E. I. DOROSHENKO
Candidate of Philological Sciences
Keywords: Libya, democratization, transition period, "direct democracy", pan-Arabism
February 17, 2014 marked the 3rd anniversary of the newest Libyan revolution. However, despite the physical removal of the" main obstacle "to democracy - former leader Muammar Gaddafi - and the destruction of the former political system of" direct popular power " - the Jamahiriya, the expected changes are almost invisible. The country still does not have a Constitution, public confidence in the official government-mainly due to security concerns - is steadily declining, and serious economic difficulties are also brewing, as oil exports have not been brought even to the level of 2012. The transformation process is clearly dragging on, and the "transition" disease is becoming worse. chronic: power in the country is still held by armed groups of former rebels, whose actions are hardly comparable to parliamentary debates.
What stands in the way of true democracy in Libya? Can we assume that the so-called "Libyan scenario" is limited exclusively to the military intervention of the NATO coalition, which led to the fall of the regime (and with it the centralized power in the country), or should the consequences be included in this concept?
In a statement issued on November 8, 2013, the Governments of France, Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States expressed their support for "the Libyan people, whose efforts are aimed at the final establishment of democracy." Further, the Western powers, whose joint actions in 2011 proved fateful for Libya, note their concern, first of all, about" instability "and"the threat [that instability] poses to democratic transformations."
It follows from the text of the statement that "instability" characterizes both the security situation and the political and social situation in the country:
"We ... We support the political institutions created on the basis of the elections and call on Libyans to refrain from any use of force against them (here and further - author's italics).
We believe that the adoption of the Constitution is a key element that determines the future of Libya as a safe and prosperous country, and we support the early start of the constitutional process.
We are convinced that the universal national dialogue ... It will play a crucial positive role in ensuring the transition to democracy and will ensure that every voice is heard.
..We call on all representatives of the Libyan people to put aside their private differences, join forces for the benefit of national interests and focus on strengthening democratic institutions in order to achieve the full realization of the aspirations of the revolution, thereby honoring those who sacrificed their lives for it. " 1
The analysis of these formulations allows us to correlate them with a number of significant events that caused "concern" to the authors of the statements that took place after the revolution of February 17, 2011, and thereby identify the main obstacles that stand in the way of the democratic process.
In the first place are the lack of security in the country and the problem of violence from warring detachments of former rebels. The call in the statement for the rejection of any use of force against "political institutions" refers to the incident with the adoption of the lustration law in April-May 2013, when the government, under direct pressure from armed groups, was forced to give in to their demands.
The work of the besieged Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs was blocked for a week and a half - the former rebels did not leave their positions even after the adoption of the law, since their main requirement was to protect their lives.-
The demand for the resignation of the country's Prime Minister Ali Zeidan remained unfulfilled. "We intend to continue our actions until Ali Zeidan leaves," said Osama Kaabar, a leader of one of the groups that pledged to lift the siege after Law 2 was passed.
As the subsequent development of events showed, these were not empty words: in October of the same year, Zeidan was briefly abducted by the same ex-revolutionaries, which he later described in his speech as an "attempted coup" 3.
The end of the thorny and short career of the Libyan Prime Minister was a high-profile resignation: in early March of this year, the country's parliament, the General National Congress (GNA), passed a vote of no confidence in Zeidan due to his inability to stop the actions of armed separatists who sought to establish independent oil exports from the eastern region of the country4. As a result, Zeidan was forced to move to Europe in a hurry, and the reputation of the official authorities was dealt another - and very serious - blow.
The instability of the internal political situation in the country and the inextricable link between internal security and the activities of the authorities are also indicated by the numerous resignations of other members of what are supposed to be new democratic institutions. Thus, in mid-March 2013, referring to numerous threats against him, the chairman of the Committee on Human Rights and Civil Society, a member of the General National Congress of Libya, Hassan al-Amin, resigned from his post.5
In August of the same year, as a result of "disagreements" with the Prime Minister and due to "interference" in his activities by the Government and Parliament, Interior Minister Mohammed Khalifa el-Sheikh resigned. It is significant that he held his post for only three months.6
The most notable resignation in 2013, however, was that of Deputy Prime Minister Awadh al-Barassi. As he left office, he described the Government as "incapacitated" because it was unable to cope with the "wave of violence" in the country.7
Unfortunately, neither the authority nor the "legal capacity" of the official authorities has increased since then. Naturally, the process of democratization, and even in the context of armed confrontation between groups, cannot be completed in the blink of an eye. However, the government, referring to the fact that it did not have time to "prove itself", only contributes to strengthening the influence of ex-revolutionaries, teetering on the verge of complete submission to them.
