The events in question took place at a time when almost all of Mongolia was under the control of the Oirats, the Mongolian - speaking inhabitants of its western borders. The progressive weakening of the Khan's power after the defeat suffered by the Mongols from the Chinese at Lake Baikal. Buir-nor near the city of Inchan in 1388, contributed to the strengthening of the Oirats and eventually led to the loss of power by the Mongol Khans. The Oirat Esen of the Choros family, who held the post of taishi 1 at the court of Daisun Khan (1439-1452), actually ruled the country from 1440 to 1455. In the late summer of 1449, as a result of a successful military operation, he not only defeated a huge Chinese army at the Tumu post station southwest of Huailai in Hebei, after which this collision became known as the "Tumu incident", but also captured the Emperor Zhu Qizhen (Yingzong, 1435-1449).

Key words: Tumu incident, oirats, Esen-taishi, Zhu Qizhen, legitimacy of the supreme power, omens.

Overwhelmed by his unexpected good fortune, Esen made a fatal mistake - instead of immediately marching on Beijing, which had almost no one to defend, he withdrew his troops to the north, where he was waiting for an embassy from China, but it never came. Meanwhile, the Minsk capital was hurriedly deciding whether to rescue Zhu Qizhen from captivity or find a replacement. As a result, one of the Chinese appanage rulers, Zhu Qizhen's half-brother Zhu Qiyu (Jing-zong), on the advice of the talented commander Lu Qian, took the reins of power and removed the direct heir of the captive emperor from power, which was a gross violation of the Chinese rules of succession legalized by the founder of the Ming dynasty, Zhu Yuanzhang (1368-1398).2. According to the unanimous opinion of historians, only emergency, although not entirely consistent with the law, actions of Lu Qian saved the situation. Realizing his mistake, Esen moved to Beijing in October, but it was too late: the Chinese managed to organize an effective defense of the city, and the nomads did not achieve the desired goal. The defector advised Esen to demand a ransom for the captured emperor in

1 The title "taishi", derived from the Chinese da-shi (great mentor [of the Emperor]), was adapted outside the Great Wall of China as early as the Khitan Liao Empire era (916-1125). For more information, see [Huckcr, 1985, p. 481; Scrruys, 1977, p. 353-380].

2 According to the "Precepts of the Founder of the Reigning Ming Dynasty" ("Huang Ming zu yeyun"), compiled by order of Zhu Yuanzhang and personally edited by him, the throne was to pass to the eldest son from the main wife-the empress, and in case of his death or if he was not yet born, then to the next after the late emperor in seniority to his younger brother [Bokshchanin, 2008, pp. 50-51]. Zhu Qizhen himself met this criterion, as he was the eldest son of Emperor Zhu Zhanji (1425-1435). Given that by the time of his capture, he had a son by his main wife, the future Emperor Zhu Jiansheng (1464-1487), it was the latter who was supposed to inherit the supreme power in the fateful autumn of 1449.

page 5
in the amount of one hundred million bloopers3. Moscow officials refused. Esen's attempts to break through the defense were met with stubborn resistance from the garrison, as a result of which he was forced to retreat. Esen's March campaign against Beijing in 1450 also ended in nothing, after which the Oirat leader began negotiations for the transfer of Zhu Qizhen to his homeland, and in September of the same year the former emperor returned to Beijing. There, however, he was imprisoned in the Southern Palace of the Forbidden City, where he remained until the beginning of 1457, when his brother, due to a fatal illness, lost the ability to control the situation. Only then was Zhu Qizhen able to regain the Ming throne for a few more years (1457-1464). This is the outline of this tragic episode in Chinese history.

The Tumu incident has repeatedly attracted the attention of historians. A special article was devoted to him by the American sinologist Frederick Mote, based on the reports of important primary sources - "Yingzong Shilu", "Guo Jue", etc. [Mote, 1974, p. 243-272]. M. Rossabi, V. P. Sanchirov, D. G. Kukeev, and Longfei Feng wrote about Oirato-Chinese relations in the mid-15th century [Rossabi, 1970, pp. 31-39; Sanchirov, 2002, pp. 38-53; Sanchirov, 2008, pp. 53-63; Sanchirov, 2009, pp. 133-139; Kukeev, 2008(2), pp. 2-9 Kukeev, 2010, p. 40-46; Longfei Feng, 2009, p. 12-18]. These authors focus on the search for the reasons for the establishment of Oirat hegemony in Central Asia, the initial military successes of the Oirats and their subsequent failure in the fight against Mines. The events of the reign of Zhu Qiyu (1449-1457), or the Jingtai period, are traced step by step in the monograph of Philip de Heer (Neeg, 1986).

I will try to look at the Tumu incident through the prism of the traditional ideas of the peoples of the East about the cosmological role of supreme power. As you know, both the Chinese emperor and the leader of the nomadic state were considered sacred figures, isomorphic to the "world axis": both perceived and transmitted to the earth the beneficial power of Heaven, whose proteges they were. As long as there was a legitimate, Heaven-pleasing ruler on the throne, prosperity reigned in the lands under his control; on the contrary, the reign of an illegitimate, charismatic monarch led to failures in the entire universe. It was believed that the appearance of the protegee of Heaven in the world was accompanied by unusual, but necessarily favorable natural phenomena. For example, about the birth of the Ilkhanid Uljaytu in the spring of 1289, it is reported that at that time there was a terrible drought in the area of Merv and Serakhs, which greatly disturbed people, but at the time of Uljaytu's birth, a cloud appeared and it rained so heavily that the torrents of water knocked him down [Hafiz Abru, 2011, p.28].

In foreign policy practice, these ideas were refracted as follows. Thus, around 586, the Turkic khagan Shabolio (581-587) flattered in a letter to the Sui Emperor Gao-tzu (581-605):

"Recently, we have a favorable climate: wind and clouds come regularly. I think this is the influence of the ascension of the great saint emperor to the throne in China. ... Since there are no two suns in the sky, I think that only one lord can rule on earth! "The Emperor of Great Sui is a true emperor!" [Bulletin, 2002, pp. 52-53].

The cultural code of this message is as steppe as it is Chinese, and clearly speaks about the peaceful initiatives of the Turkic leader. The opposite example. When officials suggested that the Han Emperor Taizong (627-649) restore the Great Wall and send soldiers to the border, he replied: "At Tuque, despite the height of summer, frost fell; five suns rose at the same time and three moons shone at once; a red mist covered their pastures. The fact that this Hali does not do a good deed in the face of these natural disasters shows that he is not in awe of Heaven" [Bulletin, 2002, p. 68]. Khagan of the ancient Turks Kheli (620-630) otli-

3 In the Ming Empire, a silver ingot worth one liang was sold with a nominal value of 37.3 g [1... 1975, p. 183].

page 6
He had a restless temper and often attacked China, which made it clear to the Chinese that he was going against the will of heaven, and this fully justified a punitive campaign against Hali. Eventually, he was defeated, captured, and died in captivity, and the First Turkic Khaganate ceased to exist. According to Chinese beliefs, unusual natural phenomena were warned about this end of the kagan in advance, since social catastrophes are foreshadowed by unfavorable omens.

Descriptions of these signs abound in the Yingzong Shilu account of Zhu Qizhen's ill-fated campaign. The atmosphere of waiting for a tragic denouement is pumped up in it, like in a classic horror novel. In 1449. Zhu Qizhen was only 21 years old, and the chief eunuch of the Office of Rituals, Wang Zhen, was in charge of the affairs, and he started an adventure with a military expedition against the nomads. In any case, Chinese historiography places all the blame for what happened near Tumu on him personally. The reason for the speech was the hostile actions of Esen, irritated by the refusal of the Minsk court to reward all members of his embassy to Beijing in 1448, when about three thousand envoys arrived instead of two thousand. Esen attacked the fortified Datong area and then routed a 40,000-strong cavalry force led by Emperor Jing Yuan's relative. Then a huge army was assembled - about half a million people-and, despite the admonitions of the advisers, the emperor himself became its head. The campaign was planned by Wang Zhen as a triumphant march northwest from Beijing to Datong, and from there north to the steppe. The imperial troops were supposed to be returning through his home district. The barbarians were supposed to run away at the sight of the army, and the emperor would be Wang Zhen's guest of honor on the way back. On August 4, the army set out on a campaign.

However, things didn't go as planned almost immediately. As soon as the troops passed the Juyong Pass, contrary to all the norms of this season, heavy rains began to fall, with occasional storms. The officials accompanying the emperor applied to stop for a few days and wait out the storm, but Zhu Qizhen ignored their advice. The head of the Astronomy Department privately informed Wang Zhen that to continue moving was to go "against all astronomical signs", but Wang Zhen rudely replied: "If this is how it should be, then it is determined by fate." Ominous signs were observed almost every day. People were alarmed. On August 12, officials and the imperial entourage once again petitioned to wait out the storm outside the strong walls of Xuanfu City, which infuriated Wang Zhen. Not only did he not give the petition a go, but he also forced the respected officials to kneel down all day. Cao Nai, the chancellor of Hanlin Academy, called for the murder of the presumptuous eunuch sooner, but found no support. One day, just before dawn, a black cloud appeared, stretching from south to north. Then it slowly drifted away in a northerly direction. Two days later, the troops were passing through the valley where Esen had recently defeated the Chinese army. Unburied warriors lay everywhere. Horror seized the hearts of those who saw this. During the night, an ominous astronomical phenomenon was observed. On August 18, the army reached Datong, where dark clouds and strange behavior of the sun were observed. Wang Zhen was finally persuaded not to go to the Mongolian steppes, but he changed his plan: instead of taking a fairly safe direct route to the south, he insisted on returning by the old road, because he was afraid that such a huge number of soldiers would cause damage to the property of his relatives, whose lands lay in the way of the troops. The rain continued to fall, and strong gusts of wind continued to blow.

