A. M. VASILIEV
Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences
D. I. VINITSKY
Our sobkor in Egypt
Keywords: Egypt, June 30 revolution, Mohammed Morsi, Muslim Brotherhood, Abdel Fattah al-Sisi
June 30, 2013... This is a new date in the history of Egypt, which will soon appear in textbooks as an example of an attempt to overcome the division of Egyptian society, to combine mass demonstrations of one half of it with the use of military force to avoid civil war. At the same time, this day will be another eloquent evidence of how much the choice of a political regime is linked to the position and actions of the armed forces. Once again, as during the revolutionary events of January-February 2011, the role of the army as an element of the state structure in the Pyramid Country was not limited to the professional framework.
Egypt's Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi explained its actions to oust President Mohamed Morsi in his first speech since the June 30 revolution: "The Egyptian armed forces, as a whole, including all military personnel and commanders, did not hesitate to remain in the service of the people and support their free will." so that he can choose what is best for him, as his will reflects his collective intelligence and wisdom...
The Egyptian economy, due to (political) ambition, mismanagement, and unwillingness to recognize the right of future generations, has reached a risky point of destruction... Social standards and living conditions of the majority of the population have fallen catastrophically, accelerating the growth of social tension, which was repeatedly multiplied by weak political and economic forecasting, lack of governance, and incorrect decisions, while reform attempts for various reasons did not bring visible success. The intellectual and cultural levels that have long made Egypt a model for the whole world, the country's influence and status in the region have weakened, affecting the role of the Egyptian state in the international community. " 1
These facts, stated by the head of the military department of Egypt, caused a protest of a significant part of Egyptians who, after the revolution of January 25, 2011, felt a taste of freedom and, believing in their own strength, hoped for changes for the better, believed in improving their material and social situation in the near future. A new force - the Muslim Brotherhood Association (ABM), previously semi-banned, but the most organized, with support among the population, preaching values close to the people, and its representative as president, Mohammed Morsi, was entrusted with running the country. Although a little more than half of the voters voted for Morsi, he became the legally elected president and positioned himself as " the president of all Egyptians." Behind him was a powerful, extensive organization that made so many great promises.
However, less than a year later, many Egyptians began to think that they were simply being deceived, that their dreams of long-awaited improvement in life were not just melting away, they were stolen. "What has he (Morsi) done for us? - asked a young Egyptian woman who came to at-Tahrir Square to participate in peaceful protest demonstrations on June 30. "In his first year in power, he did absolutely nothing for the Egyptians. We have constant problems. We can't fill up our cars with gas. We suffer from constant power outages. Some essential medicines are almost impossible to find. And the economy is so broken that we have to think about whether we will get paid or not."
All revolutions have always led to economic decline. Recall that ration cards were introduced for the first time in history in half-starved revolutionary Paris-the capital on the eve of the revolution.-
the oldest country in Europe. It is difficult to say how any other political force would have coped with solving the accumulated problems, but once the power was in the hands of the "brothers", they were responsible for everything, and they were blamed for all the troubles. Mohamed Hasanein Heikal, a prominent Egyptian journalist and well-known public and political figure, said in a television interview that the past year has clearly demonstrated "the inability of the ABM to take responsibility for governing the country, and it is time for it to leave the stage."
A MEASURE OF REVOLUTIONARY ACTIVITY
After the election of Morsi as president, his policy pitted one part of society against another, and there was indeed a tendency to monopolize power, to the birth of a "new pharaoh". The President has effectively concentrated all the branches of government - legislative, executive, and judicial-in his hands. Recall that on November 22, 2012, Morsi issued his Constitutional Declaration, which allows him to issue "any decrees aimed at protecting the revolution", which cannot be challenged in court.
During the presidential election campaign, Morsi made many promises, the implementation of which was linked to the economic development plan proposed by the "brothers", which was loudly called "Ennahda" ("Revival"). In fact, this plan was a continuation of the liberal economic policy of the government of former President Hosni Mubarak, which proved its worth even during the global financial and economic crisis. But in the Islamic refraction.
Morsi promised to fight poverty and unemployment through Islamic" alms " - zakat, charitable loans, expansion of Sharia-oriented banking services and the introduction of Islamic bank bonds - sukuk. However, these measures have not been implemented in the daily banking activities and life of Egyptians.
