Libmonster ID: U.S.-1904
Author(s) of the publication: E. N. KULKOV

KRWGSWENDE: Dezember 1941. Referate und Diskussionsbeitrage des internationalen historischen Symposiums in Stuttgart von 17. bis 19. September 1981.

Koblenz. 1984. 268 S.

Under this title, the proceedings of the international Symposium of historians, held in Stuttgart in September 1981, were published in Germany. The publication clearly traces the difference in the approaches of Soviet and bourgeois historians to the analysis and assessment of the events of the Second World War related to the end of 1941 - beginning of 1942.

It is well known that in the second half of 1941 the epicenter of World War II shifted to the Soviet-German front. The failure of the fascist plan for a "lightning war in the East" and the defeat of the Nazis near Moscow had a huge impact on changing the military and political situation in favor of the states and peoples that were subjected to aggression by the fascist bloc. However, at the symposium, bourgeois historians put forward the problems of waging war in the Pacific, in the Atlantic and in the Mediterranean, and the question of the victory of the Soviet Army in the battle of Moscow was pushed into the background. Most of the speeches were devoted to the causes of the war in the Pacific and the significance of the United States ' entry into World War II. At the same time, both problems were clearly presented in a biased manner.

Retired Japanese Rear Admiral S. Toyami and West German historian P. Herde attempted to remove responsibility from Nazi Germany and militaristic Japan for unleashing the war against the United States. Following the concept put forward in the 60s by right-wing conservative historians of the West, both speakers argued that the Japanese government sought to settle disputes with the United States "without using military force" and was forced to attack Pearl Harbor allegedly only because of the intransigence of the American government, which took a "tough position". The" decisive push " to the beginning of the Japanese aggression in the Pacific, in their opinion, was the adoption of the Federal Law of the USSR. Roosevelt's decisions to freeze Japanese assets and impose an embargo on oil supplies to Japan (c. 17, 21, 40, 47, 50 - 51). In accordance with the tradition established in the conservative historiography of Germany, P. Herde also stated that the military - political alliance of Germany and Japan was aimed at "preventing the United States from entering the war" on the side of Great Britain (p.40). Both authors, without paying attention to the numerous data on Japan's preparations for an attack on the USSR in 1940-1941, claim that since 1939, Japan has been preparing for an attack on the Soviet Union. After the events at Khalkhin Gol, the Japanese military "did not have the slightest inclination to attack the Soviet Union" (pp. 45, 60-61).

The American historian G. Weinberg drew attention to the facts that refute the version of the "preventive-defensive" nature of the German-Japanese alliance in relation to the United States. He showed that since 1937 the Hitlerite leadership had been hatching plans for war against the United States, and since the spring of 1941 it had repeatedly promised the Japanese government its support in the event of a Japanese-American military conflict (pp. 74-75, 77-78). At the same time, Weinberg seeks to exaggerate the role of the United States in the war against the fascist powers. He writes that Japan's entry into the war in the Pacific was "the highest goal of German policy in 1941," and tries to interpret the attack of nazi Germany on the USSR as a kind of auxiliary action designed to "free Japan from all concern for the security of the rear" in the north and thereby "facilitate" its deployment of an offensive in the south (p. 76).

The frank desire to exaggerate the influence of the United States on the course of World War II in 1940-1941 is also characteristic of the West German historian Yu. The rover. Completely ignoring the evidence that up until May 1943 the United States and Great Britain failed to provide effective protection of transport traffic in the Atlantic Ocean from the actions of German submarines, 1 he writes that "the decisive turn in the battle for

1 For more information, see: World War II. Brief History, Moscow, 1984, pp. 328-331.

page 162

The Atlantic occurred in 1941" (p. 83, 103). This thesis is Yu. Rover tries to support the claim that the United States began to provide significant assistance to the British Navy in organizing the protection of ocean communications even before the official entry into the war against the fascist bloc (p. 102). However, at the same time, he bypassed the fact that the US Navy, according to American historians, in 1941 was "completely unprepared (both from a material and moral point of view) for the deployment of anti-submarine operations" and for a long time suffered significant losses in the Atlantic from enemy submarines .2
In other words, bourgeois historians try to claim that the US entry into the war had a "decisive influence" on its course, was "the beginning of the end for the Axis countries" (p. 54). C. Luttichau (USA) goes so far as to say that the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor put an end to the military threat to the USSR from the Japanese side (p. 55).

The speculations of bourgeois historians were duly answered by the head of the delegation of Soviet historians, Academician A. M. Samsonov. He pointed out that during the battle of Moscow, the Japanese militarists, having concentrated almost a million Kwantung army near our Far Eastern border, were only waiting for the right moment to attack the USSR. They did not dare to take this step only because the Soviet command, even in the most difficult days of the struggle against the German Wehrmacht, did not go to weaken the Far Eastern Army (pp. 60-70). A. M. Samsonov also refuted G. Weinberg's statement about the "threat" to Japan from the USSR. Unable to argue on the merits of the question, Mr. Weinberg said that "from the German point of view, the Japanese were afraid (of the USSR - E. K.) regardless of whether there was a real threat or not" (p. 118).

The events in the Mediterranean theater of Operations were devoted to the speeches of J. R. R. Tolkien. Somerville (Great Britain) and A. Santoni (Italy). J. Somerville mostly limited himself to describing some aspects of the British offensive in Cyrenaica (November 19, 1941-January 10, 1942), as well as their retreat (January 21-February 7, 1942) under the blows of Italian-German troops to the borders of Egypt. Its report does not contain any generalizing estimates of the significance of the Mediterranean Theater of Operations in the period under review, and does not provide data on the composition and number of forces and assets involved there.

Unlike J. R. R. Tolkien, Somerville A. Santoni focused on broad "generalizations". From an ultra-right, pro-Nazi perspective, he criticizes the policies of fascist Italy in 1940-1941, praising the" effectiveness " of the German Wehrmacht. The attempts of the Italian fascist leadership before 1941 to carry out aggression on its own, dictated by its desire to maintain some degree of independence and not finally become completely dependent on its stronger ally and competitor, German imperialism, A. Santoni regarded as the main "cause of Italian military defeats", which, in his words, had "catastrophic consequences". consequences for the Axis countries", since Hitler in 1941 was forced to send "significant forces" to help Italy, which could be used in a "preventive war against the Soviet Union" (p. 149, 166).

This is nothing more than a retelling of conjectures from Hitler's "political testament", in which the Nazi Fuhrer, trying to shift responsibility for the defeat of fascism by the Soviet Army to Mussolini, argued that if the Wehrmacht had not rushed to the aid of Italy, which suffered a defeat in the Greek campaign in the autumn of 1940, the success of the war against the USSR would have been ensured. West German historians, who are well aware of this document, pretended not to notice where A. Santoni borrowed "his" version. Only E. Eckel found it necessary to point out to the overzealous Nazi advocate that Hitler's war against the USSR "was from every point of view an unprovoked, offensive war" (p.171). A. Santoni's statement about the" significant forces " of the Wehrmacht sent to help Italy is also incorrect. In the autumn of 1941, there were only 65,000 German soldiers in North Africa, while Army Group Center, which was advancing on Moscow, had almost 30 times as many of them. At the same time, it should be borne in mind that at that time the Soviet-German front was active.

2 Morison S. Battle of the Atlantic (September 1938-May 1943). Moscow, 1956, p. 250.

page 163

60-thousandth Italian expeditionary force.

The inconsistency of various versions put forward by bourgeois historians in order to exaggerate the role of the Pacific, Atlantic and Mediterranean theaters of military operations is particularly evident in the light of the report published in the collection of Academician A. M. Samsonov's "Battle of Moscow". It unfolds a majestic panorama of the heroic struggle of the Soviet people against the overwhelming forces of the fascists in defensive battles in the summer and autumn of 1941. The author pays great attention to the socio-political factors that influenced the outcome of the battle. "Victory at Moscow," he writes, "would have been impossible without the advanced socialist system, the humane and progressive ideology inherent in it, the unity of all nations and nationalities, a planned economy, and the support of the front by the entire population in the rear" (p.195).

In the report of A. M. Samsonov, it is emphasized that in the battle of Odessa, the German-fascist plan for a "lightning-fast" war against the USSR finally collapsed, the Wehrmacht was dealt a crushing defeat, which dispelled the legend of its invincibility. K. Reinhardt, an employee of the Military Historical Research Department of the Bundeswehr, had to admit the correctness of this conclusion. According to him, the German Wehrmacht near Moscow "lost the aura of invincibility", suffered huge losses, which "in the future it was impossible to make up" (p. 207). At the same time, K. Reinhardt tries to defend the hackneyed version of bourgeois historiography about the" fatal miscalculations " of Hitler, who allegedly, contrary to the wishes of his generals, did not strive for a "quick military victory", underestimated the significance of the offensive on Moscow, etc. (p. 200).

Among the materials of the symposium, A. M. Filitov's historiographical report attracts attention. It shows the absurdity of attempts in bourgeois literature to treat the battle of Moscow as one of the "ordinary events of the war", refutes various arguments in favor of the far - fetched version that the Soviet Army was able to disrupt the German - fascist "blitzkrieg" only thanks to the supply of weapons from the United States (pp. 211-214).

The collection ends with the section "Generalizing discussion on the topic" The turn in the War: December 1941". However, unfortunately, the content of the section does not correspond to its title. The main place in it is given to the arguments of the bourgeois historians A. Hillgruber, G. A. Jacobsen, G. Deutsch and others. on the goals of the belligerent powers in World War II. They try to attribute to the USSR certain aggressive aspirations in Europe, Asia, and even Alaska, accuse it of "exporting the revolution", and so on. 231, 234 - 235, 241, 250). Soviet historians gave a worthy response to these slanderous attacks. They convincingly showed that the U.S.S.R., in the war imposed on it, pursued just, liberating goals, and consistently advocated the observance of the right of every nation to establish such a social system and to choose such a form of government as it considers appropriate.

The materials of the collection show that bourgeois historians do not weaken their attempts, on the one hand, to belittle the significance of the outstanding victory of the Soviet Army in the battle of Moscow, and on the other - to exaggerate the role of military operations of the Anglo-American armed forces in the Pacific and Atlantic, where the strategic initiative was still firmly held by the states of the fascist bloc. The speeches of Soviet researchers contributed to exposing falsifiers, strengthening the authority of Marxist-Leninist historical science, and establishing the truth about the decisive contribution of the USSR to saving humanity from the threat of Fascist enslavement.

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