On the first day back, when they set up camp, a black cloud gathered and hung so low that it seemed to press down on people's heads, although the sky was clear outside the camp. Soon, a thunderstorm broke out and lasted all night, causing fear and panic. The next nine days passed relatively calmly, although the weather did not improve, the Chinese troops were returning home, and suddenly on the tenth day (August 30) news came that the rear guard was completely defeated by the Mongol-Oirat army.

page 7
cavalry. A new army was urgently sent to cover the rear, but it also died that evening. On the last day of August, the imperial troops reached the Tumu post station and encamped near it. Intelligence reported that there were enemies on all sides. The Emperor was advised to withdraw immediately to the inner line of the Great Wall, but Wang Zhen declined this reasonable suggestion, fearing for his straggling baggage train, and threatened to kill the adviser. Meanwhile, the rain had stopped and people were getting thirsty. Attempts to dig wells did not lead to anything: the water was too deep. Someone said that there was a river nearby, but it was impossible to approach it - there was a dense barrier of Esen's soldiers between the river and the Chinese troops. Zhu Qizhen's army was completely blocked and suffering from thirst.

There was still hope for a successful outcome of the negotiations, but Wang Zhen allegedly played a fatal role here as well. The next day, September 1, the eunuch took command on his own authority and ordered to cut through the enemy's ranks. The nomads promised to spare the lives of those who surrendered, and many threw down their weapons. Trying to escape, they ran straight at the Mongol swords. A relentless beating of the Chinese troops began. About half of the personnel were killed, and many Chinese were captured. Almost all the generals and dignitaries were killed. It is believed that Wang Zhen was hacked to death by the emperor's entourage. Zhu Qizhen sat down on the ground in the midst of the general chaos. A shower of arrows killed most of his entourage, but he was miraculously unharmed. Perhaps this is where the legend of the Ming Emperor's invulnerability to weapons was born (see below). Having guessed that he was an important person, the steppe people took Zhu Qizhen to Esen, who could not believe the unexpected happiness that had befallen him [Mote, 1974, p. 254-263].

In the light of traditional Far Eastern historiography, the political conflict of 1449 acquired a mystical connotation, as reported by both Chinese and Mongolian sources. According to the Ming Shi ,when Esen once had "evil intentions" against Zhu Qizhen, thunder killed the horse under him (an indisputable sign of the Sky's discontent!), and the tent in which the captured emperor lived was surrounded by a wonderful glow (Pokotilov, 1893, p.68). This radiance, which resembled a rising dragon, appeared to Esen whenever, after the failure of the Mongol-Oirat troops near Beijing, he turned his gaze to the emperor's tent (Pokotilov, 1893, p. 71). The symbolism of the dragon as the personification of imperial power in China is well known. However, this image is ambivalent: depending on the circumstances, the appearance of the dragon could serve as both a good and an ominous omen, which will also be discussed later. In this case, for Esen and his followers, it was a terrible warning, but for Zhu Qizhen, on the contrary, it was good news, undoubtedly indicating the protection of heaven. The Sky's protest against Esen's actions is quite clearly outlined here, and, in fact, it is difficult to expect any other modality in the presentation of these events from Chinese historians.

Let's now look at what steppe historiography reports about the capture of the Minsk emperor. In" Altan Tobchi " by Lubsan Danzan, facts also coexist with conjectures and miracles. First of all, it is claimed that Esen allegedly did not intend to fight with China at that moment - he was near the border simply because he was returning from a successful campaign against Jurchen, but, having met the Chinese army, he took the fight. During this campaign, his relative Esen Sami dreamed that he had captured the Emperor of China. Esen Sami told Esen-taishi about this, to which he replied: "May the Hagan be captured! If you capture it, I'll give it to you!" [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 269]. The Hagan, i.e. the supreme ruler of the state, is called Zhu Qizhen, which in itself is significant. Lubsan Danzan wrote his work in the middle of the 17th century, when Mongolia was not a single whole, being divided between the Genghisids and in addition was gradually absorbed by the Manchus. The former single supreme authority (as well as

page 8
the former imperial ideology) did not exist in the country for a long time, but in the traditional Central Asian picture of the world, someone had to embody it. Before Ogedei's reign, the Mongols called the khagans of the Jin emperors, then the semantic center of the ecumene moved for them to Karakorum, and there could be no other bearers of this title, except for the all-Mongol ruler. Those who thought otherwise were subject to extermination. Now the role of the khagan was taken over by the Ming emperor (which in fact seems to be an innovation of the chronicler, but it could be true if we were talking about the Qing emperor), and Mongolia is recognized by its inhabitants as the periphery of the inhabited world. The transformation of Mongolia from the center of the universe to its outskirts was facilitated not only by the political situation after the fall of the Yuan, but also by the rooting of Buddhism in the Mongolian culture, thanks to which the kingdom of Magadha (V century BC - VI century AD) in northern India became such a center for the Mongols, as well as earlier for the Tibetans. Vanchikova, 2001, p. 90].

When Emperor Zhu Qizhen was actually captured in a military encounter, which the chronicle reports rather briefly, the Oirat leader fulfilled his promise and gave the noble prisoner to Esen Sami. However, at first they allegedly tried to take his life, but nothing came of it: "The Hagan was pulled out of the pit, and when they began to cut him, his body did not give in, and the sword broke into small pieces that fell [around]. When Hagan was thrown into the water, he did not drown, but remained on top. We couldn't kill him..."[Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 270]. As already mentioned, these mythical ideas may have emerged in the minds of nomads in response to the" miraculous " rescue of Zhu Qizhen in the crucible of a fierce battle near Tumu.

There are serious reasons to doubt that Zhu Qizhen was actually intended to be killed. It was much more useful to keep him alive for blackmail and ransom demands, as it really was. He was given a new name - Muhur Seguse, settled in a yurt and married to a Mongolian commoner Mulu Dzahata 4, who, according to rumors, had a child with him. The meaning of the Mongolian name of the captive has no generally accepted interpretation. Thus, X. Serruys believes that it means "Pockmarked guy" and could arise from the smallpox marks on Zhu Qizhen's body [Serruys, 1974, p. 321-323]. P. O. Rykin (personal message) does not agree with this reading and is inclined to think that the nomads gave the emperor the pejorative nickname " Stupid Slave". The latter seems all the more likely because the name of his Mongolian consort, if he ever had one, is most likely also a nickname in which the word Mulu may have been misspelled, and it should be read as Mulguu ("stupid, stupid"). Mongol history already knows similar precedents, when Genghis Khan sarcastically honored the last ruler of the Tangut state of Nanping, Wang Xian (1226-1227), with the nickname Shidurgu "Honest" [Kozin, 1941, § 267], and Ogedei called the Jin emperor Wanyan Shouxiu (1224-1234) "Servant" [Kozin, 1941, § 271].

Despite this humiliation, Lubsan Danzan highly appreciates the beneficial influence of the imperial person on the people and nature of Mongolia. Zhu Qizhen's charisma not only preserved him, but also illuminated everything around him: "When he lived there, there were no diseases among the people, no cattle deaths, no ice, no famine. They lived without suspecting that this was happening because the person who served them was Zhingtai-hagan. When he slept, light came out of his body" [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 271]. This information was analyzed by T. D. Skrynnikova, who pointed out the protective and regulatory nature of the ruler's charisma [Skrynnikova, 1997, p. 104], with which it is quite possible to agree. But if this is the case, why would the chronicler want to endow a foreign emperor with supernatural qualities and recount events

4 "Min Shi" reported that Esen was going to marry the prisoner to his younger sister, which, perhaps, is much more in line with reality. The emperor refused [Kukssv, 2008(1), p. 28].

page 9
from a pro-Chinese perspective? Perhaps the fact is that Lubsan Danzan himself was a Chinese, as some researchers think, for example, V. Haissig (cit. by: [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 25])? However, the language of the chronicle does not contain the inevitable Sinisms (Orlova, 1984), and the reason for the exaltation of Zhu Qizhen by the learned Lama remains unclear.

Nevertheless, this fact suggests that the legitimate ruler, even without being in power for any reason, was considered to have a beneficial effect on the surrounding space. It is interesting to note that it also applies to other people's possessions. Probably, the episode with Zhu Qizhen contains the well-known idea of the universal power of the Chinese emperor, who was appointed by Heaven to rule the whole world and spread harmony even to the lands of the "barbarians" 5, and also once again emphasizes the illegitimacy of Esen, whose presence (and not Zhu Qizhen at all) should have had such a beneficial effect in the Mongolian nomads, if he had a legitimate right to power.

Similarly, the "Tumu incident" is described by the anonymous "Altan Tobchi" (Zolotoe Skazanie, 2005, p. 48-49). Other Mongolian sources, such as the writings of Lomi [Mopggol Borjigid, 1957, notebook 11, l. 6r-6v], Gombozhab and Rashipuntsuga [Gorokhova, 1986, p. 60], are stingy about the details of this incident and are silent about the miracles around the Chinese emperor, despite the fact that in general Mongolian historiography includes more legendary reports than the Chinese version. However, the Ordo prince and historian Sagan Setsen (1604 -?) shows the prisoner's influence on nomad life in exactly the opposite way; in his story, the Ming emperor brought only disasters to people and livestock.:

"The captured Daimin-Jintai Khan was given to the Asud Aliman-chinsan, giving him a Mola as a wife and naming him Tsagan-sheuse. When the latter took him home, there were frequent cases of starvation and disease in that country. One night, while Tsagan-sheuse was sleeping, he was seen by Alimanchinsan's maidservant, who got up to milk the cows. A red-yellow ray of light came out from under Tsagan-sheuse's eyelids, which rotated as the sun rotated. She told Khansha Akhaldai-aga about it. Then everyone saw it, and they were surprised. "This is a man of great destiny. After we detained him here, trouble began to occur, and now he has shown signs that are different from an ordinary person. It must be returned, "[people began to say]. When they took Daimin-Jintai Khan away, the six thousand Ujeds were rewarded with the great yellow title of Daidu and treasures that were impossible to raise. From Molu, whom Jintai received as his wife in Mongolia, the son of Ju-Dagas was born, who is the Asud Talbai-tavnan" [Haadyn undesniyn erdeniyn tovch, 2011, p. 79].