2. The Constitution
The second major obstacle to democratic transformation is the lengthy process of drafting and adopting the final version of the Constitution. Currently, only a preliminary version of the "basic law" is in force in the country, the central (and most controversial) postulate of which is the definition of Sharia law as the basis of Libyan statehood.8
The "Constitutional Declaration of the Transition Period" - the official name of the current version-was adopted in May 2011.The final version is being worked on against the background of " increasing polarization [of society] and power struggles, during which political associations manipulate the security situation in the country in their own interests. Such conditions hardly contribute to the urgent task of creating a new constitution. " 9
A similar criticism of the political instability hindering work on the "basic law" is contained in the annual report of the human rights organization Human Rights Watch, published in late January 2014: "[Activities] The role of the National Congress is complicated by internal disagreements between its member parties: the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Justice and Development Party and the more liberal Alliance of National Forces. [Other major obstacles are] both the voluntary resignations of members of Congress and their removal under the sweeping lustration law, which prohibits individuals who held any post under Gaddafi from participating in the [new] Government."10
A direct consequence of the latest "disagreements" was the withdrawal from the government of five ministers - members of the Justice and Development Party, including Abdelbari Arousi, who was in charge of the oil industry. According to the party's statement, then-Prime Minister Ali Zeidan "failed in his duty to ensure security [in the country] and failed to achieve the stated result in the energy sector." 11 In such circumstances, representatives of the new government do not have to count on the success of the announced political transformation and a positive assessment of the population.
However, despite the obvious crisis, the members of the National Assembly voted to extend the powers of the Parliament until December 24, 2014, "in order to give the specially convened Constituent Assembly time to draft a new constitution" 12.
According to the "Constitutional Declaration of the Transition Period", the Congress created following the elections in early July 2012 was supposed to cease to exist on February 7, 2014. However, it was expected that by November 2012 the Government would appoint members of the Constituent Assembly to work on a new Constitution. 13 Since this did not happen, elections to the Assembly were scheduled for February 20, 2014, and therefore the new Constitution-if the most favorable outcome-would not be developed and ratified until July at the earliest 2014
A more realistic scenario is as follows: the current "Constitutional Declaration" is amended by the Congress on the "third transition phase", in which general presidential and parliamentary elections are held in the country in August 2014, and the new government will set the direction of the "transition process" until the Constituent Assembly submits the final version Constitutions 14.
What is happening around the adoption of the Libyan "basic law" seems to be an endless process. For comparison, in Egypt, where the events of the" Arab Spring " began not much earlier than in Libya, by the end of 2013, two constitutions had already been created and adopted, reflecting the political policies of two different governments.
The decision to extend the parliamentary mandate cost the official government 12 ministers who resigned amid protests that began in the country and clashes between supporters and opponents of the current government. 15 According to supporters - and among them there are armed groups directly under the control of the Congress-the activities of the Parliament are inextricably linked to the drafting of the Constitution and, therefore, can only be stopped after its approval. The main argument of opponents of the extension of powers is that since Congress was unable to comply with the requirements of the current "Constitutional Declaration", it should not "hold on to power unnecessarily"16.
It is obvious that such a confrontation does nothing to bring the members of the new Libyan society closer together, but only gives another reason for a split - on another political basis - and significantly slows down the development and adoption of the Constitution. There is no doubt that its creation is a primary task, since it is impossible to imagine a truly democratic state that does not have a permanent basic law and does not rely on a continuous tradition of law-making. The credit of time and public confidence in the new government as a whole, as the public reaction shows, is almost exhausted.
