arshak's inaction were of interest to ancient historians. Thus, according to Polybius, Arshak hoped that Antiochus would not go further than the already captured Hoarena and Comisena (Polyb. X. 28. 1). But it is hardly possible to attribute an image to the ruler of Parnov

4 It is not clear why the authors attribute this invasion to Arshak II, when, according to the general opinion of Wolski, 1462, p. 145; Le Rider, 1965, p. 300; Chaumont, 1971, p. 148; Wolski, 2003, p. 58], the death of Arshak I and the rise to power of his son date back to the time of not earlier than 217 BC.

5 F. Walbank [Walbank, 1967, p. 242], ignoring the data of Pliny the Elder, for some reason places this city in Copenhagen.

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the child's thoughts. Most likely, at the first stage of the campaign, the surprise factor played in favor of Antiochus. However, in the subsequent Arshak II did not dare to give the enemy a battle in an open field. This is partly due to the numerical superiority of the Seleucid army, although the numbers given by Justin are 100,000 infantry and 20,000 horsemen (Just. XLI.5.7) are clearly fantastic [Debevoise, 1969, p. 17; Schmitt, 1964, p. 63] 6. The Parnae attempted to stop Antiochus ' advance by destroying underground channels (ropes) and wells (Polyb. X. 28. 5-6). However, this did not help, and the Seleucid army, having passed through the Parthien, occupied Hekatompil (Shahr-i Kumis)7 without resistance and continued on to the Laba passes leading to Hyrkania (Polyb. X. 29. 1-3). It is sometimes assumed that Antiochus III went to Hyrkania via the Chalchanlian Pass to the east of the Shahkuh ridge (Walbank, 1967, p. 238). However, the Shamshirbur pass located to the west [Melgunov, 1863, p. 89], which was used by Alexander [Engels, 1978, p.83; Bosworth, 1980, p. 341, 349], seems to me a more preferable choice. 8
It was here that Antiochus first encountered serious resistance. It is often suggested that its main opponents in the mountains and Hyrcania itself were the Parthians [Debevoise, 1969, p. 17-18; Bokshchanin, 1960, p. 202-203; Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, p. 26] and that the massacre of the Greeks in Syrinx was organized on the orders of Arshak [Wolski, 2003, p. 26]. 68]. However, these hypotheses are not supported in the text of Polybius, who refers to the enemies of Antiochus simply as barbarians (Polyb. X. 29-31). Most likely, they were the same Tapurs and Mards that Alexander fought (Arr. Anab. III. 23-24). After breaking their resistance and crossing the mountains, Antiochus occupied the Hyrcanian cities of Tambrak and Sirinc, located in the vicinity of Astrabad-modern Gorgan (Dorn, 1875, p. 73; Pédech, 1958, p. 79-80; Walbank, 1967, p. 241), as well as Ahriana (Polyb. X.31.14).

The route of further advance of the Seleucid army can be judged from the following data. Polybius ' account of the waterfall on the Oxus and Apasiacs (Polyb. X. 48) suggests that Arshak II had to follow in the footsteps of his father (Strab. XI.8.8) and take advantage of their "hospitality" (Niese, 1899, pp. 398-399). But Arshak's flight beyond the Oxus (Ozba) can only be explained if Antiochus reached at least the valley of Atrek. Indeed, the concealment of a hoard of more than 1,500 drachmas by Alexander, Philip Arrhidaeus, Lysimachus, Antiochus II (?), Diodotus, Arshak I, and Arshak II north of Bojnurd around 209 BC (Abgarians and Sellwood, 1971, p. 103-118) suggests that the inhabitants of this region felt a military threat looming over them. Thus, it can be assumed that as a result of the victorious campaign, Antiochus III cleared not only Hoarena and Comisena, but also Hyrcania and Parthia from the Parnians. The winner got the city of Dara, founded by Arshak I as his residence (Just. XLI.5.2 - 4)9. Communication with Nesaya was also restored.

What is the reason for Arshak's rapid and crushing defeat? In my opinion, this - apart from the surprise of Antiochus ' attack and his apparent superiority in strength already mentioned-is due to the nature of the Parnoi's power in the occupied lands. This character can be seen from Arshak's attempts to delay the advance of the Seleucid army. He could throw his superior cavalry against Antiochus to harass the enemy infantry on the march and attack the foraging parties. However, Arshak did not want to risk his fellow tribesmen and instead

6 If we take into account that Antiochus III mustered 62,000 infantry and 6,000 cavalry for the decisive battle with Ptolemy IV at Raffia (Polyb. V. 79. 13), and in the battle with 10,000 Bactrian horsemen on the Arius River, victory came at a great cost (Polyb. X. 49. 7-13), then the number of Seleucid cavalry in the eastern campaign most likely did not exceed 10 000 - 12 000 a person.

7 For the localization of this city, which later became the capital of Parthia, see [Hansman, 1981, pp. 3-9].

8 Cf.: [Pédech, 1958, p. 77], where no option is excluded.

9 According to M. Kiani (1982, p. 47), Dara corresponds to the modern Kara Shikh Tepe on the southern slopes of the Gokcedag ridge.

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Instead, he resorted to the "scorched earth" tactic. These actions clearly demonstrated that Arshak, in fact, was not the ruler of Parthia, but only the leader of the Parnians, that his power in Parthia and other Seleucid satrapies was rather a military occupation. The consequence of this situation was the lack of support 10 from the local population. Indeed, Arshak's order to destroy the ropes and wells that were the mainstay of irrigation in Parthien 11 doomed the local peasants to ruin and starvation. In such a situation, they had to wait for the arrival of Antiochus ' troops as deliverance from certain death.

No later than the winter of 209 - 208 BC, Antiochus III concluded a peace with Arshak, the terms of which Justin reports only that Arshak became an ally of the Seleucids (Just. XLI. 5. 7). The deliberate ambiguity of the expression societatem used in the epitome of Pompey Trog created the ground for numerous interpretations. There is a prevailing tendency in the literature to downplay the consequences of a military defeat for Arshak II. Thus, it is suggested that Parthia was reduced to a state of "technical vassalage" [Green, 1990, p. 294, map 18], that Antiochus recognized the independence of Parthia [Rawlinson, 1873, p. 57], that Seleucid sovereignty over Parthia was only nominal,and that Arshak retained the royal title [Bokshchanin, 1960, p. 57]. p. 203; Schmitt, 1964, p. 63; Schippmann, 1980, p. 21], that the victories of Antiochus III, in fact, were fruitless [Musti, 1984, p. 213]. Farthest in this direction went Y. Wolski, who claimed the victory of Arshak II without any reservations [Wolski, 2003, p. 48, 65].

All this has nothing to do with reality. Antiochus had no reason to give Arsaces a bonus for the rebellion in the form of ceding the Seleucid satrapies he had just recaptured. In this situation, the Parnians were only able to retain the lands on Sumbar and Atrek that they had occupied on the eve of the first invasion of Parthia. Arshak II was forced to recognize Seleucid domination, pay tribute [Ghirshman, 1976, p. 216], send his soldiers to the army of Antiochus (Liv. XXXVII.40.8)12 and, as a sign of the loss of sovereignty, stop minting coins [Sellwood, 1980, p.25]. So often debated in science, the question of whether Arshak II retained the royal title [Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, pp. 31-32] is generally pointless. Neither the text of Polybius (Polyb. X. 28-29), nor the coins issued by Arshak II himself (Sellwood, 1980, p. 26-27) 13 allow us to assume that he ever held the title BAΣIΛEϒΣ In this way, even if we agree with Justin-Trog and recognize the conclusion of an alliance between Antiochus III and Arshak II, then it must be remembered that this was the union of the rider and the horse.

The Parni had to maintain loyalty to the Seleucids for the next twenty years, until Antiochus III the Great suffered a crushing defeat at the hands of the Romans at the Battle of Magnesia, in which the Parni (Dai) themselves participated, according to Livy and Appian.

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Balakhvantsev A. S. Seleucus II Kallinikos and Parthia // Interstate relations and Diplomacy in antiquity. Kazan, 2000.

10 The only exception was the wild mountain tribes of the Tapurs and Mards, who, however, were not so much for Arshak as against anyone who tried to break into their house.

11 On the role of such underground channels in the water supply of territories adjacent to the central deserts of Iran, see: [Petrov, 1955, pp. 83-84; Walbank, 1967, p. 236].

12 The observation that they were mercenaries again [Briscoe, 1981, p. 211-212] not only has no support in the sources, but also contradicts common sense [Balakhvantsev, 2000, p.203-204].

13 Recently, an attempt was made to revise the scheme of development of early Parthian coinage developed by D. Sellwood and attribute to Arshak II coins usually attributed to Mithridates I, on the reverse of which, along with the image of an archer sitting on an omphalus, there is a legend with the royal title [Koshelenko and Gaibov, 2012, pp. 26-29]. Unfortunately, G. A. Koshelenko and V. A. Gaibov did not take into account the fact that among more than nine hundred Early Parthian drachmas from the Bojnurd hoard, there is not a single coin with this type of reverse. This circumstance makes their assumptions unsubstantiated.

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