Whose version is closer to the rumors that probably circulated in the steppe in connection with the capture of Zhu Qizhen? It seems that there is more reason to trust Sagan Setsen's version, as it easily explains Esen's decision to grant freedom to the Ming Emperor. It is possible that such rumors were spread by Esen himself, so as not to be accused by his subjects of incompetent disposal of the rare chance that fell to him. The danger that Zhu Qizhen supposedly posed to the nomads might be sufficient reason to get rid of him even without a ransom.

5 In principle, traditional Chinese thought limited the scope of the good power of the te emperor (yang) to China proper, outside of which, in the lands of the "barbarians", the laws of nature (yin) rule, according to which the moral qualities of the "barbarians"are formed. According to this scheme, the latter remain outside the limits of the world order implemented by the power of de (Krol, 2005, pp. 193-194, 212, 239, 243).

6 Communication III. Bira's claim that information about disasters caused by Zhu Qizhen is described in the anonymous Altan Tobchi (Bira, 1978, p.214) is a misunderstanding. Speaking about this source, the author for some reason refers the reader to the work of the same name by Lubsan Danzan, published in Ulaanbaatar in 1937 with numerous errors that greatly reduced the scientific value of this publication (for more information, see N. P. Shastina's preface to the Russian translation of Lubsan Danzan [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p.14-16]). At the same time, according to A.D. Tssndina, the manuscript "Erdenin Tobchi" by Sagan Setsen published in China in 1987 shows the presence of the captive Chinese emperor among the nomads as extremely beneficial for the people [Tssndina, 2007, p.70].

page 10
It is known that the failure to negotiate with the Minsk court did not directly cause the weakening of Esen's power in Mongolia, but, according to some historians, in particular T. Barfield [Barfield, 2009, p.192], it undermined his prestige in the eyes of the steppe leaders, since taishi did not justify their hopes for a good profit. Further political miscalculations led to his demise.

According to Lubsan Danzan, Zhu Qizhen wrote a note that he was in Esen's possession and secretly sent it to China among the wool that the nomads were sending for sale [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 271], while "Ming Shi" reports that Esen became attracted to Zhu Qizhen and sent envoys to Beijing to negotiate about his future fate. The senior censor Yang Shan (1384-1458), who was known to be a very clever man, arrived and pointed out to Esen the connection between natural disasters and wrongdoing: "The sky gives life, and you, Tai-shi, take it away; that's why storms and bad weather often occur in your country "[Pokotilov, 1893, p. 77]. It is clear that this is nothing more than sophistry. In China itself, blood often flowed freely, but China felt obliged to educate and educate "barbarians". That's not the main thing. Not being a Genghisid, Esen had no right to rule over the Mongols at all, and Yang Shan could have pointed out this reason for the climatic vagaries in his country with full justification. The senior censor knew who the leader of the victorious Mongol-Oirat army really was, because he called him "the leader of the Mongol-Oirat army".taishi, and not khan, and even more so not hagan, although later, when Esen dealt with Daisun Khan and still decided in 1454 to adopt the high-profile title "august great hagan of the great [dynasty] Yuan", at the Minsk court it was decided to refer to him in official letters as "hagan of the Oirats", and at the same time In other circumstances, he was called an Esen or Oirat Esen, without the title taishi (Serruys, 1977, p. 364; Kukeev, 2008(1), p. 28).

As noted above, in the light of the political views of both the Chinese and nomads, the illegal occupation of the throne, which was objectionable to Heaven, caused a negative reaction on its part, which was expressed in natural disasters, epidemics, enemy attacks and other misfortunes. In this case, the irony of fate was precisely the opposite: "storms and bad weather" pursued the legitimate Zhu Qizhen during his unsuccessful campaign, while the years of Oirat rule in Mongolia were not famous for any out-of-the-ordinary natural whims.8 However, there is no contradiction and violation of tradition here: being legitimate in itself, the emperor dragged China into an illegal enterprise, which angered the Sky. It should be remembered that we do not have accurate meteorological data on winds and precipitation in the area where the Tumu disaster was brewing, and we are forced to rely on chronicle data, the objectivity of which cannot be completely sure. It is likely that the endless series of bad omens, rainstorms, and storms appeared in the Yingzong Shilu precisely because the compilers of these texts

7 For more information, see [Hok-lam Chan, 1976, p. 1528-1531].

8 Dzut is mentioned only in 1454, when Esen assumed the title of Hagan and, contrary to the agreement, did not transfer the position of taishi to his associates. Esen's imperial claims were the cause of a violent civil strife, which, according to an eighteenth-century Mongolian historian. Rashipuntsugu was preceded by the murder of Bogun , one of the sons of the same Sursun of the Yongshisbu family who participated in the Esen war with China and was later killed by Esen for letting slip about the capture of the Ming emperor. Upon learning of the plot against Esen, Bogun allegedly said that the TS people planned the same evil that Epbeg Khan had once committed, because of which the Mongols were subordinated to the Oirats. Bohun's mother approved of these words, and his brothers caught up with him and killed him. "So the first evil was committed in revenge for the previous one," the chronicler summarizes and adds, "in that year the Oirats and Oghelets had a disaster - there was a big dzut" [Gorokhova, 1986, p. 61]. It is clear that dzuts, like other natural disasters, happened and happen against the human will and regardless of political events; this could be the case in this case. When reading Rashipuntsug's post, it seems that this author made strong zoot directly dependent on an unjust murder. However, the victim actually stood on the side of Esen.

page 11
The True Records did not approve of the eunuch's adventure, which was supported by the emperor.

In fact, Esen did not receive any benefits from his captive and returned him to the Great Wall. Finally, he allegedly arranged a farewell feast, during which he delighted the ears of the former emperor by playing a musical instrument, and ordered his wives and concubines to bring wine to the guests. Then, by his order, they built an earthen mound and placed Zhu Qizhen on it. Esen himself, his wives, children, and relatives worshipped him. After giving Zhu Qizhen a large amount of food supplies, the Oirat chief accompanied him for a half-day's journey. This farewell ended, according to the Chinese chronicler, with the friendly lamentations of the Oirats, who were grieving over the impending separation from the Chinese emperor [Pokotilov, 1893, pp. 78-79].

A few years later, in 1455, Esen fell in a feud and his state crumbled. However, the story didn't end there. The second stage of the drama, also accompanied by appropriate omens, was already being played out in China.

Confusing the chronology and calling Zhu Qizhen Hongxi and Zhu Qiyu Shindong, the 19th-century Mongolian historian Galdan writes:

"After five years, the Oirats returned the Hongxi Emperor. When he came, Shindong, his younger brother, said: "You are the rightful emperor, sit on the imperial throne." But the Hongxi Emperor, his brother, replied:: "I once caused the displeasure of heaven, continue to reign you." Saying so, I didn't agree. Therefore, Emperor Shindong reigned for another three years. He died after reigning only eight years. After his death, the Hunsi regained the imperial throne and became known as Tansun-hagan" (Galdan, 2012, p. 161).

This touching story about the brothers did not come out of nowhere, but it was only half true. Indeed, on September 16, 1450, while still outside Beijing, Zhu Qizhen dictated a decree in which he expressed happiness at his return from captivity, blamed himself for previous mistakes, and abdicated the throne [Neeg, 1986, p. 57]. Before entering the city, he confirmed his abdication [Neeg, 1986, p. 58]. It is quite possible that Zhu Qizhen gave up power without external pressure, and the very statement of abdication could be purely ritual and did not imply a real resignation. Such " recusals "were common in the political culture of the Middle State: citing their" weak te "and the resulting moral and ethical imperfection, applicants ceded the throne to their" more worthy " relatives, but in the end, after equally ritualized persuasions, they invariably ended up on it themselves. This practice is also known among the medieval Mongols. However, the fact that the ex-imierator lost his freedom almost immediately after his return gives reason to suspect that he was a serious competitor for Zhu Qiyu, probably had many supporters, and perhaps did not intend to spend his allotted time on the sidelines of state affairs. So instead of a throne or a hermit's hut, he was placed under house arrest in the Forbidden City.

The Chinese sources examined by F. According to De Heer, there is no doubt that Zhu Qizhen's brother either did not intend to return power to Zhu Qizhen, or, even if he was ready for this noble step (which was not typical of the Ming era), the dominant party at court could effectively stop it. Where, then, did Galdan get the information about Zhu Qiyu's proposals and why did he put it in his historical work? What grounds did he - a Qing official-have to demonstrate the nobility of a dynasty that had already passed away from the historical scene?

Identifying sources that could have been used by the compiler of "Erdenin Erihe", P. B. Baldanzhapov established that this passage follows the presentation of the Beijing Sagan Setsen list, which was also used by I. Ya.Schmidt [Geschichte der Ostmongolen, 1829, P. 293]. The Urga list duplicates this information [Haadyn undesniyn erdeniyn tovch, 2011, p. 105]. Sagan Setsen finished his work in 1662, i.e. more than a century ago.

page 12
200 years after the Tumu incident. Because of his anti-Qing sentiments, the Ordo prince could in principle reproduce information showing the emperors of the Ming Dynasty overthrown by the Manchus in a positive light. He himself lists the written sources he has used.