3. National unity
The third problem, which is directly related to the first two, is the lack of national unity. The critical security situation in the country and the extreme weakness of the central government reinforce separatist tendencies and fuel internal conflicts. Libya's eastern province of Cyrenaica, which periodically declares independence (first partially, and then completely, with the creation of its own autonomous government), has at its disposal a stronger argument than just the demands of local tribal leaders: almost all oil production is concentrated in this area. 17
Armed groups, which interpret the concept of "federalism"in their own way, do not miss the chance to take advantage of this. According to the American edition of Foreign Policy, Ibrahim Jadran, a former rebel, now an active supporter of federal reorganization and leader of the self-proclaimed Transitional Council of Cyrenaica, seized three major oil terminals in the summer of 2013. As a result, by the beginning of February 2014, " his subordinates control about half of Libya's daily export potential - 600 thousand barrels. The storage tanks at the facilities at its disposal are capable of holding 17.5 million barrels of light low-sulfur oil with a total cost of about $2 billion. However, the [official] government in Tripoli does not dare to return the terminals to its control, despite numerous threats. Jadran makes fun of me ... authorities are responsible for this and other failures from their office in Brega and base in Ajdabiya, south of Benghazi... The blockade imposed by Jadran costs the country $60 million. daily"18.
According to other sources, the overall result of the capture of the oil fields and terminals of al-Sidra, Amna and Sirtika by armed groups was a significant reduction in oil production: from 1.4 million barrels. per day in January 2013 up to 250 thousand in September of the same year 19. This strong economic argument in the hands of ex-revolutionaries, combined with separatist tendencies that also exist in southern Libya (Fezzan province declared its independence in September 2013,20), can have a significant impact on shaping the future political structure of the entire country.
If this balance of power continues, Libya is likely to become a federal state, and in this case, it is possible that the problem with the adoption of the "basic law" will be solved by restoring the 1951 Constitution in the country. 21 Thus, according to Ibrahim Jadran, " the influence of Tripoli should be curtailed, and
federalism must become law. " 22
It is worth noting that Jadran has repeatedly proved the seriousness of his political intentions and economic ambitions: on January 7, 2014, the Libyan navy, under the command of official authorities, prevented an attempt by a Maltese-flagged tanker to enter the port of El Sidra to load and export the first batch of oil from "independent" Cyrenaica. 23 Then, in March, another tanker Presumably belonging to North Korea, not only successfully entered the same port and loaded, but also safely "exported" 234 thousand barrels. into international waters around Cyprus. It is noteworthy that the rebel tanker somehow inexplicably "slipped" from the encirclement of the Libyan Navy, and it took the intervention of American "navy seals" to place it under the control of the government in Tripoli 24.
This whole situation, as mentioned above, cost Ali Zeidan the post of Prime Minister, and for the central government it turned out to be completely humiliating for several reasons. First, all official warnings about an attack on a tanker-even at the cost of an "environmental catastrophe" - were completely ignored by one side, while the other side was never implemented.25 Second, it required the intervention of foreign military forces to bring the tanker back under government control - a blatant fact that proves that neither the security forces nor loyal groups were able to cope with the loaded non-military vessel. And, thirdly, the volume of the exported oil shipment is noteworthy - almost the same as at that time it was produced throughout the country.
It is clear that the crisis has seriously discredited the central authorities, and despite the relatively successful conclusion for the government in Tripoli, the precedent set may prove to be a convincing guide to action for supporters of autonomy.
At a more local level, trends towards self-government are manifested in the emergence of so-called "city-states". According to Foreign Policy, the most significant example among them is the city of Misrata, where in December 2011, despite all the destruction, the airport was restored, and now the seaport is operating and the local TV channel 26 is regularly broadcast.
This self-government, however, has its own "dark side". The problem of the "ghost town" of Tawergha, whose inhabitants were forced to leave their homes and move to refugee camps, remains unresolved to this day27.
The confrontation between the population of Misrata and nearby Tawergha began in 2011: Misrata was originally one of the centers of the "Arab Spring", and in Tawergha there was a military base of Gaddafi's army. In addition, since Tawergha was inhabited mainly by black Libyans, this gave the rebels an excuse to declare them "African Gaddafi mercenaries" and accuse them of all imaginable crimes - including rapes - allegedly committed against the residents of Misrata.28 As a result, Misrata blamed Tawergha for the worst human rights violations during the March-April 2011 war, and by the end of the year, armed groups had turned the city into a desert. One resident of Tawergha describes the situation in November 2011 as follows: "They not only call us Gaddafists, but also hate us for our skin color. All blacks in Libya are having a very difficult time right now. " 29
Tawergha, which is under the administrative control of Misrata, will probably soon be erased from all maps, and a city called "New Misrata"will appear in its place.30
It is significant that in the case of Misrata and Tawergha, the conflict was caused not only by diametrically opposed political beliefs, but also by racial characteristics. Unfortunately, representatives of other non-Arab minorities, in particular the Tuaregs, who sided with Gaddafi during the war and are now forced to leave the country, are now facing a similar attitude in "free Libya".