Another promise was to raise $200 billion. in the form of foreign direct investment - a clear populist exaggeration, designed for the gullible. But in the first 9 months after the elections, only $1.4 billion came to Egypt, which is only $200,000 more than in the same period of the previous year, the heaviest after the first revolution. Unemployment in the fast - growing country increased to 13.4% in Q1 2013.2 and among Egyptian youth aged 15 to 29, it reached 77%3, although these figures were lower at the time of Morsi's inauguration. In 6 months, the economy lost 180 thousand jobs. Notably, as of 2010, the official unemployment rate in Egypt was about 8% and was lower than in the United States, France, Spain, Poland, Hungary, and Turkey, although it did not reflect hidden unemployment and part-time employment.
The fall in the exchange rate of the Egyptian pound against the US dollar (January 2013-6.2: 1, June 2013-7.1: 1), interruptions in the supply of diesel fuel caused a collapse in domestic consumer prices. The annual inflation rate jumped to 8.2%, primarily affecting the price of basic necessities, which is extremely sensitive for the majority of Egyptians living in poverty or on the edge of poverty. Chronic queues at gas stations, lack of domestic gas caused increasing irritation.
In addition, the regime has failed to gain support and credibility from national businesses. The ban on leaving the country for members of the Naguib Sawiris family, the richest and most influential Coptic business family (in 2012, Forbes put him on the 2nd place in the list of the richest people in Egypt [$2.7 billion]4), freezing the assets of 23 of the most influential businessmen who have not yet been brought to justice for certain crimes Mubarak-era crimes , as well as one-sidedness in making decisions on fundamental economic issues, forced Egyptian businessmen to suspend their business activities and distance themselves from the regime. It is not surprising that the conciliatory efforts made by the influential brotherhood businessman Hassan Malek, the right-hand man of the" grey cardinal "of the Hash Shatyr organization, to return to Egypt businessmen who chose to stay abroad after the" January 25 revolution", were also unsuccessful.
To mitigate the economic crisis, Morsi tried to get loans totaling $30 billion from the EU, the United States, Russia, and Arab countries. However, his efforts were unsuccessful. No "Marshall Plan" could be proposed by the West, which was immersed in a creeping crisis.
The protracted negotiations with the IMF did not help to change the situation either. A deal with him could restore the confidence of investors and level the concerns of donors generated by a period of instability. During negotiations with the IMF, the Egyptian government pledged to reduce subsidized subsidies and increase taxation. The ministers promised to reduce the list of subsidies for basic necessities from 25 to 6. However, the agreement was never finalized, because the Egyptian authorities were afraid to implement socially sensitive reforms, namely, to drastically reduce subsidies, which the Fund demanded. And without reducing subsidies, it was impossible to create a healthy market economy.
Gold and foreign exchange reserves, the total volume of which reached $16 billion by June 2013, were increased only due to injections from Qatar ($3 billion). in April 2013 and previously allocated $4 billion) and Libya ($2 billion)5. But we must not forget that these subsidies were not gifts at all. The external debt, which had to be repaid annually, was growing. But the situation is even more complicated around the domestic debt, which reached 1.5 trillion EEG. pounds (about $217.8 billion), or 87.5% of GDP in 2012-2013 fin. year 6. A year earlier, this amount was 1.1 trillion eeg. pounds, or 68.3% of GDP, and in 2011 the domestic debt was even less - 861 billion eeg. pounds, or 55.8% of GDP. There was also a positive development: according to official data, GDP growth for the first 9 months of M. Morsi's stay in power amounted to 2.2%, compared to a year earlier, for a comparable-
However, it corresponded to 1.8%. But for Egypt, with its rapidly growing population, such "growth" did not solve any problems.
The instability of the situation was compounded by insecurity and increased crime. According to the Egyptian Interior Ministry, in 2012 the number of homicides across the country increased by 30%, thefts and robberies-by 250%, and kidnappings - by 45%. The police were clearly not up to their basic tasks.7
Thus, if the government of the Muslim Brotherhood managed to bring any changes to the socio-economic situation, they were only cosmetic in nature. The decisions taken by the Islamist government in the economic sphere were not transparent and unexpected, and often simply contradicted each other. Many people remember the effect of Morsi's decision to introduce a package of new taxes, adopted in December 2012 and canceled by the president himself only a few hours later.
June, the last month of the Islamist president's stay in power, was the most disastrous, overwhelming the patience of Egyptians. Now the political blunders of the Muslim Brotherhood have already taken their toll. The key EGX30 index of the Egyptian stock exchange fell by 16% overnight amid growing tensions between Cairo and Addis Ababa over the construction of a giant dam on the Ethiopian section of the Nile, as well as the decision announced by M. Morsi to freeze relations with Syria.
Of course, some of the internal problems were objective, one might even say systemic, but in specific circumstances, the blame for all the troubles was laid personally on the president and the Muslim Brotherhood organization.
Significant foreign policy miscalculations should also be attributed to the attempts of the radical part of the Egyptian "brothers" to export the Islamic project to the Persian Gulf countries. The euphoria of their victories in Egypt and Tunisia, and certain successes in Jordan and Morocco, turned them against the monarchies of the Persian Gulf. In 2013, a group of Egyptian Islamists was arrested and put on trial in the UAE, planning, according to the authorities, to "carry out a coup d'etat in the country" and "extend their activities to Saudi Arabia"8. Brotherhood cells have been uncovered in other Arab States. In 2003, the Brotherhood denounced the consent of the Arabian monarchies to the invasion of Iraq by the United States and its allies. Since then, the split between the former "friends" has deepened. All this causes noticeable tension in relations between the Gulf monarchies and the"brothers".
It is important to recall that in the "first democratic" presidential election, 13.2 million out of 51 million voted for Morsi. That is, only a quarter of eligible Egyptians are eligible to vote. Therefore, it can hardly be said that he was "popularly elected". The presidential election also showed that Islamists do not have universal support in Egypt. And this is the main "weak point" of M. Morsi and Egyptian Islamists of various persuasions. He won only because his opponent in the second round was the former Prime Minister of the bankrupt regime of H. Mubarak.
ARMY AND REVOLUTION
In Egypt, the armed forces have traditionally been an essential part of both the State and social structure. Not a single inhabitant of the Pyramid Country could imagine their state without an army. But while many readily accepted her leadership role, the brothers believed that in peacetime her place was in the barracks. The conflict dates back to the time of the royal regime and took the form of an uncompromising confrontation during the reign of Gamal Abdel Nasser.
During the three decades of Hosni Mubarak's rule, the largest army in Africa (440 thousand people) significantly strengthened its presence in the state apparatus and in the economy of Egypt. From 1997 to 2010 The budget of the Egyptian armed forces increased from $2.6 billion. up to $4.5 billion. Over the past 40 years, the Egyptian army has received annual aid from the United States in both arms supplies and "cash" in the amount of $1.3 billion. 9 The army leadership was and still is entitled to dispose of the profits of enterprises of the "military economy", the share of which in the country's GDP is high. The Islamist authorities, adopting a new constitution in December 2012, were forced to take these factors into account and retain all military privileges. It seemed that a compromise had been reached with the army.
"Market relations" and the arrival of new owners, however, dictated their own conditions. M. Morsi and the "brothers" behind him began to look at the economic spheres under the control of the military, which caused an extremely negative reaction from generals and officers.
In addition, since the first weeks of his tenure as president, Morsi has taken a number of steps to make the army command more or less loyal, if not to bring the armed forces under control. First of all, he dismissed the Minister of Defense, Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi, the chief of the General Staff, General Sami Anan, and some lower-ranking generals.
And already on August 12, 2012, the president appointed Major General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi as Minister of Defense and, bypassing the rank of Lieutenant General, awarded him the rank of colonel General.
Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was born in Cairo on November 19, 1954. After graduating from the Egyptian Military Academy in 1977, he served in the Infantry. He rose to the post of commander of the mechanized forces. He held the position of head of the Information and Security Department of the Ministry of Defense secretariat, was a military attache in Saudi Arabia, and headed military intelligence. In 2006, General Al-Sisi was trained at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania (USA).
General al-Sisi was known as an ideological supporter of the Islamists. Rumor has it that his uncle was one of the founders of the Egyptian ABM. However, the paths of the military command and the Islamists diverged. In June 2013, al-Sisi abruptly changed his position, supporting opposition demonstrators who opposed Islamists.
COURSE OF EVENTS
Since June 26, almost the entire country has been rocked by bloody clashes between opponents and supporters of President Morsi. On June 29, civil society activists who organized the Tamarrud ("Riot") youth movement said they had collected 22 million signatures from Egyptian citizens demanding the resignation of the head of state. The opposition accused Morsi of monopolizing power by the Muslim Brotherhood, accelerating the Islamization of the country, failing to fulfill his election promises and failing to govern, which caused the economic and political crisis in Egypt.
On the morning of June 30, the anniversary of the inauguration of Mohamed Morsi, several million Egyptians took part in protests across the country (according to the opposition - up to 30 million) demanding his resignation. On the night of July 1, opponents of the President seized the headquarters of the Muslim Brotherhood Association in the capital's Muqattam district.
In these dramatic circumstances, the armed forces command, in an effort to prevent a civil war, issued an ultimatum to politicians: resolve the political crisis within 48 hours.10 If this requirement is not met, the military promised to take its own measures to stabilize the situation in the country.
In response, Morsi said that despite all the opposition's calls to resign, he will remain in office in accordance with the country's constitution and will defend the constitutional legitimacy "at the cost of his life." The main culprits of Egypt's problems, he called supporters of the regime of ex-President Hosni Mubarak, who, according to him, in every possible way sabotage the reforms of the new, legally elected government. Only on July 3, realizing the gravity of the situation, Morsi proposed the creation of a coalition government and an independent commission to amend the constitution. However, the flywheel of the revolution could no longer be stopped.
On the evening of July 3, Egyptian Defense Minister Abdel Fattah al-Sisi made a televised address to the nation, saying that Mohamed Morsi is no longer president. He also said that the Constitution is temporarily suspended and that it will be amended "in accordance with the demands of the people."
General al-Sisi spoke on behalf of the council, which, in addition to him, included: the leader of the liberal opposition, Mohammed al-Baradei, the chief imam of the al-Azhar Mosque, Ahmed al-Tayyib, Coptic Pope Theodore II. At the same time, al-Sisi stressed that the military does not intend to rule the country, but is trying to prevent a civil war in Egypt. The Defense Minister promised to create an interim coalition government and a commission to draft a new constitution and prepare for early presidential elections in the near future.
The military offered the deposed president to" voluntarily " resign in exchange for security guarantees and judicial immunity. However, Morsi did not accept this offer and was placed under house arrest. Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohammed Badia, his deputies Rashad al-Bayoumi and Kheirat al-Shatir, Parliament Speaker Saad el-Katatni and about 300 other activists were arrested. Islamist-controlled media outlets were shut down.
Noteworthy are the positions taken by organizations that are ideologically close to the Muslim Brotherhood. While the Islamist group Al-Gamaa al-Islamiya has said it supports President Morsi, the conservative Islamist movement Salafi Appeal, led by the Al-Nur political party, has called for early presidential elections in the country and the formation of a technocrat government that will prepare parliamentary and presidential elections as soon as possible.. Note that the Salafists were competitors of the "brothers" in the political field of Egypt and enjoyed the support of Saudi Arabia. Numerous reports suggest that the military coordinated its actions with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
The speed, logic and thoughtfulness of the actions that followed the announcement of the resignation of the head of state give strong grounds to assert that the "events of June 30" were carefully planned. In order to minimize accusations of a military takeover, Adly Mansour, Chairman of the Supreme Constitutional Court, was appointed Acting President for the transitional period late on July 3. This, on the one hand, demonstrated, first of all, the return of respect for the judicial system, which is very significant for the Egyptian people, which was trampled on by the former president. On the other hand, a signal was sent to the international community that everything that happens in Egypt from now on will allegedly comply with the letter of the law and comply with the norms of international law.
After taking the presidential oath of office on July 4, 2013, Adly Mansour delivered a brief speech welcoming the army, the judiciary and the police. He also thanked the Egyptian media for "covering the failures of the previous regime" and praised the participation of all revolutionary forces in the "glorious revolution of June 30".
Soon, a new constitutional declaration was issued, defining the" road map " of the transition period. According to its provisions, parliamentary elections should be held two months after the amendments to the current constitution are approved by referendum (approximately in February-March 2014). Presidential elections are expected to be held one week after the parliamentary elections.
After brief but intense consultations, the Prime Minister's candidacy was agreed upon. It was 77-year-old liberal economist Hazem Bablaoui. He soon revealed the composition of the government, which included 34 ministers representing technocrats and secular liberals. Representatives of Islamists, despite invitations, refused to nominate their representatives to the Cabinet of Ministers.
It is worth mentioning two vice - presidents-Muham-
meda al-Baradei and Ziyad Bahaeddin. Both come from liberal backgrounds: the Dustour Party and the Egyptian Social Democratic Party, respectively.
Al-Baradei, who played a prominent role in both the "January 25 revolution" and the "June 30 revolution," was well respected in Egypt's pro-Western youth circles. In addition, he had extensive experience in international politics and enjoyed the confidence of its actors. It is not surprising in this regard that he was appointed curator of the foreign policy direction. "Most Egyptians were encouraged by al-Baradei's call for Morsi to step down voluntarily, as well as his active role in organizing the June 30 demonstrations. Therefore, it is quite natural that now he should have continued his mission and helped the revolution gain international recognition, " said Hassan Nafaa, a prominent Egyptian political analyst.
