M. International relations. 1983. 288 p.

Associate Professor of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Candidate of Historical Sciences A. Yu.Borisov devoted his book to Soviet - American relations during the Great Patriotic War, when, despite the differences in social systems and ideologies, the complex interweaving of specific interests of the two countries, it was possible to find a basis for cooperation in order to This experience, the author rightly emphasizes, "is not only of great historical significance, but also useful in analyzing modern international relations and their development prospects" (p. 6).

This topic has always attracted the attention of Soviet historians, which is reflected in numerous works on the history of World War II. A. Y. Borisov made this topic the subject of a special monographic study. He used a wide range of sources, among which an important place belongs to materials from the Archive of Foreign Policy of the USSR, documentary publications of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR and the US State Department.

Thanks to the attraction of new materials, A. Y. Borisov managed to shed additional light on such little-known subjects as the USSR's proposal in 1941 to settle the issue of obtaining a loan of $ 500 million in the United States through the supply of Soviet raw materials (p. 58), the American note of November 13, 1941, which essentially justified the brutal treatment of Soviet prisoners of war by the Nazis (p. 76), new data on the responses in the United States to the Red Army's victory near Moscow (p. 78-82), Washington's attempts to "link" the issue of the Red Army to the Soviet Union.

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the opening of the second front with the recognition of the Soviet western border (p. 91), the role of the Soviet Union in alleviating the fate of American prisoners of war captured by Japan during the battles in Asia (p.124-125), and some others.

The author was able to trace the complex history of Soviet-American relations during the war years through the main problems and stages, and to give a reasoned rebuff to bourgeois falsifiers who claim that relations between the USSR and the United States at that time prove the impossibility of a long and stable peaceful coexistence of states with different social systems.

The research is based on the principle of historicism. US foreign policy during World War II is considered in a broad historical context: both in the light of American imperialism's dissatisfaction with the outcome of World War I and the Versailles-Washington system, and in view of its claims to world hegemony after World War II. In this regard, the author's attention to the pre-war period and the US involvement in the policy of "appeasement" of aggressors is fully justified.

The book clearly shows the responsibility of the United States for the fact that real opportunities for Soviet-American cooperation were missed. Behind the screen of supposedly passive waiting and inaction, the author emphasizes, were hidden the selfish plans of the American monopolies, who very actively sought to "try to resolve all the contradictions, both inter-imperialist and class, and at a relatively small price to ensure the United States a leading position in the world" (p. 22).

The author focuses on the following main issues: American supplies to the USSR, the opening of a second front in Europe, and the post-war structure of the world. The author - and this is natural - devotes a lot of space to the confrontation between realistic and adventurous trends in US politics, and characterizes the political figures who represent these trends. Progressive America, the people of the United States, and their sympathy and support for the heroic efforts of the Soviet people are also not ignored.

Speaking about American supplies to the Soviet Union, the author notes that when Nazi Germany attacked the USSR, the US leadership was in no hurry to provide assistance and real support to our country. Moreover, the Soviet Union was even assigned a kind of" probationary period " - whether it could withstand the onslaught of the fascist hordes until October 1941. The Soviet Ambassador to the United States, K. A. Umansky, noted the tendency in the American ruling circles from the very beginning to use the assistance not yet provided to the Soviet Union "to penetrate into our affairs" (p. 52). It is characteristic that the American side has always tried to use contacts with the USSR and the discussion of various problems to obtain secret information of strategic importance (p. 130-132) and plant its intelligence agents, in particular in Siberia and the Far East (p.122-123).

The Soviet side, the author points out, considered American military supplies "not only from the point of view of their independent value, but to a greater extent as the first step towards establishing strong military and political cooperation with Washington" (p.50). The book exposes the fabrications of bourgeois historians who belittle the significance of the decisive contribution of the Soviet people to the defeat of fascism, claim that American supplies "saved" the USSR, and extol the" nobility "and" generosity "of the United States, which allegedly did not even try to take advantage of the" plight " of the USSR and did not demand any money for its help.or concessions.

Considering the history of negotiations on the opening of the second front, the author criticizes American bourgeois historians, who still persist in claiming that the British set the tone in delaying the opening of the second front. The monograph reveals the unseemly role of the United States in this issue, which preferred to "remain in the shadows in matters of dubious nature" and deliberately put the more straightforward British "in the foreground" (p. 101). Soviet diplomacy understood the meaning of the tactics of the Western Allies, "which could only be changed by the success of Soviet weapons at the front, supported by relentless diplomatic efforts" (p. 106).

From the material given in the book, it is clear that the American leadership stubbornly sought to replace the question of opening a second front and accelerating the defeat of nazi Germany with other problems, among which the question of the USSR's entry into the war with Japan occupied a special place-

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problems of the post-war structure. The US ruling circles were most concerned with the main goal: the conquest of world hegemony. In 1943, the president told his son that the goal of the United States was to "ultimately extract the greatest benefits from it", and not to conduct it in such a way as "to end it... as soon as possible " (p. 113).