Their" battle for Libya "is still being waged by the Berbers (or Amazigh, i.e." free"), resorting to the same methods of economic pressure as the ex-revolutionaries. For example, in November 2013, they occupied the port of Mellita in western Libya, thereby blocking gas supplies to Italy and partially stopping oil exports, seeking to expand their rights and freedoms - in particular, the official recognition of the national language. 31 However, they refused to participate in the Assembly's work on creating a new Constitution, apparently considering economic measures more effective.32
In these circumstances, the need for a "national dialogue", as outlined in the above-mentioned joint statement of the European Parliament, becomes all the more obvious.-
the governments of France, Italy, the United Kingdom, and the United States. In January 2014, the Government of Ali Zeidan once again demonstrated its readiness to start this dialogue. Then, after the March events, Libyan Foreign Minister Mohamed Abdelaziz confirmed that this initiative will be implemented jointly with representatives of the Arab League and the African Union, but it is possible that these statements will not be implemented.33
Even with the most optimistic expectations, it is hardly possible to expect a concrete, tangible result in the near future, since it is precisely the divisive factors that prevail in society at the moment. Both the separatist sentiments of the Libyan East and South, and the economic "measures of influence" on Tripoli by former rebels and local tribes clearly do not contribute to centralized democratic transformations.
It is also unlikely that in the foreseeable future the population of Libya will be able to abandon "private differences" (as the Western powers call for in their statement), and the problem of armed groups will be solved democratically. In November 2013, Prime Minister Ali Zeidan said that "people should take to the streets to show support for the newly created army and police." 34 Unfortunately, the clashes that broke out five days later between protesters against the dominance of groups in Tripoli and former rebels led to the death of more than 30 people, 235 were injured, and a state of emergency was declared in the capital.35
The "national dialogue" initiative itself seems to be the only correct political solution in such situations, as the examples of other countries of the "Arab spring" - Tunisia and Yemen-show, where there was also a real threat of division. Much depends, however, on the timely implementation of this measure, especially in a multi-ethnic State like Libya. It remains to be hoped that attempts to restore national unity in the country will not be too late, and therefore pointless.
JAMAHIRIYA: AN ABORTED EXPERIMENT WITH DEMOCRACY?
In historical fairness, it is worth noting that this is not the first time that Libya has experimented with democracy: the Jamahiriya system, or "direct democracy", created by Muammar Gaddafi, assumed the existence of subordinate elected political institutions (people's assemblies, committees and the General People's Congress-an analogue of the National Assembly), growing from the periphery to the center, in the activities of which it was the entire population of the country should participate, thereby expressing its will, determining the political course and managing the resources of the country.36
American researcher Ronald B. St. John writes in his book Libya: Continuity and Change: "Having inherited [from the former regime] an inert, indifferent society, the [Gaddafi] government since 1969 has spent a huge amount of time and resources on creating organizations and institutions that would develop public consciousness and explain to citizens their role in political life. the system and involve [the population] in active participation in its functioning. Reasons for this [enterprise] failed, still unclear, but what is clear is that the regime failed to prepare its citizens for ... participation in political activities " 37.
As a result, the political apathy of the population increased (apparently, not least because of the favorable economic conditions created by the same regime), which inevitably led to the need to strengthen control over the country. Consequently, Muammar Gaddafi, who initially aspired to the symbolic role of" leader of the Revolution "(after the final transfer of power to the people), had to act more and more authoritatively, and, accordingly," direct democracy " slowly turned into a kind of dictatorship.
However, following the same logic, we can also talk about the current - much more dynamic-transformation of the originally laid "democratic freedoms" into permissiveness, leading to anarchy and chaos, and the transformation of the desire for self-determination into separatist tendencies that threaten the integrity of the country. In such conditions and as a consequence of these processes, control over economic objects becomes both a symbol of power and a tool for influencing a weak, isolated central government that is unable to provide its citizens with security and solve other urgent tasks. The question of whether the former rebels are prepared in principle to sacrifice their influence solely for the sake of "establishing democracy" and subsequently integrate into the ranks of the emerging security forces is still open.