There are seven main sources [Bira, 1978, p. 253-254; Haadyn undesniyn erdeniyn tovch, 2011, p. 106]. Not all of them have survived to this day. Of these, Gushi Tsorji's Shastra called "The Essence of Everything Necessary", written between 1587 and 1620, in its fifth section devoted to the monarchs of India, Tibet, and Mongolia, brings the exposition only to the last Yuan emperor Togon-Temur (1333-1368) (Heissig, 1959, pp. 26-34). Of another work, the Shastra called The Amazing Coupon of Flowers, it is only known that its author was a certain sage Aksapata; judging by the name, obviously Indian, his work may have had a religious rather than secular historical character. The Chinese Shastra titled "A Flower Garden that Enlightens the Minds of Scientists "has also been lost. The following text, the well-known" Red Book " of Gunga-Dorje, was completed in 1346, and cannot be considered as a source of information about the Minsk emperors. "The White Story" and "The Yellow Story"do not contain the passage we are interested in (Shara Tuji, 1957; Baldanzhapov and Vanchikova, 2001). Finally, among the non-preserved works, there is also the "History of the Origin of the Khans compiled by Sharaba-Hutuktu", in which, based on its title, one might expect some information about the Oiratokitai conflict. According to V. Heissig, this text was written between 1617 and 1629 by the personal mentor of Ligden Khan of Chakhar (1594-1634) [Heissig, 1959, p.48-50].

Sagan Setsen drew information from a number of Buddhist treatises and from the above. When describing the history of the "small khans", he clearly resorted to the oral Mongolian tradition and, possibly, to some records kept by the Mongol princes [Bira, 1978, p.255]. This is indirectly confirmed by his great inaccuracy in reporting the length of Zhu Qizhen's stay in Oirat captivity: five years instead of one year9. Chinese historiography probably wouldn't have made such a mistake. Thus, there is reason to believe that the story of the mutual cession of the throne of Zhu Qizhen and his brother was based on Mongol traditions.

During the years of Zhu Qiyu's reign, under the motto of Jingtai ("Ennobled View"), the Middle Kingdom was constantly suffering from droughts and floods. In 1452, heavy rains caused flooding in the Huanghe and Huaihe Valleys in Henan, the northern and southern metropolitan areas, and Shandong. The next two years were also rainy, and in 1455 a drought struck Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, and Shaanxi. The following year, 1456, was remembered by contemporaries as a drought in some provinces and prolonged rains in others [The Cambridge History of China, 1998, p. 336-337].

Natural disasters unfolded against the backdrop of a general cooling of the climate in this part of Asia, and the cold and snowfall were not only recorded in court chronicles and writings of intellectuals, but were also captured in art, for example, in the scrolls of the painter Dai Jin (1388-1462)10, such as " Returning Home through the Snows "(1455) [Brook, 2010, p. 55-56]. The winter of 1453-1454 was particularly severe, with unusually heavy snowfall from Shandong in the northeast to Jiangxi in the center of the country. Opposite the mouth of the Huaihe, ice formed on the sea, and the population that lived in the valley of this river lost several tens of thousands of people due to the cold. In early 1454, Jiangnan experienced heavy snow for more than forty days. Cold and hunger have become commonplace.-

9 Even less accurate is the Shastra of Orunga, written at the court of Ligdsn Khan, where the emperor's captivity stretches for eight years (thus silencing his imprisonment in the Forbidden City). It also does not mention Zhu Qizhen's renunciation of power [Baldanzhapov and Vanchikova, 2001, p.128].

10 For more information, see: [Kravtsova, 2010, pp. 568-569].

page 13
the reason for the deaths of many people in Suzhou and Hangzhou. Prolonged snowfall, which killed livestock, was observed even in Hengzhou in southern Hunan [The Cambridge History of China, 1998, p. 336-337]. In April 1454, the emperor was informed that many people were frozen in the lower reaches of the Yangtze: up to 1,800 people in Changshu, on the southern bank of the river, and even more on the northern bank. In the spring, the Yangtze estuary (a funnel-shaped river mouth extending seaward) was covered with ice. The bamboo died out. The following winter, snow covered the land in the lower reaches of the Yangtze River with a meter layer. On Lake Taihu, ice blocked the harbors, which stopped navigation. Animals died in large numbers from the unusual cold. This period of severe cold weather ended in 1456, just before Zhu Qiyu's death [Brook, 2010, p. 54].

We cannot accuse Chinese historiographers of falsification: during the reign of Zhu Qiyu, a natural disaster occurred, which may have made a significant contribution to the further development of events in the Middle Kingdom, since the climate anomalies provoked by it destabilized Chinese society and most likely played into the hands of the organizers of the palace coup in 1457.

The reason for the prolonged sharp cold snap can be considered reliably established. Modern methods of reconstructing climate dynamics show that the" trigger " of the above processes (far from being limited to China itself) was a powerful explosion of the Kuvae volcano, located on one of the islands that now belong to the State of Vanuatu in the southwestern Pacific Ocean. In 1452, the volcano was virtually destroyed by an explosion, the strength of which is estimated at six points out of eight on the international scale of volcanic eruptions (eng. Volcanic Explosion Index). In place of the island, a caldera was formed - a funnel flooded by the sea. A huge amount of volcanic ash entered the atmosphere, which led to a drop in temperature on a planetary scale. The consequences of this eruption can be traced in very remote parts of the world [Gao et al., 2006, p. 1-11; Hoffmann, 2006, p. 62-71; Witter and Self, 2007, p. 301-318; Plummer et al., 2012, p. 1929-1940]. In particular, they can be found in stories about the fall of Constantinople under the onslaught of the Turks on May 29, 1453, i.e. about a year after the catastrophic eruption.

The death of Constantinople as the center of the Orthodox world was perceived by contemporaries as a universal catastrophe. The capital of the Eastern Roman Empire, which lasted for more than a thousand years, fell into the hands of gentiles. Of course, Christian witnesses of the fall of the" Eternal City " could "recall" in hindsight all sorts of ominous phenomena that predicted, in their opinion, the impending catastrophe, but some of these phenomena could actually take place due to the global impact of the shroud of volcanic ash on climate processes. For example, the Greek historian Michael Kritovul (c. 1410-second half of the 15th century), who attributed the success of the Turks to the divine will that man cannot resist, wrote about the signs as follows::

"They (the defenders of Constantinople) were no less disturbed by the strange events that were taking place at that time, which they took for divine signs: unusual tremors, earthquakes and celestial phenomena, thunder and lightning, terrible peruns, bright light, terrible gusts of wind, strong streams of rain and heavy rains, and in addition, the appearance of unknown stars: disorderly movement and disappearance of some and long standing with a plume of smoke others. And many other wonderful and extraordinary things pointed to the divine will, predicted a terrible future and great changes to come... " [Mikhail Kritovul, 2014, pp. 37-38].

Three or four days before the start of the battle, a large procession was walking around the city with the icon of the Mother of God, and suddenly the icon broke out of the hands of people and fell to the ground. Attempts to lift it for a long time remained futile: it is not known why the icon became incredibly heavy, and only after long shouts and prayers with great effort it was lifted off the ground and placed on the shoulders of porters. People were very anxious and decided that this was not a good thing. This is not the end of the disaster:

page 14
"Immediately after this, the procession had not gone much farther, when at noon there was a terrible thunder, lightning flashed through the clouds, and such a heavy downpour with terrible hail poured in that the priests, porters, and the crowd following them could not bear the weight of the torrent of water that fell on them and move from their place because of a large rainstorm. the hail that blocked their path. Many of the children in the procession would have been carried away and dragged along by the strong and violent current of the rushing waters, if not for the men who managed to seize them and with great difficulty pull them out of the raging elements; this mixture of rain and hail was a strange and unusual phenomenon, which predicted imminent death, disappearance and destruction in a stormy and"[Mikhail Kritovul, 2014, p. 56-57].

And the next day, from early morning until late evening, Constantinople was shrouded in a thick cloud, which was regarded by the historian as a sign that the city was abandoned by God to the mercy of fate: "This phenomenon showed that God turned away from the City, despised, left and left it; the Deity hidden by the cloud appeared and disappeared. That's how things were" [Mikhail Kritovul, 2014, p. 57].

The Byzantine historian and statesman George Sfrantzi (1401 - after 1478) tells about the strange glow that illuminated the Christian capital from the sky. However, the interpretation of this sign among the warring parties synchronously changed. At first it was received with alarm by the besieged, but was soon regarded as favorable, while among the besiegers it first caused fear, but then, when it appeared to their eyes the next evening, it was interpreted in their favor:

"The light coming down from the sky illuminated the City all night. At first, when they first saw the light, they (the Byzantines. They said that it was God who was angry with the Christians and wanted to burn them and hand them over to the Turks as slaves. Then, seeing that they were invariably thrown from walls and stairs, and that they could not prevail by such tricks, and hearing that the Italian fleet and Janos were supposed to have arrived, they began to talk about the glow again. It is God who fights on the side of the Christians and protects them, he is their protector, because even they (so the Turks said) could not do anything. And for these reasons, as we have already said, the Emir and all his army were so sad and discouraged that they decided to lift the siege on the morning of the next day. However, that same evening, during the council for tomorrow's retreat, they again saw a light descending from the sky, but this time it did not extend high over the City and did not shine all night, but, appearing in the distance, dissipated and immediately disappeared. As soon as the Emir and all his entourage saw this, they were filled with great joy and said, " Now God has forsaken the Christians." And the sages and scribes who were involved in their impure faith and delusion judged that this light foreshadowed the capture of the City. Here all the Turks were filled with hopes that were destined to come true because of our sins " [(Pseudo-) Sfrantzi, 2014, p. 142].

