V. V. EVSEEV. MILITARY AND POLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE IRANIAN NUCLEAR ISSUE.

Moscow: Institute of Problems of Science Development of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2010, 240 p.

The book provides an analysis of the Iranian nuclear problem, assesses the country's nuclear missile potential in the light of the Iran-Israel confrontation, the attitude of the United States and Russia to this problem,as well as China, which is trying to position itself as a responsible state and in the future a world power center equal to the United States.

It is noted that since the seizure of the US Embassy building in Tehran by a group of students in November 1979, diplomatic relations between Iran and the United States have still been interrupted. American diplomats were held for 44 days, but this did not lead to US military action against Iran. Meanwhile, as the author of the monograph writes, the US military potential is so great that it is enough to launch massive bomb attacks on Iran for a long time (the "Yugoslav scenario") and completely destroy the military-industrial potential of Iran.

Almost 35 years have passed, and now the United States is seriously preparing to start such a war, specifying the location of targets for a possible strike on Iran and being in close proximity to this country. The main reason for a future war is the danger of Iran developing its own nuclear weapons and missiles to deliver them anywhere in the world.

It is clear that this cannot but worry Russia, which is forced to maneuver between Iran and the United States. Russia, according to the author, to a greater extent than the EU, tried to slow down the development of the Iranian nuclear crisis. At the same time, it managed to retain the right to cooperate with Iran in the field of nuclear energy by completing the Bushehr nuclear power plant and supplying it with nuclear fuel. It supplied Iran with modern diesel submarines, combat aircraft and helicopters, anti-aircraft and missile systems, and various types of armored vehicles. Russia has contributed to the training of Iranian specialists in the maintenance of nuclear power plants in Bushehr, but has not provided Tehran with assistance in the development of nuclear technologies.

The Iranian nuclear program has quite a long history, dating back to the time of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi in close cooperation with the West, which shows how ready Iran is now to have its own nuclear weapons, how tightly it has approached becoming a nuclear power. The author describes in detail the history of this issue and shows that the deteriorating foreign policy situation around Iran forces this country to constantly think about its own defense and the ability to resist a preemptive strike from Israel. Nuclear status should be a strategic guarantee for the preservation of the theocratic regime. At the same time, it is important to emphasize that the reserves of natural uranium available in Iran are quite sufficient to solve this problem. The book shows and describes all the most important scientific, technical and industrial centers through which the nuclear program is carried out in Iran.

Iran is not a nuclear state, the author emphasizes, but its potential for achieving this status is extremely high. This is described in a special section of the book called "Mastering rocket technologies and the rocket program in general." It states that Iran's missile program is based on a solid foundation of Iranian-North Korean cooperation. At the same time, unlike Pyongyang, Tehran has significant financial capabilities to create high-tech means of delivering nuclear weapons to any part of the world. At the same time, critically analyzing the state of the Iranian missile program, the scientist revealed that Iranian tactical missiles cannot yet be used as carriers of nuclear weapons and have limited capabilities for delivering chemical and bacteriological weapons. The danger of Iranian tactical missiles is that they can be transferred to radical Islamic movements, primarily in the Middle East hot spots. The book shows a detailed picture of the operational and tactical potential of the Iranian missile technology.

A special section is devoted to the issue of Iran's development of intermediate-range missiles, in which it has been making particularly rapid progress over the past 10 years with the assistance of North Korea. According to sources collected and analyzed by the researcher, Iran in 2014-2015 will be able to create a liquid-fueled missile capable of hitting targets in Western Europe, and in "some perspective" the country will create ballistic missiles capable of carrying a single-ton warhead at a distance of 3.7 thousand km or more. The difficulties that Iran faces on this path are that the country does not have a sufficiently extensive territory of its own to test such missiles (Iran is not able to provide a missile firing range of more than 2 thousand km along the internal trajectory) (p.35).