There is another important issue concerning the willingness of the population as a whole to give up their clan and tribal ties for the sake of the very idea of democracy. The historical experience of the region shows that even the idea of "pan-Arabism" in the 50s-60s of the last century, which was much more global in scale and close to the mentality of the population of the Middle East and North Africa at that time than "democracy" today, could not force out of their consciousness the innate loyalty to their closest environment-family, to the clan and tribe.
As the historian Adid Dawisha notes in his book Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, this loyalty was actively used by Middle Eastern monarchs to prevent coups and protect themselves from advancing progressive regimes: "In some countries...," he writes, " tribal ties were the solid foundation on which popular support was built [of the ruling regimes], which reliably protected the local rulers from the growing wave of revolutionary Arab nationalism. This is definitely evident in the case of Saudi Arabia, where the demographic structure of society is based on a tribal basis.-
wu, significantly contributed to the stability of the political system. To ensure that the loyalty of the Bedouin was not limited to their own tribe, but also extended to the state, Saudi monarchs were obliged to behave like ordinary tribal leaders and made every effort to ensure that they were perceived as such.
...It was the Bedouins of King Hussein of Jordan's Arab Legion who helped him survive despite seemingly insurmountable circumstances. [The "Arab Legion" as the "Bedouin mainstay of the Hashemite state"]... definitely saved Hussein the throne... during the coup attempt by Nasserist officers in 1957. " 38
There is also a fair point of view, according to which one should not try to explain all the troubles of modern Libya by the "tribal way" of society, since its structure has long ceased to be "tribal" 39. However, the very fact that in the current chaos of anarchy, many Libyans remembered their clan loyalty - as an alternative to political games and political conflicts. the armed redistribution of territory and resources is already evidence of much. It should also be taken into account that the Libyan society itself has ceased to be "tribal" due to the modernization (in particular, mass relocation to cities) carried out by Muammar Gaddafi, so the current aggravation of tribal conflicts should be regarded more as a sign of social regression, and not an indicator of emerging pluralism.
* * *
It is hoped that the idea of democracy will nevertheless mark a new stage of constructive political and economic development for both Libya and its neighboring countries, which are undergoing a dynamic process of transformation. At the same time, the accumulated historical experience should be adequately perceived and interpreted - as an integral part of the political tradition of the region, as a factor determining the course of all transformations, and as an undoubted value that cannot be ignored in favor of momentary ideological attitudes.
1 Statement by France, Italy, UK and US on Libya - https://www.gov.uk/government/news/statement-by-france-italy-uk-and-us-on-libya
2 Libya fighters continue siege of ministries // Aljazeera, 07.05.2013- www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/05/2013572836221462.html
3 Libya PM says kidnap 'attempted coup d'etat' // BBC, 12.10.2013 - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24504702
4 Libya's Prime Minister ousted in chaos over tanker // New York Times, 12.03.2014 - www.nytimes.com/2014/03/12/world/africa/libyas-prime-minister-ousted-in-chaos-over-tanke r.html
Eljarh M. 5 Libya's politicians get a wake-up call // Foreign Policy, 15.03.2013 - http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/03/15/libvas_politicians_get_a_wake_up_call
6 Libya interior minister Mohammed al-Sheikh resigns // BBC, 18. 08. 2013 - http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-23750456
7 Libya's deputy PM resigns citing violence // Aljazeera, 04.08.2013 - www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2013/08/201384112631486261.html
8 Подробнее см.: Libya Draft Constitutional Charter for the Transitional Stage - http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/libya/Libya-Draft-Constitutional-Charter-for-the-Transition al-Stage.pdf
Eljarh M. 9 One step closer to a new Libyan Constitution // Foreign Policy, 26.09.2013 - http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/09/26/one_step_closer_to_a_new_libyan_cons titution
10 Human Rights Watch Report 2014. Events of 2013, p. 577 - https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/wr2014_web_0.pdf
11 Islamist ministers quit Libyan government // Aljazeera, 21.01.2014 - http://www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/01/islamist-ministers-quit-libyan-government-20 14121175731737583.html
12 Libyan MPs resign amid protests // Al Arabiya, 07.02.2014 - http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2014/02/07/Tensions-high-as-Libyan-manda te-parliament-ends.html
Eljarh M. 13 February is a make-or-break month for Libya // Foreign Policy, 06.02.2014 - http://transitions.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/06/february_is_a_make_or_break_month_f or_libya
15 Libyan MPs resign amid protests...
Eljarh M. 16 February is a make-or-break month for Libya ...