However, let's return to the events in China. Worried court officials tried to remonstrate with the emperor, reminding him of the connection between the weather's vagaries and his violations of family relations. In one of the reports submitted to the throne in November 1451, it was noted that when there is unanimity in the state, the will of Heaven prevails, but now something exactly the opposite is happening, so there are everywhere phenomena of nature hostile to man. Referring to disasters, the author of the report called on the Emperor to get rid of the evil ministers [Neeg, 1986, p.75]. In 1454, one of the dignitaries ventured to openly attribute unfavorable weather events to Zhu Qiyu's disrespect for the correct order of succession to power. He exhorted the emperor: "Restore the status of the Prince (son of Zhu Qizhen. - Yu.D.) as the heir to the throne; secure the great foundation of the state. If this is done, then mild weather will fill the country, and disasters will stop by themselves." However, Zhu Qiyu didn't heed his words. Enraged, he ordered the execution of the brave dignitary. The very next day, a sandstorm hit and enveloped the capital. The emperor took this as a warning from Heaven and refrained from executing him. It should be added that the son of Zhu Qiyu himself, whom he had appointed as his heir in 1452, unexpectedly died a year later [Brook, 2010, p. 97].

Reports of famine caused by drought or heavy rains flocked to Beijing from all provinces. These reports invariably ended with pleas for help and requests for tax cuts. Eclipses of the sun and moon were also reported, pa-

page 15
giving stars and strange thunderclaps without lightning or clouds. The water in the constantly muddy Yellow River suddenly became clear." The two bells at the Southern Gate of the Forbidden City lost their ability to produce sound on July 21, 1455. After an unusual storm in late March 1456, Empress Han suddenly died. Some time later, Zhu Qiyu, in accordance with ancient Chinese tradition, publicly accepted the blame for all the troubles in the state, and on June 12 of the same year, the entire Outer Court resigned. The emperor did not accept the resignation, arguing that all dignitaries should work together with him to cope with troubles. However, the sky was not appeased by this decision. The signs and catastrophes continued (Neeg, 1986, p. 107). The emperor's serious illness was added to them.

In early 1457, Zhu Qiyu was already so ill that he could not even attend the morning audience for the New Year. Meanwhile, a coalition of top military and civilian officials released Zhu Qizhen from house arrest and installed him on the throne in February. His rival died on March 14, 1457. It would seem that justice was restored, but the Sky regarded the return of the former emperor to power somewhat differently. The fact is that he actually ascended the Ming throne as a result of a coup d'etat, called "force open the gates [of the palace]" [The Cambridge History of China, 1998, p. 338-339], and later, instead of gratitude, Zhu Qizhen tried to get rid of all the officials who supported him. On a summer day in 1458, the sky sent nine dragons to China, defeating the city of Qiongshan on Hainan Island. The dragons descended from the multicolored clouds, attacked the Yamyn county chancellery, completely destroying its front gate, literally tore apart one woman, then soared into the air and rushed to the northeast, destroying the houses of peasants along the way and scattering their belongings everywhere. They were followed by millions of dragonflies. In the same summer, the island was hit by a powerful typhoon, which uprooted trees and leveled houses to the ground [Brook, 2010, p. 50].

Despite the disasters of the Jingtai period described by contemporaries, as well as the accusations and self-accusations of Zhu Qiyu, the catastrophe of 1449 objectively stimulated the strengthening of the political and economic institutions of Ming China. This allows historians to claim that in the second half of the XV century. China had relatively good governance and was able to successfully deal with internal and external problems [The Cambridge History of China, 1998, p. 331].

Now it is time to take a closer look at the traditional political and philosophical ideas of the representatives of the opposite side involved in the "Tumu incident" and discuss how the issue of the legitimacy of Oirat domination in Central Asia was resolved by contemporaries. Noteworthy is the general non-recognition of the Oirats as legitimate rulers in very different and independent sources representing different cultures: Confucian Chinese, Tengri-Buddhist Mongolian and Muslim Central Asian, although

11 A similar unusual occurrence, according to Chinese sources, has happened before. For example, in 166, the scholar Xiang Kai, a recognized expert on astrology and mantic books, submitted a report to the Emperor Huan-di (146-168) on the evils caused by eunuchs. Xiang Kai declared that their interference in state affairs and personal closeness to the emperor, which prevented him from producing male offspring, had brought the" natural strength "of the dynasty to a decline, as evidenced by a series of omens:" an unusually harsh winter, strange flashes in the sky, hail and heavy rains, the discovery of a dead dragon, the fall of meteorites, the destruction of the gates of the Capital's school, the sudden enlightenment of the always muddy waters of the Yellow River "[Malyavin, 1983, pp. 95-96]. The "enlightenment of the waters "was recorded in" Hou Han Shu " under 165 and 166, both times in the fourth month (Malyavin, 1983, p. 202). Among the various cataclysms that occurred in the Jin Empire in 1209, the enlightenment of the Yellow River waters during 500 li is also mentioned [History of the Golden Empire, 1998, p. 195]. It would seem that there is nothing sinister in the clear, transparent river water? The bad thing is that this phenomenon is out of the ordinary, and therefore it could not help but alert those who observed it.

page 16
The latter two still relied on the authority of Genghis Khan to legitimize the supreme power.

Mongolian sources attribute the beginning of the rise of the Oirats to the incident with the Oirat thousand-year-old Huuhai Taiu. One winter, the Mongol Elbeg Khan (1393-1399) shot a hare and saw its blood on the snow. Shimnus (an evil spirit) entered into his heart, and the Khan asked:: "Is there a beauty anywhere with skin as white as snow, cheeks as rosy as blood?" Huuhai Taiu replied that there was a woman of such beauty, and it was none other than the Khan's daughter-in-law. Inflamed with passion, Elbeg Khan killed his own son to possess her, and she slandered Huuhai Tau out of revenge, and he was executed. Subsequently, the repentant Elbeg Khan appointed two sons of Huuhai Tau to be in charge of the four tumen oirats, and then he himself fell a victim to them [Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 257-258]. According to A. I. Chernyshev, the khan gave Batul-chinsang (Mahama) power over the Oirats, and Ugechi Hashig (Taiping) became his co-ruler. In 1415. Ugechi Hashig killed Batul-chinsang and died the same year. Oiratov was headed by his son Esehu for ten years [Chernyshev, 1987, pp. 80-82]. It is possible that this Esehu repeatedly led troops to Moghulistan, as will be discussed below. Eastern Mongolia was ruled by Aruktai at this time. Suffering constant defeats from the Oirats and finding no understanding with the Ming, he migrated further east, but in 1425 he gathered his strength and inflicted a crushing defeat on the Oirats, and put Adai Khan (1425-1438) over the Mongols.

Among the defeated Oirats was the son of Batul-chinsang Togon (? - 1439). For some time, he was held captive by Aruktai and served as a sheep shepherd. Adai Khan had given him his freedom. Togon rallied his tribesmen around him and in 1434 defeated the eastern Mongols. Aruktai was killed. Four years later, Togon dealt with his liberator and became the absolute master of all Mongolia. He replaced Adai Khan with Daisun Khan, and served as taishi under him. Although Togon's mother was the daughter of Elbeg Khan, his origin did not allow him to become khan officially, since this required being a male descendant of Genghis Khan: "He wanted to be called a khagan, but the people did not approve of this, and he elevated Tokto-buha to the throne, giving him all the people who had previously lived in the city. owned by Aruktai. Togon declared himself cheng-hsiang (top official - Yu. d.) and settled in the northern part of the Gobi " (Kukeev, 2008(1), p. 26). In the future, Chinese historiography seems to lose interest in Togon's ambitions, especially since he died in 1439, never having had time to measure forces with the Ming. However, Mongolian sources tell a mystical story about the sudden death of this man, and so unanimously that there is no doubt about its edifying nature: do not have Genghis Khan's blood in your veins, do not dare to claim power. This story is described in sufficient detail in the "Altan Tobchi" by Lubsan Danzan, which has already been quoted more than once:

"After that, Togon-taishi, having received the power of the Mongols and thinking a lot about himself, [went] to worship in front of the eight white yurts of the lord. 12 When he arrived, he said: "I will take the khan's throne!", - made a bow and became a khan. Togon-taishi was intoxicated by this grace of the lord and shouted loudly: "If you are the august [lord] of greatness, then I am a descendant of Hanshi of greatness!" He slammed the small tent of the lord and shouted loudly. Then he turned to leave, and blood began to flow from Togon-taishi's nose and mouth. He grabbed the mane of his horse and said: "What is it?" When they looked, they found that the eagle-feathered arrow stuck in the hole of the lord's quiver was moving and blood was running down it. Everyone saw [it]. Togon said: "The august husband has shown his power. But I, Togon, the son of the Sutai woman, am dying . My pretensions will disappear. There is mongoljin Mongke. Take his life!" After saying these words to his son (Esen - Yu.D.), he died. At the word of your father

12 Refers to the "Eight White Yurts" sanctuary in Ordoss, organized by Genghis Khan's grandson Kublasm. According to legend, some personal belongings of Genghis Khan and his family were kept there. After the fall of the Yuan Dynasty in 1368, this sanctuary acquired Mongolian significance as a place where a legitimate pretender to the Khan's throne received a blessing from the spirit of Genghis Khan. But if it wasn't Genghisid who was trying to claim power, the angry spirit would punish him with death, as it did with Togon.

page 17
[his son] killed the Mongol Mongke. This is how the entire Mongol empire was captured by the Oirats " (Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 269).