As for the 49-year-old Baha'eddin, his appointment as head of the economic unit marked the involvement of the most experienced and responsible practitioners in solving numerous problems in the economy.
General Al-Sisi became the first Deputy Prime Minister. According to analysts, this appointment meant recognition of the role of the army and al-Sisi personally in the "June 30 revolution", and also signaled that the military will play an active role in the Egyptian political arena in the foreseeable future and will be able to influence the government's course.
At the initial stage, the Government had three main tasks. "They consist of a planned transition to true democratic governance, restoring order to the streets and ensuring security in Sinai, as well as reviving the economy, "said Ahmed Sayyid al - Nagar, an economic analyst at the Al-Ahram Research Center. Hassan Nafaa specified these tasks, pointing out the importance of " preparing a new constitution in the next 6 months and holding free parliamentary and presidential elections."
THE STANDOFF CONTINUES
On July 19, 2013, Adly Mansour called on the people of the country for national reconciliation and dialogue, promising to " restore complete order, prevent chaos and violence in the country, defend the gains of the revolution and continue moving towards freedom and stability." At the same time, obviously referring primarily to Islamists, he noted that "the framework for national reconciliation is open to all political forces without exception."11
However, ABM rejected the possibility of compromise with the new authorities. According to analyst Kamal Zahran of the Suez Canal University, the Muslim Brotherhood considers only two possible scenarios for the situation in the country: Morsi's return to the al-Ittihadiyah palace and the transformation of Egypt into a militant Islamic state, or the Association will do everything possible to drag the country into a protracted and bloody civil war.
As events have shown, ABM leaders were determined to resist the new government. Their numerous supporters have already started protest demonstrations demanding the return of the "legally elected president". The clashes began immediately after the speech of the Supreme Mentor (murgiid)on July 5 ABM of Muhammad Badia. The first to break out was Sinai, where jihadists, who had accumulated considerable human, financial and military potential during the brotherhood's year in power, launched attacks on police patrols and military checkpoints. In Cairo, the most striking and bloody beginning of the clashes was an attempt to storm the headquarters of the Republican Guard on the night of July 8, when Islamists used weapons and Molotov cocktails, and the military opened fire to kill. As a result of the clash, more than 50 people were killed and almost 500 injured.
Simultaneously with calls for street riots and demonstrations, attacks on army and police units, the brotherhood made extensive use of modern media and telecommunications, as well as a number of foreign media outlets, primarily the Qatari-friendly Al-Jazeera TV channel and the American CNN. On screens in front of an audience of millions, they called themselves " victims of a military coup." The entire arsenal of influence on public consciousness, which was repeatedly tested, was used - from exaggerations and "clippings out of context" to openly edited shots of "reprisals and victims". Al Jazeera was soon banned in Egypt.
Mass demonstrations of support for the ousted president continued unabated and gradually escalated into sit-ins in the square near the Rabia al-Adawiya Mosque in the Madinat Nasr district of Cairo and in Nahda Square in front of the Cairo University in Giza.
These two squares became the center of resistance of Islamists to the new government. Many thousands of supporters of the ousted president were on them around the clock. Over time, the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood decided to turn them into defensive points and fortified areas and prepared for a long siege and repulse possible attacks by law enforcement and military police. Around them, paved sidewalks were dismantled, curbs were uprooted, and barricades and barriers were built around the perimeter. Soon weapons began to appear there, molotov cocktails were brought up, gas cylinders were buried in the ground, ready to be blown up. As a" human shield", the Islamists used women with young children who sat in squares all day long. There was no need to talk about any sanitation. Residents of the houses adjacent to the squares became targets of attacks, often direct aggression. There were reports of abductions of opponents of Islamists and torture, to which they were allegedly subjected.
Calls by the authorities to start a dialogue, stop strikes and violence have not been met with any response. It became clear that the very stability of the new government is under threat. A carefully planned operation to" clean up the squares " began on August 14. During the day, Egyptian security forces broke up rallies in Cairo. First, the square in front of the Cairo University was cleared, and by the end of the year, the area was cleared.-
Cheru is also occupied by a camp near the Rabia al-Adawiya Mosque in the east of the city. "Sweeps" were accompanied by numerous victims.
After the departure of Morsi's supporters, 23 corpses were found buried under the main rostrum on Rabia al-Adawiya. How these people died is still unknown, it was claimed that the bodies showed signs of torture.
Clashes continued for several hours in the nearby Es-Saa Square. Egyptian television footage broadcast live showed Islamists firing automatic weapons at security forces.
Following the crackdown, hundreds of armed Morsi supporters launched a series of attacks on police stations, government offices, infrastructure, as well as Coptic churches and schools. It is known that about 15 Christian churches, as well as Coptic homes, were attacked. Islamists staged a real massacre in the village of Kerdassa, located in the suburbs of Cairo near Giza. They attacked the police station and shot all the policemen who were there. According to official data, that day in Egypt, about 150 people were killed and about 1.5 thousand were injured. The Brotherhood claimed that 2,600 of its supporters were killed and tens of thousands were injured. According to the Interior Minister of Egypt, Mohammed Ibrahim, among the dead were 43 policemen, including 18 officers. Another 211 law enforcement officers were injured. Al-Baradei resigned.
The protests did not stop there, and the number of victims and casualties on both sides was constantly growing.
The role of the United States in the events before and after June 30 in Egypt is estimated by experts to be far from ambiguous. The range of these assessments is so wide - from planning to complete ignorance-that it is necessary to follow the reaction of American politicians in order to get any realistic idea of the White House's involvement in the Egyptian events. At the same time, we can safely say that the project of political Islam - Washington's cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood-largely met the interests of American foreign policy. The statements and actions of the US representatives confirm this assessment.
US President Barack Obama expressed deep concern about the removal of President Morsi and the suspension of the country's constitution, calling on the Egyptian military to return full power to the civilian government as soon as possible and not to subject Morsi and his supporters to prosecution. On July 16, US Undersecretary of State William Burns arrived in Cairo for talks with the Prime Minister and the new Vice President. He did not meet with the" brothers". The US has threatened to suspend military aid to Egypt if the change of government is deemed a coup. This happened a few weeks later. However, the reaction of the official administration of the White House is considered by many to be sluggish and not entirely definite. Much more remarkable and revealing is the" wave of emotions " of the US Senate.
From the moment of the" June revolution "until the violent crackdown on sit-ins in Rabia al-Adawiya and Nahda squares in mid-August, Republicans demanded that Obama cut off aid to Egypt if the new Egyptian authorities failed to quickly restore stability and return to a "democratic framework" that included, among other things, Mursi's release. and other ABM leaders from custody. According to Senators John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, the events in Pyramid Country were nothing more than a"coup" 12, which fell under the American law on stopping aid to any country where the military seized power through a coup.
The two senators traveled to Cairo in August and tried to force al-Sisi to "restore democracy and release Morsi and the other Muslim Brotherhood members who were arrested after the military coup." 13
The main conductor of this line "on the spot" was the US Ambassador to Egypt, Ann Paterson, who on the eve of recent events openly ignored the Egyptian secular-liberal forces, focusing the efforts of the American diplomatic mission in Cairo on strengthening Washington's relations with the ABM. She openly advised the brotherhood leaders on how to resolve the internal socio-political crisis, without taking into account the importance of reaching consensus with the opposition. It seems that her open support for the ABM through direct close contacts with Hash Shater may have given the "brothers" false hope that the American position will be a signal for the army and the opposition not to take any active actions against the legitimately elected president and his team.
Therefore, many political analysts see both the June 30 demonstrations and the subsequent events as a failure of American diplomacy in Egypt. Washington tried to "stay on its feet" after such a blow. But there was an impression that, as in Egypt, as in Syria and Iraq, Washington simply got lost, fell into the trap of its own propaganda. After all, democracy is not only an election, but also a specific policy after the election, and historical and civilizational factors interfered with its implementation.
As a result, the White House was dominated by fears that the events in Egypt and the prolongation of the period of instability as a result of the termination of material assistance will cause a "domino effect" throughout the Middle East and eventually affect Israel. The Obama administration was forced to tone down and avoid using the word "coup"in reference to Egypt in the future. The new head of American diplomacy, John Kerry, spoke in a different key, choosing his words carefully. The head of the State Department said that "millions of Egyptians have asked the military to intervene" to stop the country's slide into chaos, and "the Egyptian army restored democracy" when it removed the first legally elected president from power, "rather than taking power through a coup." 14
Egyptian observers believe it is obvious that the new re-
The revolution in Egypt confused Washington's maps and disrupted its plans. The first reaction of the White House was a mixture of indignation, hurt pride, and a desire for revenge and recovery of what was lost.
However, numerous external factors and the realization of the real threat of loss that came with time forced the United States to accept failure even more, urgently develop new tactics, not forgetting about strategic goals and interests.