It was about the global expansionist program of the United States, aimed at remaking the world in its favor at the expense of the defeated and weakened, including at the expense of its allies - the old colonial powers. The book examines in detail the main aspects of this imperial program-the demand for the dismemberment of Germany, plans for "international guardianship", the creation of a new balance of power in the Far East, the implementation of the principle of "open doors", "freedom of trade", "equal opportunities", and the use of an international organization in the interests of the United States, which was assigned the role of the central link of the entire post-war strategy The United States, the center of "American influence in the world" (p. 118, 150). This program also left its mark on the nature of relations between the United States and the USSR.

The struggle in the ruling circles of the United States over the post-war structure of the world occupies a significant place in the book. It shows the increasing intensity of this struggle as fascism is defeated and a new balance of power is formed in the world. The author notes that an influential part of the ruling class of the United States, based on the need for cooperation with the USSR, was in the position of realism (p.170). It was expressed by Roosevelt, whose views underwent a significant evolution in a positive direction during the war years. In Roosevelt's realism, the author notes, "class interests did not obscure objective reality" (p.172). At the opposite pole, there was a fairly close-knit group of politicians who saw their goal in disrupting the line of developing Soviet-American cooperation. They actively spread the myth of the "Soviet threat", called for "firmness" and "tough reciprocity" in relations with the USSR, and the use of economic levers of pressure on the USSR to obtain political concessions from it. Already during the Second World War, the thesis appeared that the spurring of the arms race could be used as a tool to "deplete" the Soviet economy (pp. 196-197).

The book shows that despite the maneuvers of opponents of Soviet-American cooperation, a realistic approach prevailed, as evidenced by the results of the Yalta and Potsdam conferences. This conclusion is very significant, in particular, due to the fact that Sovietologists persist in calling the Yalta Conference "the new Munich", which meant "the victory of the USSR" and "the defeat of the United States", and the beginning of the"cold war".

The author specifically considers the question of the turn in Washington's foreign policy, especially in relations with the USSR, which occurred after the death of F. D. Roosevelt. He emphasizes that this turn from cooperation to confrontation with the Soviet Union was "programmed" deep in the bowels of American capitalism, because "President Roosevelt's flexible foreign policy, which combined concern for the interests of American capitalism with a fairly sober assessment of international reality, long before his death ceased to satisfy the most reactionary part of the US ruling class" (p. 232). In this connection, the author returns to the circumstances of the election of H. Truman as vice president in 1944, when Roosevelt, under the strongest pressure from the right wing of the Democratic Party, was forced to abandon the candidacy of the liberal G. Wallace and accept the candidacy of G. Truman, 1 who was closely associated with military concerns. The latter, if it was a "gray horse", then only for the public, but in fact "was put forward with a long-range view... It suited those who were planning post-war world expansion in the best possible way" (p.230).

Of course, the book in question could not, and does not claim to, cover all aspects of Soviet-American relations. But it seems to us that it not only successfully summarized and systematized the results of studying this multifaceted and extensive problem, but also outlined ways to further develop it. One of the most important and perhaps most pressing issues is the impact of shifts in the balance of global forces on the positions of various groups of the US ruling circles and on their foreign policy in general.-

1 Manykin A. S. Istoriya dvukhpartiyonnoy sistemy SSHA [History of the two-party system in the USA]. Moscow, 1981, p. 189.

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academic course. We believe that it was the changing balance of power in the world that was crucial for the development of Soviet-American relations.

It is also necessary to draw deep conclusions from the fact that the United States, both in the pre-war period and during the war, persistently tried to draw the USSR into a war with Japan even before the defeat of nazi Germany was completed. The book by A. Y. Borisov contains a lot of material on this issue (p. 14, 16, 17, 69, 70 - 72, 119, 123 - 124, 146, 164 - 165, 250 The facts presented by the author indicate that American diplomats considered this task as the main one. By delaying the opening of the second front, the US ruling circles pushed the USSR to enter the war with Japan, meaning not only to accelerate the defeat of its rival, but also to force the USSR to take the brunt of the war with Japan, and at the same time to divert significant forces from the Eastern Front in Europe and thereby weaken the "onslaught of the Russians" at the final stage of the war and create favorable conditions for the advance of Anglo-American troops in Europe further to the east. The entry of the USSR into the war with Japan was an example of an honest attitude to the allied duty.

The whole complex of issues related to Soviet-American relations, of which the main ones received such a successful coverage in the reviewed book, is also waiting for development. We are talking, in particular ,about the impact of these relations on the relations of the United States with other European countries. 2
Borisov's book is very timely. It recalls the historical responsibility of the ruling circles of the United States for the fact that "real opportunities were missed to realize the hopes of peoples for a lasting post-war peace" (p. 266). Its content once again confirms that cooperation between the USSR and the United States is possible and fruitful if it is based on a fair and equitable basis.

2 See, for example, Sevostyanov G. N., Utkin A. I. The USA and France during the war of 1939-1945. Moscow, 1974.

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