So, after Togon, power over Mongolia went to Esen, who ruled on an equal footing with Daisun Khan and for some time formally recognized his seniority, also called taishi, although both co-rulers independently maintained embassy relations with China. Esen subdued the Mongols not only in the territory of present-day Mongolia, but also went on campaigns to Mogolistan, where the fallen descendants of Genghis Khan from his son Chagatai also ruled ingloriously. Nevertheless, they justified the rule of their origin, which Esen himself could not boast of. The tradition was still so strong that even the great Timur, despite his grandiose military successes, was content with the titles of emir and gurgan (Khan's son-in-law) and ruled his empire on behalf of fake Mongol khans.

Mirza Muhammad Haidar dughlat (1499-1551) gives interesting details of the capture by a certain Isan of Taishi, whom he considered to be the Oirat Esen, of Weiss Khan (Uwais ibn Shir - ' Ali-oglan, great-grandson of Tughluk-Timur), who ruled Mughalistan in 1418-1421 and 1424-1425. [Akimushkin, 2004, p. 257-269]:

"So the turn for the khanate came to Uwais Khan. He was an extremely pious Muslim, noble and distinguished for his courage in that family. Since the Khan did not allow jeta (a contemptuous name for the nomads of Moghulistan) to raid the Muslims and was close to the infidel Kalmaks (Oirats), he constantly waged wars against those infidels. Despite his frequent defeats, he did not abandon the holy war and was twice captured by those infidels. The first time he was captured was in a battle in an area called Ming Lak 13. They seized him and, assuming that he was a khan, took him to Isan Taishi, the leader of the Kalmaks. Isai Taishi thought to himself: "If he really belongs to the Genghis Khan family, then he will not show me any respect, but will look at me as a naukar." When the khan was brought in, Isai Taishi was on horseback. He dismounted, made a low bow, and went over to pay his respects to the khan. Han turned away from him and didn't offer his hand. [Isai Taishi] had full confidence in the khan, paid him many honors, and released him. When the Khan was asked why he was rude to [Isan Taishi], he said: "If he had approached me simply, I would certainly have turned to him with a bow out of fear for my life, but he approached me with a bow according to the ancient customs of the infidels, and it occurred to me that the time had come for my martyrdom, and to look at the actions of an infidel is contrary to Islam. So I didn't bow down." Through faithfulness to religion, the Khan was saved from such an abyss "(Mirza Muhammad Haidar, 1996, pp. 91-92).

Mirza Muhammad Haidar attributes Weiss Khan's deliverance to his "faithfulness to religion," even though Esen might not have dared to raise a hand against Genghisid. After all, he bowed to his captive (of course, if this is not a fiction, and there are reasons for doubt) not as an "infidel" Muslim, but as Taishi Khan.

Religious motives are even stronger in the account of these same events by a younger contemporary of Muhammad Haidar, Hafiz-i Tanysh Bukhari, who calls Esen "the supreme ruler of the borders of Moghulistan", which Esen, of course, never was, and in the mouth of Weiss Khan puts a scathing description of the Oirat taishi, to whom he denies human dignity on the basis of the fact that the reason for his disbelief:

"In the war with the infidels, he fell into the clutches of evil-doers several times, and in [all] these dangerous and terrible circumstances, the great god saved him. [Here is] one such case. In the area of Ming Bulak, he happened to fight with Esan Taishi, who was the supreme ruler of the borders of Moghulistan. He was defeated and captured by the infidels. When he was brought before Esan Taishi, the infidel drew the following picture on the tablets of his mind:"If he is indeed of Genghis Khan's lineage, he should not honor me." When Weiss Khan was brought to him, he

13 Ming-Lak perhaps, Ming-Bulak ("Thousand Keys"). There were several places with this name in Mogolistans, for example, in the Merke district (Dzhambul region) west of Bolshoy Yulduz, in the basin of the Chongol and Karagol rivers flowing down from the Halyktau ridge. The summer residence of the khagans of the Western Turkic Khaganate (603-704) was located in the Ming-Bulak area near Turkestan. However, it is difficult to say what exactly the author of "Tarikh-i Rashidi" meant.

page 18
The infidel [Esan Taishi] jumped up from his seat, [received him] with honor, and wished to touch the khan. His Majesty [Weiss Khan] turned away from him, not even touching his head with the hand of blessing. This meritorious act of the khan finally convinced [Esan Taishi that this was a descendant of Genghis Khan], and he sent the khan to his country with respect, with all honors. Khan was asked: "What is the reason why that infidel showed [you] all kinds of respect, but you rejected them and did not open your sweetly smiling lips to him?" Han deigned to reply: "When I was confronted with the customs of the infidels, with the rituals of that crowd of villains, my religious dignity did not allow me to greet him (Esan Taishi) and consider him a human being" [Hafiz-i Tanysh Bukhari, 1983, pp. 94-95].

However, the question arises: are both Muslim sources quoted really talking about the same Oirat Esen-the future hero of the "Tumu incident"? X. Serruys in one of his articles notes: "It is also obvious that this Isai Taishi is none other than Esen-taishi oiratov" [Serruys, 1963, p. 442], but the translators of "Tarikh-i Rashidi" believe that Isan Taishi should be understood as a completely different person, namely the Kyrgyz khan Esehu (1415-1425), which is very vaguely mentioned in the Mongolian chronicles (Shara Tuji, 1957, p.143; Lubsan Danzan, 1973, p. 259). They are based on the year of Esen's birth (1417) and the year of his opponent's death (1428), which makes their collision problematic [Mirza Muhammad Haidar, 1996, p.622]. A rather serious argument in favor of identifying Isan Taishi with Esehu is given in the work of K. I. Petrov (Petrov, 1961, pp. 168-171).

But Esen's birth date is controversial. The year 1417 (the year of the fire chicken) is indicated by Sagan Setsen in the Beijing list of " Erdenin tobchi "[Geschichte der Ostmongolen, 1829. P. 153], but, as is well known, this author, who lived already in the XVII century, is often confused in chronology, and the scribes of his work add even more ambiguity, therefore, the given date cannot be considered absolutely correct. Meanwhile, some researchers, relying on other lists of "Erdeniin tobchi", adhere to the earlier date of Esen's birth-1407 (the year of the fire pig). In particular, this year appears in the list kept in the Ulaanbaatar State Library [Haadyn undesniyn erdeniyn tovch, 2011, p. 76]. Even Ts. Zh. Zhamtsarano noted that the Urga list "Erdenin Tobchi" differs from other preserved lists in its completeness and accuracy, especially in comparison with the one published by I. Ya.Schmidt, as well as with those stored in the Institute of Oriental Studies of the USSR Academy of Sciences (Zhamtsarano, 1936, p. 14). V. V. Barthold agreed with Muhammad Haidar's version of Esen's repeated battles with Weiss Khan on the banks of the Ili River, in which the latter was almost always defeated [Barthold, 1963, pp. 86-87]. These views are shared by K. A. Pishchulina [Pishchulina, 1977, p. 113-114], O. K. Karaev [Karaev, 1995, p. 78], A. N. Baskhaev [Baskhaev, 2011, p. 40] and a number of other specialists.

According to the Min Shi, in 1422 the Oirats attacked the city of Hami and sacked it. The Minsk court condemned their actions, and the oirats apologized [Kukeyev, 2008(1), pp. 25-26]. Who led the campaign, the source does not specify. If Esen was born in 1407, then at that time he should have been 15 years old - the age from which a nomad was considered a warrior, so his presence in the Oirat army was quite possible. Esen's young age could partly explain his respect for the captive Weiss Khan, but this assumption has no reliable justification yet. It is believed that there were three clashes between the Oirats and Mughals in Eastern Mughalistan in the 1420s [Rossabi, 1976, p. 416], in two of which Weiss Khan was captured, and if the first time he was simply released, the second time he had to pass off his wife as Esen . Makhtum Hanim's sister, who bore Oirat Taishi a daughter and two sons, Ibrahim and Ilyas. The marriage was allegedly performed according to a Muslim rite, and Weiss Khan converted Taishi to Islam [Mirza Muhammad Haidar, 1996, p. 115].

By X. To Serrais, Weiss Khan did not marry his sister to Esen, but to his son Amasanji. Later, this Amasanji quarreled with Ibrahim and Ilyas on the basis of reli-

page 19
religious differences and forced them to seek refuge in China (Serruys, 1963, p. 441). However, even if Esen had already become a father by that time (i.e., before 1428), his son was clearly still too young to be suitable for the role of groom, although the Mongols until recently had the custom of arranging an "egg wedding" (oidog khurim), when the parents of a young boy and girl agreed to marry. about their marriage. Until they reached adulthood, they remained in their families, which often roamed together, forming one of the lowest social units of Mongolian society - hot island. In this case, the maintenance of long-term relations between the families was excluded, especially since Makhtum Hanim was most likely already an adult at that time. As for the conclusion of marriage according to Sharia, for this purpose, the married couple must reach the age of majority, which is set for young men by all madhhabs at least 15 years. An engagement was possible at an earlier age. K. I. Petrov reasonably asserts that Amasanji was not the son of Esen, but of Esehu [Petrov, 1961, p. 156, 160].

All of the above forces us to leave open the question of who exactly Isan Taishi was in the story of Muhammad Haidar. In any case, it is noteworthy that the author used the example of this man to show the illegality of the Oirat claims to power in Central Asia in almost the same images as Chinese historiographers. In both Tarikh-i Rashidi and Min Shi, Esen worships his captives. Here and there, the authors of historical works force him to acknowledge his lesser position. However, if Zhu Qizhen belongs to the imperial family is indisputable, then the situation with Weiss Khan is different.