But even after overcoming these and other obstacles and receiving an ICBM, the country will not ensure nuclear safety, since such missiles are easily visible from space and therefore will provoke a preemptive strike on them. The production and storage of nuclear weapons, as well as the storage and storage of nuclear warheads, is another matter. Destroying these weapons is more difficult than at the stage of its creation. It is much easier to place the latter covertly due to the lack of pronounced unmasking features and the smallness of their geometric dimensions (p. 50).

Iran's nuclear missile potential is being developed at a fairly high rate. Therefore, the most important questions are: is this power sufficient to gain military superiority over the" sworn enemy " of Iran-Israel, and what will happen if this confrontation escalates into an armed conflict?

It would seem that Israel can be sure of its invulnerability. However, due to its small territory (143rd largest in the world) and a fairly high population density (over 300 people per 1 square kilometer), two medium-power nuclear warheads or four carrying bacteriological weapons are enough to destroy a significant part of the inhabitants of this country. Israel does not have the territorial advantage to fight Iran with conventional weapons; its military capacity is not enough to cover a significant part of Iran's territory. In this case, the Israeli leadership may decide to use its own nuclear weapons. That is why, the author believes, the Russian leadership should refrain from selling Iran air defense systems that would prevent Israel from fighting Iran with conventional weapons and encourage the use of nuclear strikes (p. 49).

However, as long as Iran does not possess a nuclear weapon, Israel is able to destroy Iran alone. Referring to the data of American experts, the author believes that Israel is able to destroy key Iranian nuclear facilities, for which 95 aircraft are enough, which is 25% of the Israel Defense Forces aviation fleet.

At the same time, Israel's conventional military capabilities are insufficient to carry out a sustained operation. Apparently, the duration of Israeli rocket and bomb attacks will be only a few days, and the list of targets will not exceed hundreds. The reason is the considerable remoteness of Israeli military air bases (about 1.5 thousand km), the lack of long-range aviation, the lack of long-range weapons and the limited fleet of tanker aircraft (p. 53). In addition, Israel and Iran do not share a common border, and to launch strikes, you will need to obtain an air corridor in advance or decide to cross the borders of a number of states without notice. The book shows the main corridors of the Israeli strike: the northern one along the Syrian-Turkish border, then through Syria and the Turkish part of Kurdistan; the central one - through Jordan or along Syria-

North-Jordan border, then through Iraq; south (probably the main one) - through Jordan and Saudi Arabia, then through Iraq or Kuwait (p. 54).

Israeli air-to-ground missiles will inevitably have to enter the range of Iranian air defenses, which means that the loss of the Israeli aircraft fleet will be inevitable. Since it is impossible to destroy all of Iran's mobile missile systems in a first strike, a retaliatory strike against Israel is also inevitable. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that Israel will not be able to immediately destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure due to the political decision taken in Iran to duplicate all strategic facilities and enterprises. As a consequence, Tehran will cease all relations with the IAEA and immediately start producing weapons-grade uranium (p. 55). From this it follows that a conventional war with Iran is possible from Israel only with the support of the United States.

The final, 5th chapter of the monograph deals with the resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Turning Iran into a nuclear power, according to the author of the book, will lead to "avalanche-like nuclear proliferation" in the Middle East, as well as to the lifting of UN Security Council sanctions to stop Tehran from any activities related to uranium enrichment and plutonium regeneration. In the international arena, the author is convinced, "complete chaos can arise" (p. 181). But it is also impossible to eliminate the Iranian nuclear infrastructure by force, because this is fraught with"unpredictable consequences".

The book explores American scenarios for solving the problem: 1) support for the opposition inside Iran; 2)" Yugoslav scenario"of military actions; 3) ground operation ("Iraqi scenario").

An attempt to carry out these actions, according to the author, will be fraught with"enormous difficulties". Iran significantly exceeds the military potential of Saddam's Iraq. The Armed Forces of the Islamic Republic of Iran are the largest in the Middle East in terms of numbers, with experience in military operations. At the same time, it is important to take into account that Azerbaijan signed a non-aggression treaty with Iran in 2005 and pledged not to provide its territory to other states for conducting military actions against its southern neighbor. The United States has no more hope for Iraq, which has never become a convenient springboard for the US advance to the East (p. 186). The United States has failed to enlist the support of the Shiites who make up the majority of Iraq's population.

It is possible, the author of the book writes, that the military campaign against Iran will become a catalyst for a new mass action of forces in Iraq, which will finally undermine the shaky positions of pro-American forces, especially in the context of a significant reduction in the US military presence in this country (p.193). The situation in Afghanistan remains no less difficult. Iran's policy towards this country is "more effective than anywhere else" (p. 193). Cooperation with Turkey is also unreliable due to a possible war with Iran. The scenario of a "color revolution"in Iran is absolutely unrealistic.

There is no serious opposition to the regime in Iran. All opposition activities are carried out within the framework of the Islamic regime. The current regime in Iran most fully meets the interests of the Bazaars, the traditional class that is the most influential in the country.

As for the "Yugoslav option" of launching massive strikes on nuclear facilities, it seems to be effective only at the first approximation. Iran's territory is vast, and key facilities are well protected. For example, the Natanz uranium enrichment facility is located at a depth of 8 km (!) and is protected by several layers of reinforced concrete (p. 189). Iran has 27 nuclear facilities covered by air defenses. With all the advantages of the United States in such a war, it will be just a dubious adventure with a huge zone of instability (Azerbaijan, Armenia, Russia, the Caucasus, especially the Northern One).

Assessing soberly the possibility of starting a US war against Iran, the author comes to the conclusion that Iran does not threaten US territory, and such a war is unlikely in the near future. This argument could be countered: did Iraq or Afghanistan threaten the United States, or did that threat come from Yugoslavia? The beginning of a war between Iran and Israel is also unlikely, since this war will only delay the transformation of Iran into a nuclear power, after which Israel will finally be completely isolated from Muslim states.

So how much time does Iran have left to get a nuclear weapon? At least two years after the political decision is made, the author writes. However, the countdown

It should be conducted from the moment of termination of Iran's relations with the IAEA (the first sign of a political decision on the creation of nuclear weapons). Until this has happened, it is simply not serious to talk about "any specific time frame for the creation of nuclear weapons" (p. 195).

A military solution is the worst option, and in this regard, it is interesting to consider the author as an alternative solution to the problem of introducing economic sanctions against Iran. The history of sanctions against Iran dates back to 1996, when the Clinton administration issued a package of sanctions against Iran and Libya, which limited the opportunities for foreign investment in these countries in order to hinder the development of the Iranian oil and gas sector as much as possible. The book details US actions to further increase economic pressure on Iran, resulting in up to 60% of the country's population becoming poor, significant unemployment and high inflation. However, such sanctions will not stop the Iranian leadership from becoming a nuclear power, nor can they significantly reduce the ability of the country's clerical elite to distribute oil revenues ($55 billion a year, 2009 data) through various funds in order to ensure the loyalty of its citizens and subsidize food and basic necessities among the poor social strata of the population (p. 207).

According to American experts (David Williams), Iran is a rational player and it is possible to use the doctrine of nuclear deterrence against it, similar to the one that the United States had in relation to the USSR. However, unlike in that era, it should be an extended deterrence program (Richard Kruger).

Be that as it may, the prospects for resolving the Iranian nuclear crisis remain unclear. It is necessary to continue forceful pressure on Iran, because otherwise Tehran will feel impunity for secret activities in the nuclear sphere and continue its provocative foreign policy. But the danger is that by increasing military pressure, you can cross the line beyond which the process of military confrontation will be impossible to stop.

One thing is absolutely clear: a missile and bomb attack will necessarily lead to the creation of an atomic bomb in Iran, albeit with a delay of several years.

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