The history of Egyptian-American relations shows that the strategic partnership between the two countries is based on several cornerstones that no political turbulence can move. First, the Egyptian military is the guarantor of preserving the peace treaty with Israel. Secondly, in geopolitical terms, relations between Egypt and the United States are closely linked by the Suez Canal, which is the main artery for the operational relocation of the American fleet from one region to another. Separately, it is worth recalling the military-technical cooperation, in which the bulk of the transactions planned for 2013 had already been implemented by the time of the revolution.
Since 1982, the United States has provided billions of dollars in aid to Egypt, much of which is spent on the needs of the Egyptian army. Or rather, to ensure that this army never tries to fight against the US strategic partner Israel. In other words, American aid to Egypt is the price of its leadership's loyalty to the United States and Israel.
However, the presence of Islamists in power in Egypt, even such relatively moderate ones as the Muslim Brotherhood, did not guarantee their loyalty to either the United States or Israel. And, of course, this also did not guarantee that the Egyptian army would be a conduit for American influence both in Egypt and in the Middle East region. In addition, Washington, Tel Aviv and the Arab monarchies of the Persian Gulf perceived Tehran's rapprochement with Cairo with great concern. Israel was also not happy with the rather substantial support that the Morsi administration provided to the Palestinians, more precisely, to the Hamas movement, the ABM branch in the Gaza Strip. After the" June 30 revolution", Hamas lost the support of its" big brother", the military closed the border with Gaza, and began destroying" secret " tunnels.
The reaction to the new round of the Egyptian revolution in the world was different. Some condemned him, others supported him, and there were some who took a neutral position.
UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said he was "following developments in Egypt with increasing concern", calling on Cairo to take into account the interests of all political forces when forming new authorities. 15 The African Union suspended Egypt's participation in the organization's activities until constitutional order was restored. 16 The League of Arab States unequivocally supported the revolution.
The EU's position was ambiguous and unclear. The Europeans were constantly in contact with the Egyptian authorities, trying to take on the role of a mediator in order to persuade the conflicting parties to dialogue. On July 17, EU High Commissioner for External Relations and Security Policy Catherine Ashton arrived in Cairo, where she met with Interim President Mysore, Interim Prime Minister Bablaoui, representatives of political parties and civil society, urging them to "implement democratic transformations as soon as possible". According to Ashton, "the European Union will help the Egyptian people on their way to true freedom and economic development in the future." 17
German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle called the events in Egypt a "serious precedent" that poses a threat to democracy in Egypt and creates negative consequences for the entire Middle East region18.
The most dramatic statement was made by British Prime Minister David Cameron and French President Francois Hollande. Hollande's statement, in which they actually supported the Muslim Brotherhood, condemned "the actions of the Egyptian authorities", and called for "the development of a common firm EU position on Egypt" 19. It seemed that London and Paris were trapped by their own rhetoric.
Ankara and Tehran have strongly condemned Egypt's regime change. The Turkish Prime Minister called for an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council in connection with the events in Egypt 20. The intervention of the military in the political process in Egypt caused extreme concern to the Turkish leadership. After all, in Turkey itself, 15 years ago, the army carried out a coup (albeit bloodless), overthrowing the Islamist government of Erbakan. Five years later, the moderate Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP), led by Erdogan, returned to power through the ballot box and gained a foothold on a wave of economic success. Hundreds of generals and officers were sent to prison. The Muslim Brotherhood even called its own political organization the Freedom and Justice Party and was sympathetic to the Turkish political model, although there were disagreements.
The removal of Morsi from power was a painful blow to Qatar's foreign policy, which has focused on supporting the Muslim Brotherhood around the world since the beginning of the series of "Arab revolutions". Qatar has been the main sponsor of the Islamist government, contributing billions of dollars to support it. Qatar, after the coup in this emirate, allegedly begins to adapt to the general line of the Gulf countries.
At the same time, the main monarchies of the Persian Gulf - Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Kuwait-expressed unconditional support for the "June 30 revolution". Nabil Abdul Fattah of the Al-Ahram Center for Social and Historical Studies commented very clearly on their position: "The Saudi authorities today view the ABM as a subversive movement and are concerned that the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and its supporters in the Arabian Peninsula are aimed at destroying the very fragile structure of society in the" oil crust-
the Levant" and the GCC as a whole and the destruction of the monarchies ruling in them." As a result, these three Arab states provided Egypt with a total aid package of $12 billion.
"The support of the world's largest oil exporter, the guardian country of the greatest Islamic shrines, has neutralized the pressure of the US and EU," said Anwar Sadat, leader of the Liberal Reform and Development Party. "It is also a direct attack on the regimes in Qatar and Turkey, which are now the mainstay of the international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood.
Analyzing the changes taking place in Egypt, we can conclude that the Muslim Brotherhood has overestimated its strength and readiness to take over the government of Egypt and ensure its stability and development. They underestimated the forces opposing them, despite the fact that for many decades they worked in different social strata of Egyptian society, creating a broad social base for themselves. Working underground is far from the ability to lead the state, which requires not only religious knowledge and ideological attitudes, but also practical experience, skills, consistency, the ability to combine rigidity and flexibility, find compromises, and win the trust of external partners.
Nevertheless, the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Association, once again finding itself in a semi-legal position in the opposition, has gained tremendous experience and is now studying its mistakes, mistakes, and will not give up its desire to regain power. Even with the persecution that has begun against her, 21 and the banning of her party, she can no longer simply be ignored or considered outside of political life. Only the complete destruction of this structure would allow it to be written off. But is it possible to destroy a movement that has an 80-year history of underground struggle and millions of followers?
At the same time, the semi-secular format of government, as demonstrated by millions of demonstrations in June, is closer to a significant number of Egyptians. An important stage will be the new parliamentary elections, which will demonstrate the likes and dislikes of Egyptians. It is difficult to predict how significant the representation of Islamists in the highest legislative body will be. It is obvious that the army will not leave the political scene. It will perform not only the functions of national defense, but also try to ensure the internal security and stability of the state.
Generals and officers simply cannot allow Islamists to return to power. Their personal safety and freedom are at stake. It can be assumed that a model of "managed democracy"is being established in Egypt.
The problem is how long the Egyptian military will retain the credibility of a significant part of the population. And this depends both on the real economic recovery of the country and on consistent democratic decisions.
The" June 30 revolution "in Egypt seems to have clearly demonstrated that the" Arab Spring " is not limited to one season or even one full annual cycle.
The process launched in the Middle East region is multivariate. It will be influenced by both internal, new and old socio-political forces of different colors and shades, various ideological attitudes, and external actors, global development.
Using the example of the Egyptian events, we can draw an intermediate conclusion that authoritarian tendencies have outlived their time in recent decades, but it is impossible to transform political foundations into democracy at the wave of a magic wand. This requires the transformation and development of a new type of socio-political structures, changes in the mentality and behavior of people.
The time has not yet come for new forces that are trying to radically change the social order. The transformation process has started. But it will take more than one or two years. Perhaps only future generations will create a "new Egypt". However, it is clear that the Egyptian people, like other Arab peoples, have changed and realized that it is in their power to choose their leaders and control their own destiny.
We can only believe that the common sense and wisdom of the people will allow them to determine the fate of their country with minimal violence and victims.
2 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-24/egypt-s-unemploy-ed-target-mursi-after-topplin g-mubarak-jobs.html
3 http://www.egyptindependent.com/news/final-issue-problem-unemploymenl-likely-wors en-egypt
6 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsConlenl/3/12/84709/Business/ Economy/Egypts-gross-domestic-debl-jumps-in-FY-.aspx
7 http://english.alarabiya.net/en/Ncws/middle-east/2013/05/04/Crime-rate-soars-in-post-revoluti onary-Egypt-amid-security-woes.html
8 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/j u 1/02/uae-sentences-coup-plotters-jail
10 http://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/2013/07/01/97001-20130701 FILWWW00471-egypte-1-armec-donne-48h-aux-politiciens-pour-Lrouver-un-accord.php
11 http://www.srnh.corn.au/world/adly-mansour-interim-egyptian-president-makes-first-tv-addre ss-while-cairo-braces-for-more-protests-20130719 - 2q7xl.html
13 http://thehill.eom/video/in-the-news/315751-mccain-graham-in-cairo-press-egypts-military-to -release-political-prisoners-
15 http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp/story.asp7NewsID= 45352&Cr=Egypt&Crl=#.UrCHbUArjMg
16 http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/75764/Egypt/ Politics-/BREAKING-African-Union-suspends-Egypt-from-all-act.aspx
18 http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/europcan-lcaders-warn-of-setback-to-democracy-af ter-egypt-coup-a-909447.html
19 http://www.foxnews.com/world/2013/08/16/hollande-cameron-call-for-strong-european-mess age-on-egypt/
20 htlp://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsConten1/1/0/79092/Egypt/0/Turkey-PM-urges-UN-Security- Council-meeiing-over-E.aspx
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