In connection with the conflict under consideration, it is appropriate to raise the question of the authenticity of its origin from the Genghis Khan family. There is no doubt that his immediate ancestors go back to Tughluk-Timur (1347-1362/1363), who was the first khan of Moghulistan to separate from the Chagataid state, but the pedigree of Tughluk-Timur himself is vague. Even V. V. Barthold noted that the information about his origin in the sources is contradictory, and it is impossible to guarantee the accuracy of information about his belonging to the Khan's family [Barthold, 1963, p. 79-80]. T. I. Sultanov cautiously calls Tughluk-Timur "an imaginary or real descendant of Chagatai" [Sultanov, 2006, p. 170]. Sources agree that he was the grandson of Duva , the energetic ruler of the Chagatai ulus in 1282-1307, but further contradictions begin. The young Tughluk-Timur was allegedly brought to Aksu from the Kulja region by the Duglat Emir Puladchi (Bulaji) and in 1347 proclaimed the ruler of an independent khanate, and he himself took the second most important position of ulusbegi (assistant to the khan).

The story of Tughluk-Timur's rise to power strongly resembles the plot from an epic tale or even a fairy tale: there is a childless khan, from whom one of the wives conceives (and the youngest in position), and the rivalry of these wives, ending with the actual expulsion of the pregnant spouse, and the long search for the rightful heir to the throne after the khan's death, during which the messenger manages to eat 299 of the 300 goats that he asked to be given to him on the road, and since on his happy return with the young prince, only one gray goat remains with him, he receives the nickname " Kuk uchku "("Gray Goat"), inherited by his descendants.:

"From the mouths of trustworthy Mughals, I have heard my father and uncle (may Allah grant them a place in the Gardens of Paradise) say that Isaiah Bughi Khan, who is the father of Tughluq Timur Khan, had an older wife named Satilmish Khatun. He also had another wife named Manlik. Khan had no children. Satilmish Khatun was barren. The Khan left with the army. The Mughals have an ancient custom, according to which the women of the harem are ordered by the eldest wife: whom she wants to leave, whom she wants to marry. This Satilmish Khatun found out that that Manlik Khatun got pregnant by the khan. She was jealous of it and gave it to Shira'vul to the Spirits. Shiravul Dukhtui belonged to the major emirs. When the khan returned from the campaign, asked about Manlik, Satilmish Khatun said: "I gave it to someone." Han said, " She was a step away from me." The Khan was upset, but since it was the Mughal custom, he said nothing.

page 20
Soon after, Isai Buga Khan passed away. There was no khan left in the Mughal ulus; the Mughals lived on their own, and the ulus began to fall into ruin. Emir Bulaji douglat, who is my grandfather, undertook to find a khan and restore order in the state. He sent a man named Tash Timur to find Dukhtui Shiravul and find out about Manlik and how she was delivered of her child, and if a son was born to her, then let him steal him and bring him back. Tash Timur said, " These tasks take a long time to complete, and provisions and riding animals are not enough for such a journey. Please allocate three hundred head of goats, so that by feeding on their milk and going from people to people, I will achieve the desired goal." Emir Bulaji gave him what he asked for and sent him away.

Tash Timur traveled all over Moghulistan for a long time. When he had only one gray goat left out of the three hundred goats, he finally reached the people of Dukhtui Shiravul and asked them about Manlik and her child. They said, " Manlik has given birth to a son. She also has a son by Dukhtuya. They are together. The son of Khan was named Tughluq Timur Khan, and the son of Shiravul was named Inju Malik." In short, he somehow took Tughluq Timur, escaped with him, and went to the Emir of Bulaji" (Mirza Muhammad Haidar, 1996, p. 25-26).

However, Esan Buga died long before Tughluk-Timur was born, so modern historians follow those medieval authors who call him the father of Emilkhodju. It seems that the anonymous authors of the extensive genealogical handbook on the Genghisids and Timurids "Muizz al-ansab", compiled in Khorasan between 1426 and 1488, were closer to the truth in this matter. Recognizing Tughluk-Timur as the son of Emil-khoja, they further write: "After his father's death, his mother took Duktu, and he was born in the Duktiya house. For this reason, he is considered the son of Duqtiyah" (Mu'izz al-ansab, 2006, p. 51). The latter is all the more likely because nothing is known about the Mongol custom, according to which the eldest wife of the khan would have the right to dispose of the younger wives at her own discretion and give them to the side without the khan's knowledge. This is a clear reminder of the Muslim rule of harems, which could hardly be applied by nomads who had not yet converted to Islam. In this case, we are not just talking about a wife, but about a pregnant spouse, because of the loss of which, along with his own unborn child, Khan is allegedly upset-and only that it looks completely implausible.

Doubts about the noble origin of Tughluk-Timur are further reinforced by the fact that the "creator of kings" Puladchi was the grandfather of Haidar, as he explicitly says in the above quote. The involvement of the author's grandfather in the restoration of the Khan's power, and in fact - in the creation of an independent Central Asian state, could hardly do without a beautiful legend in "Tarikh-i Rashidi". It only strengthens the desire to exalt Weiss Khan and at the same time confirm the legitimacy of the rule of the Tughluk-Timurid line. According to V. P. Yudin, although Mirza Haidar's data are quite objective, nevertheless, they are not devoid of a certain bias dictated by his belonging to the Mughal nobility, in particular to the Dughlat tribe [Yudin, 2001, pp. 213-214].

The above story, in my opinion, confirms the validity of this statement. Kashgaria belonged to the Dughlats since the time of Genghis Khan, and by the middle of the XIV century. they became very powerful and played a leading role in the political events of the region. The Duglat emirs occupied the highest administrative positions in Kashgaria and Mughalistan and enjoyed special privileges [Dzhumangaliyev, 2007, p. 410]. However, like the growing Oirats in the east, they also could not break the political tradition and needed formal rulers from among the descendants of Genghis Khan, and preferably those who could dictate their will. Most likely, this is how the young Tugluk-Timur appeared in the historical arena, whether he is a real Genghisid or not. The emphasis on the scene of Isan Taishi's worship of his descendant Weiss Khan as Genghisid was very useful for the Douglats to legitimize the power of their nominal masters, on behalf of whom they could conduct business as they pleased, and it is possible that this episode was simply an act of war.

page 21
written by Muhamad Haidar or one of his predecessors. It is symptomatic that Hafiz-i Tanysh Bukhari, who was not motivated to defend the legitimacy of the Tughluk-Timurid rule (his father was an approximate of Ubaydullah Khan (1533-1540), who belonged to a completely different dynasty-the Sheibanids), clearly emphasizes the religious, and not the genealogical aspect of the ideological confrontation between Taishi and Khan.

Despite significant military successes in the first half of the 15th century, the Oirats were defeated in an ideological war that they waged on several fronts. Perhaps the friendly rejection by neighboring peoples of them as legitimate rulers of Central Asia contributed to the rather rapid decline of the Oirat hegemony. However, what the Oirat Taishi failed to achieve in the 15th century, when they tried to act as political heirs of Genghis Khan, their descendants, the creators of the Dzungarian Khanate, who were already under the banner of Buddhism, were able to achieve in a certain sense two centuries later. They chose a different way of legitimizing their power, based not on a pseudo-genealogical principle, but on a religious one.

LITERATURA LIST

Limousin O. F. Chronology of the rulers of the Eastern part of the Chagatai ulus (line Tugluk of Timurhan) // Medieval Iran: Culture, history, Philology. SPb.: Science, 2004.

Baldanzhanov II.B., Vanchikova Ts. P. Cayan teuke "White History" Mongolian historical and legal monument of the XIII-XIV centuries. Ulan-Ude: BSC SB RAS Publishing House, 2001.

Bargold V. V. Essay on the history of Semirechye // Essays. Vol. 11 (1). Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1963.

T. J. Barfield Dangerous Border: Nomadic Empires and China (221 BC-1757 AD) / Translated by D. V. Rukhlyadsva and V. B. Kuznetsova, St. Petersburg: Faculty of Philology and Arts of St. Petersburg State University; Nestor-Istoriya, 2009.

Baskhaev A. N. Oiraty [Oirats]. Warriors of the Great Steppe. Elista: Dzhangar Publ., 2011.

Bira III. Mongolian Historiography (XIII-XVII centuries), Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1978.

Bokshchanin A. A. Osnovatel ' dynastii Ming Zhu Yuanzhang o moravakh i obyaznostyakh naslednika prestola i vdelyayaemykh udelami seyney gosudaryaya [Founder of the Ming Dynasty Zhu Yuanzhang on the customs and duties of the heir to the throne and the sons of the sovereign who are endowed with the appanages].
Bulletin of the Society of Orientalists. Appendix I: Liu Maocai. Information about ancient Turks in medieval Chinese sources, translated from German by V. N. Dobzhansky and JI. H. Ermolenko, Moscow: IV RAS, 2002.

Galdan. A story called Erdznijn erichz. Research and translation by P. B. Baldanzhapov and Ts. P. Vanchikova. Ulan-Bator Ulan-Ude: ADMON Publishing House, 2012.

Gorokhova G. S. Mongol sources about Dayan Khan, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1986.

Jumangalis T. D. Essay on the political history of the nomads of Prityanshan from antiquity to the end of the XVII century. Бишкек: Алтын тамга, 2007.

Zhamnarano Ts. Zh. Mongol Chronicles of the XVII century, Moscow: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1936.

The Golden Legend. Translated by G. S. Gorokhova and A.D. Tssndina // Istoriya v trudakh uchenykh lam. M.: Tovarishchestvo nauchnykh izdaniya KMK, 2005.

Istoriya Zolotoy imperii [History of the Golden Empire], translated by G. M. Rozov and commented by A. G. Malyavkin. Novosibirsk: Publishing House of the Institute of Archeology and Ethnography SB RAS, 1998.

Karaev O. K. Chagatai ulus. Haidu State. Mogolistan. Education of the Kyrgyz people. Бишкек: Кыргызстан, 1995.