Sand M. 17 Head of Libya's Cyrenaica Declares Semi-Autonomous Rule // Bloomberg, 02.06.2013 - http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-02/head-of-libya-s-cyrenaica-declares-semi-auton omous-rule.html; Autonomous government launched in Libya's east - http://gulfnews.com/news/region/libya/autonomous-government-launched-in-libya-s-east-1.1 250979
Reed M. 18 Federalism and Libya's oil // Foreign Policy, 03.02.2014 - http://mideastafrica.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2014/02/03/federalism_and libyas_oil
19 Libya in crisis as armed groups throttle oil supplies // UPI, 04.09.2013 - www.upi.com/Business_News/Energy-Resources/2013/09/04/Libya-in-crisis-as-armed-group s-throttle-oil-supplies/UPI-7364137"8323425/#ixzz2srFirlim
20 Libya's southern Fezzan region declares autonomy // Al Arabiya, 26.09.2014 - http://english.alarabiya.net/en/News/middle-east/2013/09/26/-Libya-s-southern-Fezzan-provin ce-declares-autonomy.html
Eljarh M. 21 One step closer to a new Libyan Constitution ...
Reed M. 22 Federalism and Libya's oil...
23 Libyan navy stops Malta-flagged tanker from loading from mutinous east; owner replies // Independent, 07.01.14 http://www.independent.com.mt/articles/2014 - 01 - 07/news/libyan-navy-stops-malta-flagged-tanker-from-loading-from-mutinous-east-36208967 68/
24 SEALed and Delivered in Libya // Foreign Policy, 18.03.2014 - http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/03/18/sealed_and_delivered_in libya_0
25 Libya: standoff over North Korean oil tanker Intensifies // http://allafrica.com/stories/201403100983.html?viewall=1
Caryl C. 26 Islands in the Desert // Foreign Policy, 14.08.2013 - http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/08/14/islands_in_the_desert
27 Human Rights Watch Report.., p. 577.
28 Documentary film "The Road to Tawergha "("The Road to Tawergha") of the Al-Jazeera TV channel / / Aljazeera, 02.10.2013 - http://www.aljazeera.com/programmes/aljazeeraworld/2013/10/road-tawergha-201310191859 343221.html
Zurutuza K. 29 Cornered in Free Libya // IPS, 05.11.2011 - http://www.ipsnews.net/2011/11/cornered-in-free-libya/
30 Documentary film "The Road to Tawergha"...
Shennib G., Laessing U. 31 Libyan Berbers shut gas pipeline to Italy, cut major income source // Reuters, 11.11.2013 - http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/ll/ll/us-libya-gas-idUSBRE9AA0UT20131111
Laessing U. 32 Libya's Berber to boycott committee drafting constitution // Reuters, 13.11.2013 - http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/1l/13/us-libya-politics-idUSBRE9AC0A120131113
33 Libya FM: Tripoli supports Arab counter-terrorism strategy - http://www.aawsat.net/2014/03/article55330460
34 Zeidan appeals for 'restraint' fall on deaf ears in Libya // Middle East Online, 16.11.2014 - http://www.middle-east-online.com/english/?id=62643
35 Libyan militiamen kill protesters in Tripoli // The Guardian, 15.11.2013 - http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/nov/15/libyan-militiamen-protesters-tripoli
Gaddafi M. 36 The Green Book. Part One, p. 7 - http://www.zadishefreeman.com/images/Muammar-Qaddafi-Green-Book-Eng.pdf
St. John R.B. 37 Libya: Continuity and Change. New York, 2011, p. 80.
Dawisha A. 38 Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth century: From Triumph to Despair. Princeton, 2003, p. 291 - 292.
El-Kikhia M.O. 39 Libya: A tale of two regions and a ship // Al-jazeera, 16.03.14 - http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/03/libya-tale-two-regions-ship-20143165145 3444440.html
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