Kozin S. A. The hidden legend. Mongol Chronicle of 1240 Moscow: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1941.

Kravtsova M. K. Dai Jin / / Spiritual culture of China. Encyclopedia, vol. 6. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 2010.

Krol, Yu. L., Relations between the Empire and the Xiongnu through the eyes of Ban Gu, Strany i narody Vostoka. Issue XXXII. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura Publ., 2005.

Kukssv D. G. Komentirovannyy perevod 328 tszyuani "Ming shi" "Oiraty" [Commented translation of 328 juani "Ming shi ""Oiraty"]. Vestnik Kalmykskogo instituta gumanitarnykh issledovaniy RAN, 2008(1), no.2.

Kukssv D. G. Esen Taishi and the Oirat-Chinese War of 1449 (according to Chinese sources) // Bulletin of the Kalmyk Institute for Humanitarian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2008(2), no. 3.
Kukssv D. G. Esen's military talent as a commander // Bulletin of the Kalmyk Institute for Humanitarian Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010, no. 1.
Lubsan Danzan. Altan tobchi. Translated by H. II. Shastina, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1973.

Malyavin V. V. Gibel drevnoi imperii [The Death of the Ancient Empire]. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1983.

Mirza Muhammad Haidar. Tarikh-i Rashidi. Translated by A. Urunbasva, R. P. Jalilova, and L. M. Epifanova. Tashkent: Fan Publ., 1996.

page 22
Mikhail Kritovul. Transl. by T. I. Sobol, O. N. Nikolasnkova, N. S. Evseeva et al. / / Byzantine historians on the fall of Constantinople in 1453. St. Petersburg: Aletsya Publ., 2014.

Mu'izz al-ansab (Glorifying genealogy). Vvedel., transl., note., podg. faksimile Sh. Kh. Vokhidov, opazat. Utspbsrgenova U. A. / / History of Kazakhstan in Persian sources. Vol. III. Almaty: Daik-Prsss Publ., 2006.

Neklyudov S. Yu. Polystadial'nyi obraz dukh-khozyaatelya, khranitelya i sozdatelya ognya v mongol'skoi mifologicheskoi traditsii [Polystadial image of the host spirit, keeper and creator of fire in the Mongolian mythological tradition]. 1992/1993. Vol. 46. Fasc. 2-3.

Orlova M. N. Yazyk "Altan tobchi", Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1984.

Petrov, K. I. the history of the movement of the Kyrgyz Tien Shan and their relations with the Oirats in the XIII - XV centuries. Frunze: Publishing House of the Academy of Sciences of the Kirghiz SSR, 1961.

Pishchulina K. A. South-Eastern Kazakhstan in the middle of the XIV-beginning of the XVI century (issues of political and socio-economic history). Alma-Ata: "Science" of the Kazakh SSR, 1977.

Pokotilov D. History of the Eastern Mongols during the Ming Dynasty, 1368-1644 (according to Chinese sources). St. Petersburg: Tipogr. Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1893.

(Prtrdo-)Sfrantzi. Chronicle. Translated by O. N. Nikolasnkova, V. V. Fsdchsnko// Byzantine historians on the fall of Constantinople in 1453. St. Petersburg: Aletsya Publ., 2014.

Sanchirov, V. P., Hegemony of the Oirats in Mongolia and Esen Khan (1407-1455), Vestnik Kalmykskogo instituta gumanitarnykh issledovaniy RAN, 2002, issue 17.
Sanchirov V. P. Kitayskiy imperator v oiratskom plenu: episody iz istorii otnoshenii Mongolii posluanskogo perioda s Minskim Kitayem [The Chinese Emperor in the Oirat Captivity: Episodes from the History of Relations of Mongolia after the Yuan Period with the Minsk China]. Proceedings of the International Scientific Conference, Part I. Elista, 2008.

Sanchirov V. P. Oirato-kitaiskis otnoshenii posle "Tumuskoy catastrofii" 1449 g. [Oirato-Chinese relations after the "Tumu catastrophe" of 1449]. 2009. № 1.

Skrynnikova T. D. Charisma and Power in the era of Genghis Khan, Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1997.
Sultanov T. I. Genghis Khan and the Genghisids. Sud'ba i vlast ' [Fate and Power], Moscow: ACT Publ., 2006.

Regulations on salt and tea. Translated and commented by N. P. Svistunova, Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1975.

Hafiz Abru. Zayl-i Jami At-tawarih-i Rashidi. Supplement to the collection of Rashid's stories. Translated by E. R. Talyshkhanov. Kazan: YAZ Publ., 2011.

Hafiz-i Tanysh ibn Mir Muhammad Bukhari. Sharaf-nama-yi Shahi (Book of the Shah's Glory). Facsimile of the manuscript D 88. Translated, introduced, noted and indicated by M. A. Salakhstdinova. Part I. Moscow: Nauka Publ., 1983.

Tssndina A.D. Mongol Chronicles of the XVII-XIX centuries: Narrative Traditions, Moscow: RSUH, 2007.
Chernyshev A. I. Zapadnye mongol'i: mezhdoussobitsy i kontakty s Kitayem (s vremya dinastii Yuan do raspada imperii Sung) [Western Mongols: Internecine Strife and Contacts with China (from the time of the Yuan Dynasty to the Collapse of the Song Empire)]. XVIII Nauchnaya konferentsiya "Obshchestvo i gosudarstvo v Kitaye", Ch. II.Moscow: Nauka, 1987.

"Shara Tuji" - Mongolian chronicle of the XVII century. Summary text, translated and introduced. and notes by N. P. Shastina, M. L.: Publishing House of the USSR Academy of Sciences, 1957.

Yudin V. P. Istoriograficheskaya kontseptsiya avtora "Tarikh-i Rashidi" Mirza Mukhammad Haidar doglat [Historiographical concept of the author of "Tarikh-i Rashidi" Mirza Muhammad Haidar doglat]. Almaty: Daik-Prsss Publ., 2001.

Haadyn undesniyn erdeniyn tovch (The Precious Legend of the origin of the Khans). Facsimile, per. on the modern Mong. Sh. Choimaa. Улаанбаатар: Болор Судар, 2011.

Brook Т. The Troubled Empire: China in the Yuan and Ming Dynasties. L.: The Belknap Press, 2010.

Gao Ch., Robock A., Self S., Witter J.В., Steffenson J.P., Clausen H.B., Siggaard-Andersen M.-L., Johnscn S., Maycwski P.A., Ammann C. The 1452 or 1453 A.D. Kuwac eruption signal derived from multiple ice core records: Greatest volcanic sulfate event of the past 700 years // Journal of Geophysical Research. 2006. Vol. 111.

Geschichte der Ost-Mongolen und Ihres Furstenhauses, verfasst von Ssanang Ssetsen Chungtaidschi der Ordus; aus dem Mongolischcn ubcrsctzt, und mit dem Originaltcxtc, nebst Anmcrkungcn, Erlautcrungcn und Citatcn aus andcrn uncdirtcn Originalwcrkcn hcrausgcgcbcn von Isaac Jacob Schmidt. St. Petersburg-Leipzig, 1829.

Hccr, Ph. dc. The Care-Taker Emperor: Aspects of the Imperial Institution of the Fifteenth Century as Reflected in the Political History of the Reign of Chu Chi-уй, Seventh Ruler of the Ming Dynasty (1449-1457). Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1986.

Hcissig W. Die Familienund Kirchengeschichtsschreibung der Mongolen. Teil I: 16-18 Jahrhundert. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1959.

Hoffmann A. Looking to Epi: further consequences of the Kuwae eruption, Central Vanuatu, AD 1452 // Bulletin of the Indo-Pacific Prehistory Association. 2006. Vol. 26.

Hok-lam Chan. Yang Shan // Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. Vol. II. N.Y.L.: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Hueker Ch.O. A Dictionary of Official Titles in Imperial China. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985.

Longfei Feng. Tumu Crisis and the Weakness of the Military System of Ming Dynasty // Asian Social Science. 2009. Vol. 5. N 6.

Monggol Borjigidobog-un teuke von Lomi (1732). Meng-ku shih-hsi-p'u. Hcrausgcgcbcn und mit Einlcitungcn verschen von Walthcr Hcissig und Charles R. Bawdcn. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1957.

Mote F.W. The T'u-mu Incident of 1449 // Chinese Ways in Warfare. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974.

page 23
Plummer С.Т., Curran M.A.J., van Ommen T.D., Rasmussen S.O., Moy A.D., Vance T.R., Clausen H.В., Vinther B.M., Mayewski P.A. An independently dated 2000-yr volcanic record from Law Dome, East Antarctica, including a new perspective on the dating of the 1450s CE eruption of Kuwac, Vanuatu // Climate of the Past. 2012. Vol. 8.

Rossabi M. Notes on Esen's Pride and China prejudice // Mongolia Society Bulletin. 1970. Vol. 9. N 2.

Rossabi M. Esen // Dictionary of Ming Biography, 1368-1644. Vol. I. N.Y.-L.: Columbia University Press, 1976.

Serruys H. A Note on the "Wild Mekrid" // Monumenta Serica. 1963. Vol. 22. N 2.

Serruys H. Hsiao-ssu: Seuse, a Chinese Loan Word in Mongol // Acta Orientalia. 1974. T. 28. N 3.

Serruys H. The Office of Tayisi in Mongolia in the Fifteenth Century // Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies. 1977. Vol. 37. N 2.

The Cambridge History of China: Vol. 7. The Ming Dynasty. 1368-1644. Pt. 1 / Ed. by F.W. Mote and D. Twitehett. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Witter J.В., Self S. The Kuwae (Vanuatu) eruption of AD 1452: potential magnitude and volatile release // Bulletin of Volcanologv. 2007. Vol. 69(3).

page 24

Permanent link to this publication: