T. L. DEITCH

Candidate of Historical Sciences

The embers of the conflict in the Sudanese province of Darfur have been smoldering since the 1970s.The roots of the problem are the domination of politics, local administration and business by Sudanese of Arab origin, which caused protest among the non-Arab population of the province. Unresolved economic, social and political problems, as well as a severe drought that worsened the situation at the beginning of the new millennium, led to the fact that these embers ignited a hot flame in February 2003. According to the UN, as a result of military operations, as well as from hunger and disease, 300 thousand people died; more than 3.5 million lost their homes.¹

GENOCIDE OR VIOLENCE?

The West accuses the Sudanese Government of supporting the Janjaweed militants and aiding genocide against the black population of Darfur. During the UN Security Council delegation's visit to Darfur in June 2008, the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, L. M. Ocampo, presented a report on the situation in the region, which stated that all the structures of the Sudanese State apparatus were involved in crimes against humanity in Darfur. ²

Among Sudan's population of 40 million, 70% are Sunni Muslims, 25% are adherents of local beliefs, and 5% are Christians. The fact that African Muslims kill their co-religionists and adherents of other faiths in the course of tribal conflicts, according to many scientists and politicians, can hardly be called genocide.

Alex de Waal, a Sudan expert, noted: "The claim that 'Arabs' are fighting 'Africans' in Darfur is not true. The Arabs of Darfur are the local dark-skinned inhabitants. They are African and Muslim, as are the non-Arabs of Darfur."³. A special EU commission visited Darfur. Its participants found no evidence of genocide, despite the fact that the situation in the province is extremely difficult. As Rodolfo Adada, who led the African Union (AU) - UN hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID), stated at a meeting of the UN Security Council on April 27, 2009, "there is a conflict of all against all in Darfur: armed groups are fighting each other, some members of the government security forces are fighting others, the army is fighting the police, and they are all killing civilians."⁴. There were reports that rebels operating in southern Darfur were receiving weapons from abroad, and that the separatists were supported at various times by Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda, Eritrea, and the Coptic community of Egypt.

For Washington, the Sudanese government's accusations of" genocide " in Darfur have become an argument in favor of economic sanctions. The threat of sanctions is being used as a means to pressure the government of Omar al-Bashir and strengthen the US strategic position in this part of the world. The African Union, the Organization of the Islamic Conference, and the League of Arab States (LAS) reject the idea of imposing sanctions on Khartoum. The League of Islamic Peace, the largest non-governmental international Muslim organization, called on Islamic countries to support Sudan and its efforts to overcome the crisis.

BLOOD SMELLS LIKE OIL

In the Darfur crisis, like many other crisis situations, the underlying conflict is a struggle for raw materials, in this case oil. South Darfur, like all of South Sudan, is rich in oil. At the beginning of 2009, the country's proven oil reserves amounted to 5 billion tons. ⁵ barrels. Oil production in the country increased to 500 thousand barrels. In 2007, compared to 270 thousand in 2003, Sudan planned to produce 600 thousand tons per day in 2009. barrels of oil per day ⁶.

The United States is seeking to cut off access to Sudan's oilfields to its main competitors-China, France, India and Malaysia. Chevron, an American company that had invested $ 1.2 billion in exploration for Sudanese oil, ⁷ left the country in 1985. Its specialists have discovered a number of oil fields, but they are too small for it to be profitable to develop them in the zone of instability. When the real scale of oil reserves became apparent, American companies had already left the country. In 1997, the economic sanctions imposed by the United States on Sudan, put the American

The article was prepared with the financial support of the Russian State Scientific Foundation; project N 09 - 01 - 000 - 31 a / R.

Investment in the country is illegal. ⁸ The United States hopes for a change in the regime of Omar al-Bashir, which would open up Sudan's vast oil reserves to American companies. In the meantime, oil goes to competitors of the United States, primarily to China.

AID AND INVESTMENT - IN EXCHANGE FOR OIL

China needs oil resources for its rapid growth. African oil accounts for 28% of Chinese oil imports. It was not by chance that Beijing found itself in the sphere of its interests in Africa. First of all, this is due to the significant oil reserves on the continent. If in 1976 they were estimated at 8.7 billion tons, then in 2007 they reached 15.6 billion tons. (9.23% of world reserves) ⁹.

The success of its oil strategy in Africa is largely due to Beijing's position, repeatedly voiced by the country's leaders: China does not interfere in the internal affairs of other states. It is ready to cooperate with any regime, without being conditioned by the requirements of democracy, good governance or human rights. It was this key that opened Beijing's door to Sudan. China became the country's oil partner in 1997, filling the vacuum created by the departure of Western companies. In 1999, it received less than 1% of its oil imports from Sudan; in early 2007, it received 7% ^.10 Today, Sudan is the second African source of Beijing's oil imports after Angola. In 2008, China imported 60% of Sudan's oil product11 (according to other sources, 40%) 12.

In an effort to meet its own energy needs, China is also doing a lot of good for the Sudanese economy. The joint venture-Great Nile Petroleum Operating Company, 40% owned by China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), has invested $ 5 billion in a number of projects in the oil industry ¹³, including a tanker terminal near Port Sudan, an oil pipeline to transport oil from the field to the terminal, an oil refinery. With China's help, Sudan has transformed itself from an oil importer to an oil exporter, and has developed its own oil industry.¹⁴

In recent years, China has become the main trading partner of Sudan and the largest investor in the Sudanese economy. Of the 15 foreign companies operating in Sudan, 13 are Chinese. Among the projects implemented with China's help are the construction of dams, hydroelectric power stations, textile factories, assistance in agriculture, medicine, and education. China has invested $ 750 million to build a new airport in Khartoum. In March 2009, Sudan's President Omar al-Bashir inaugurated the Meroe hydroelectric power hub , the largest structure on the Nile River after the Aswan dam. The project was implemented by a Chinese consortium and cost $ 2 billion to build. The 1,250 MW HPP is expected to double the country's electricity generation.¹⁵

China is constantly accused of continuing to maintain military contacts with the Sudan, despite the embargo imposed by Security Council resolution 1556 in July 2004 on the supply of weapons to non-governmental forces operating in Darfur, including the Janjaweed armed groups, by supplying it with weapons that somehow end up in the zone conflict resolution. Beijing, however, maintains that its military cooperation with Sudan does not threaten the peace, stability and security of the region and does not constitute interference in the country's internal affairs. Liu Guijin, the Chinese government's Special Representative for Darfur, said in London in February 2008 that, according to international statistics, the United States accounted for the largest volume of arms shipments (36%), while China accounted for only 8% of Sudanese arms imports in 2006, and according to data released by the US Congress in September 2007, - and at all 3%. At the same time, all supplies are recorded in the UN register; thus, China complies with the transparency mechanism for military supplies.¹⁶

Commenting on media reports that Chinese weapons are being used in Darfur, Chinese officials say that contacts with Khartoum are legitimate, and it is extremely difficult to trace the transfer of weapons to illegal armed groups. "We warn the Sudanese government that weapons imported from China should not be used in Darfur," they say17.

Along with supplying weapons, China is cooperating with Sudan in training military personnel. So, in April 2008 in Nanjing (prov. A mine clearance course funded by the Government of the People's Republic of China was organized for representatives of Sudan. About 20 Sudanese officers have completed a training course at the People's Liberation Army University (PLA). Equipment for mine detection and clearance was transferred to Sudan ¹⁸.

CHINA LOBBY AT THE UN

China has supported Khartoum internationally. He managed, under the threat of a veto, to soften UN Security Council Resolution 1556, which called on the Government of Sudan to disarm the Janjaweed . Beijing abstained in March 2005 from voting on UN Security Council Resolution 1593, which required the transfer of cases of war crimes committed in Sudan to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. In April 2006, Resolution No. 1672 was voted on, accusing Sudanese officials of war crimes.-

He has reduced the list of individuals (from 17 to 4) who were subject to travel bans and financial sanctions. In August 2006, he voted against a resolution that called for the deployment of a UN peacekeeping contingent to Darfur, which was supposed to be used to help AU peacekeepers, which the Sudanese President strongly opposed. China insisted that the UN Security Council resolution providing for the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force for Darfur include a condition that the deployment of these forces can only take place with the consent of Khartoum. During the China-Africa Forum summit in Beijing in November 2006, Omar al-Bashir publicly thanked China for its support in the UN vote.

HOW DOES BEIJING VIEW THE DARFUR ISSUE

In recent years, the Western media has relentlessly exaggerated the topic of China's cooperation with the Sudanese regime, claiming that its interest in oil resources encourages it to turn a blind eye to the genocide in Darfur. China is accused of not listening to the voice of civil society ¹⁹.

In response to these accusations, Deputy Chinese Foreign Minister Zhang Jun said in October 2006: "China-Sudan energy cooperation and the Darfur issue are different things. Our country pays close attention to the problem of Darfur and hopes for a rapid improvement in the humanitarian situation in the region." He recalled that China had provided financial resources to the African Union for the peacekeeping operation in Darfur three times since 2005.20

In March 2008, China's Special Representative for Darfur, Liu Guijin, donated 20 million yuan ($2.8 million) to the Government of Sudan for humanitarian assistance to the province. In total, "China has provided five tranches of humanitarian aid totaling 80 million yuan to Darfur," he said. At the same time, he expressed Beijing's readiness to continue providing such assistance. Chinese companies have spent approximately $ 59 million on development projects in Darfur.²¹ It was reported that since 2000, They have built 20 power plants, dug 40 wells, built an 85-kilometer water supply system in Southern Darfur, and provided equipment to local schools, including distance learning systems, computer labs,and teaching aids. ²²

Criticism of China as an "accomplice of genocide" negatively affected the country's image in the run-up to the 2008 Olympics. Western media exaggerated the statement of the famous director Steven Spielberg, who refused to participate in the opening and closing ceremonies of the Olympic Games in Beijing. And American actress and UN Children's Fund goodwill Ambassador Mia Farrow said the Games will go down in history as an "Olympic genocide" because China is the most important ally of the Sudanese government accused of genocide.²³

Chinese officials strongly objected to such accusations. "Darfur is an internal matter of Sudan," the Chinese representative said at the international conference on Darfur in Beijing in June 2008. We hope that all peoples and organizations interested in solving this problem will appreciate China's constructive role in helping to solve this problem and stop making unjustified accusations against it. " ²⁴

China sees the reason for the conflict not in the policy of the al-Bashir regime, but in the unwillingness of the warring parties to sit down at the negotiating table. "China's position on the situation in Darfur is very clear," Zhai Jun said in January 2007. " We stand for peace and stability in Darfur, in Sudan, and in the entire African region." At the same time, he called the components of the Darfur problem the achievement of a political settlement and reconciliation of the warring forces; determining the format of the UN peacekeeping forces; and contributing to the solution of humanitarian problems in the region25.

AFRICAN PEACEKEEPERS IN DARFUR

In June 2004, the African Union decided to send its peacekeepers to Darfur. African countries have provided military contingents to participate in the AU operation in Darfur (AMIS), while the UN, EU and NATO have provided funding, logistics and transport support. Khartoum regarded as a successful initiative of the AU, which allowed avoiding US and EU sanctions.

Initially, the AU's role in the conflict in Darfur was limited to sending military observers; their function was to monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement. However, at the initiative of President Obasanjo of Nigeria, who headed the AU from July 2004 to June 2005, the number of observers, as well as peacekeepers and civilian police, deployed to the conflict zone was increased to 3,500, ²⁶ and in 2006 the number of observers was increased to 3,500. it has already reached 7,000 people. In 2006, peacekeepers were supposed to enforce ceasefire agreements between the rebels and the Sudanese Government, which, however, were repeatedly disrupted.

In May 2006, with the assistance of the AU, another truce agreement was reached between the Government of Sudan and the largest rebel group, the Sudan Liberation Movement (SLM), in Abuja, Nigeria. However, it was not supported by other rebel groups.

FINDING A SOLUTION TO THE CRISIS SITUATION

Negotiations on the transformation of AMIS into a United Nations mission (UNMIS) were hampered by the tough position of Khartoum, which did not agree to such a transformation. However, the ongoing standoff in Sudan and the" spreading " of the conflict, which has drawn first Chad and then the Central African Republic (CAR) into its orbit, forced the Sudanese leadership to agree to find a joint solution to the Darfur crisis with the UN. The meeting in Addis Ababa in November 2006 with the participation of UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, President of the African Union, was an important step towards resolving the conflict. Representatives of the permanent members of the UN Security Council-Russia, China, the United States, France and the United Kingdom, representatives of African countries-the Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Egypt, as well as the Arab League, the EU and Sudan. As a result of the meeting, a three-stage plan for the Darfur settlement was developed. The first phase began in January 2007. AMIS forces were reinforced with 105 military personnel, 33 police advisers and 48 UN civilian representatives.²⁷ $ 21 million was planned to support the AU ²⁸ force. The second stage involved the development of a specific mechanism for strengthening AMIS by the UN military contingent during trilateral consultations between the AU, the UN and the Sudanese authorities.

The implementation of the final stage of the plan - the creation of a "hybrid" AU/UN force-caused the greatest difficulties. At the AU Peace and Security Council meeting in Abuja on November 30, 2006. Sudan insisted that the military contingent and police forces of the new peacekeeping mission should be formed exclusively from formations of African States. "We need," al - Bashir said, " an African force. We can accept technical, financial support, and advice from the UN, but not a UN force. " ²⁹

BEIJING AS AN INTERMEDIARY

At this stage, the Chinese leadership, apparently taking into account the criticism in its address, intensified negotiations with the government of al-Bashir, encouraging him to agree to accept a three-phase plan for the deployment of" hybrid " peacekeeping forces of the AU and the UN. In January 2007, Khartoum was visited by the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. Chinese Foreign Minister Zhai Jun, who said at the end of the trip that Chinese President Hu Jintao's upcoming visit to Sudan will bring peace and stability to Darfur ³⁰.

When Hu visited Sudan in February 2007, he talked to al-Bashir and urged him not to obstruct the presence of UN peacekeepers. As Andrew Natsios, the US Special Presidential Envoy to Sudan, told the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in April 2007: "China supports efforts to resolve the situation in Darfur by peaceful means, encouraging Khartoum to allow UN peacekeepers to enter the region..." and expressed the hope that if joint efforts to persuade Khartoum fail, " Beijing will join in the international community and will agree to apply more effective measures, including sanctions, to the Sudan. " ³¹

After Hu Jintao's visit to Khartoum, China's influence on the situation in Sudan grew, and the Chinese leader appeared before the world community as a mediator in resolving the Darfur conflict. Accompanying the guest, al-Bashir said that it is China that guarantees stability and security to Sudan.³² However, political commentator and editor-in-chief of the Sudanese weekly Elaff, H. Tijani, said:: "I don't think Sudan will benefit from the Chinese president's visit. The best thing China can do is help ease the pressure on Sudan. " ³³

Beijing continued to demonstrate its willingness to seek Khartoum's consent to deploy a hybrid UN / AU force in Darfur. Thus, the Chinese representative to the UN publicly expressed dissatisfaction with the policy of Khartoum in connection with a letter sent in March 2007 by President al-Bashir to UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, in which some plans for the deployment of "hybrid" forces were rejected. And China's representative to the UN said that an agreement had been reached with the Government of Sudan to deploy a 3,000-strong UN peacekeeping force in Darfur by the end of 2007, with helicopters at its disposal to support the poorly equipped 7,000-strong AU peacekeeping force, and in these circumstances, sanctions are meaningless.

China's position was supported by the representative of South Africa to the UN D. Kumalo: "It is not clear why sanctions are necessary if Sudan has met UN demands for the deployment of peacekeepers." ³⁴ In seeking Sudan's consent to deploy a "hybrid" peacekeeping force, Beijing has tried to resort to economic pressure. Thus, the Chinese National Development and Reform Commission said that if al-Bashir persists in refusing to allow UN peacekeepers into the country, Sudan will no longer receive a privileged status in trade with China, and the latter will give up some of the financial benefits promised to Chinese investors in Sudan.

Liu Guijin, who was appointed Beijing's Special Representative for Darfur in May 2007, made four short visits to Sudan, including two to Darfur. Following his May 2007 visit, he said that there was a positive moment in the Darfur process and strongly opposed the new sanctions: "If you put pressure on Sudan, it will not help solve the problem of Darfur, but will only complicate it."

the situation " ³⁵. In September 2007, China sent Liu Guijin to the United Nations headquarters in New York to explain its policy in the region and put an end to accusations that its economic interests led it to turn a blind eye to human rights violations in countries such as Sudan. In October 2007, Liu Guijin attended a peace conference with representatives of the Sudanese Government and opposition in Sirte, Libya, where he met and talked with representatives of opposition groups, urging them to reach a peace agreement through dialogue and consultation. ³⁶ During a visit to Sudan in February 2008, the Chinese envoy appealed to groups operating in Darfur to resume negotiations with the Sudanese Government. "The reluctance of the main rebel groups to return to the negotiating table has resulted in a sad delay in the political process in Darfur," Liu Guijin said on his arrival in Khartoum ³⁷.

In June 2008, an International Conference on Darfur was held in Beijing, where China's position on the issue was expressed, including the following provisions::

1. Sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Sudan;

2. Political solution to the Darfur problem through dialogue and consultation;

3. The main role of the "triple mechanism" - the UN, the AU and the Government of the Sudan in solving the problem;

4. Balancing peacekeeping operations and the political process in the Sudan;

5. Assistance from the international community to improve the humanitarian and security situation in Sudan and to restore peace and stability in the region.

At the same time, China provides unconditional support to the "triple mechanism", and itself became the first country to send peacekeepers to Darfur.³⁸

IS THERE A LIGHT VISIBLE AT THE END OF THE TUNNEL?

On July 31, 2007, the UN Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution No. 1769 on the deployment of a "hybrid" UN peacekeeping mission in Darfur with the AU-UNAMID, supporting the agreements reached a year earlier in Addis Ababa that the operation should be mainly "African" in nature and consist of military contingents sent, if possible, countries of the continent. China takes credit for the adoption of this resolution, since at that time its representative was acting as the President of the Security Council and not only promoted the adoption of the resolution, but also announced that Beijing would send as many peacekeepers as needed to Darfur.³⁹

The first units of the hybrid mission were deployed in January 2008. As of October 2008, the total number of UNAMID armed personnel was 10,527, including 8,579 military personnel and 1,948 police officers.⁴⁰ By November 2009, the military contingent of the hybrid operation amounted to 13,000 people (68% of the UN-approved size of UNAMID).⁴¹. The operation is expected to be fully operational by the end of 2009.

However, the situation in Darfur remains tense. In February 2009, there appeared to be progress: an agreement was signed between Khartoum and the rebel group Justice for Equality (JEM), but it is not being implemented. The situation was further aggravated by the expulsion of 13 non-governmental organizations from the country in March 2009 and the suspension of the work of three local NGOs, which created problems with the delivery of food and medicine to the population.⁴² This action was taken by Khartoum to protest the demand of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (ICC), Luis Moreno Ocampo, to issue an arrest warrant for President Al-Bashir of Sudan "for genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes"^.43 The ICC's position also provoked a negative reaction in Beijing. Liu Guijin stated in particular that it seriously hinders the progress of the political process in Darfur and will not serve peace and stability in the country and the region. " ⁴⁴

According to Rodolfo Adad, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of the Congo, who headed UNAMID until recently, the situation in Darfur has changed from a period of "high intensity", when thousands of people were killed, to a "low-intensity conflict". He gave the following figures: between January 2008 and March 2009, 2,000 people were killed in Darfur, one third of them civilians; 4.7 million people are in dire need of assistance. At the same time, however, according to R. Adad, the risk of an escalation of armed violence is not excluded ⁴⁵.

Active mediation efforts in resolving the Darfur conflict were undertaken this year by Russia. On January 25-30, 2009, the Russian President's Special Representative for Sudan, Mikhail Margelov, visited Khartoum to discuss the situation in Darfur and South Sudan with the country's leadership. On October 6-7, a scientific and practical conference on the Sudan problem was held in Moscow, organized by the Institute of the Middle East and the Institute of Modern Development. The conference was attended by a large delegation of Sudan, special representatives for Sudan from the UN, the EU, the United States, China, as well as representatives of Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, the leadership of the AU, the Arab League, international humanitarian organizations, the Minister of State of Qatar, Russian diplomats and scientists. According to Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Saltanov, the Moscow meeting was unprecedented in nature, since such "brainstorming sessions"on the Sudanese issue have not yet been undertaken. ⁴⁶ During this first conference in Russia-

Such a wide-ranging meeting on the Sudan problem discussed the prospects for the development of the political situation in Darfur and ways to resolve it. At the same time, it allowed Russia to demonstrate its interest in solving this problem and offer its own approaches to resolving the Darfur crisis.

The position of the PRC causes a negative attitude in the West, but in Africa it is treated with sympathy as evidence of Beijing's unwillingness to follow the lead of the United States and "defame" regimes that Washington does not like.

It should be noted that China's mediation efforts in the Darfur conflict are positively assessed by the UN leadership. Ban Ki-moon described China's role in Sudan as "useful":"The Chinese Government is making great efforts on the issue of Darfur, which I understand and appreciate." ⁴⁷ The UN Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping, Jean-Marie Guenno, also said that China "plays a very important and constructive role" in helping to resolve the Darfur conflict, and expressed the hope that China will be able to help find a political solution to the conflict and promote the conclusion of a negotiated peace agreement.⁴⁸

* * *

The extent to which China is willing to put pressure on Sudan over Darfur remains an open question. It is obvious that the Beijing leadership will not risk taking too drastic steps, given China's dependence on access to Sudan's oil resources. At the same time, China has an advantage that other countries do not have: it does business with a government that is rejected by the West, and therefore has a unique opportunity to play the role of intermediary. However, excessive pressure on the Sudanese regime may deprive Beijing of another advantage - to act as an alternative to the West in Africa and, as a result, weaken its position on the continent.

^{Taylor Ian.} 1 China's New Role in Africa. Boulder, 2009. P. 52.

² BBC Russian.com.5 June, 2008 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/Russian/international/newsid.7437000/7437948.htm

³ The Sudanese node should not become a" noose " for Russia -http://www.islam.ru.pressclub. 9.08.2004.

⁴ Security Council. 6112^th Meetting. 27 April 2009 -http://win.mail/cgj -bin/redmsg

⁵ Energy Information Administration. Country Analysis Briefs. September 2009.

⁶ Rossiyskaya gazeta. Economy - rg.ru. 8.12.2008.

^{Engdam, William F.} 7 Kitai i SSHA v novoy kholodnoy voyny iz-za neftyanykh bogatstv Afrika [China and the United States in the New Cold War because of the oil Wealth of Africa]. http://www.warandpeace.ru/ru/exclusive/view/11519

^{Abdulkhakov Muslim.} 8 "The Battle for Africa". What is behind the Darfur crisis? - Islam.<url> / Press Club - http://www.islam.ru/

⁹ Mirovaya energetika, Moscow, 2009. February, No. 2 (61).

^{Feinstein Lee.} 10 China and Sudan. America Abroad. Notes on Foreign Affairs. 24.04.2007 - http://www.tpmcafe.con/blog/americaabroad/2007/apr/24/china

¹¹ Khartoum - Beijing relations. China Institute. University of Alberta. 25.02.2008 - http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm

¹² Sudan doubles crude exports to China in 2007. China Institute. University of Alberta. 22.01.2008 - http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/nav03.cfm

¹³ Press review. August 12, 2009 - Polpred.com

^{Taylor Ian.} 14 China's oil diplomacy in Africa // International Affairs. 2006, V. 82. N 5. P. 940.

¹⁵ The Merowe Dam is a multipurpose project, says State Minister of Irrigation// Sudan Vision Daily. Official Webside. Jan. 13, 2009.

¹⁶ Xinhua News Agency Newsletter. February 22, 2008

¹⁷ China's Position on the Issue of Darfur, Sudan. International Conference on Darfur: Peace and Development. June 26 - 27, 2008. China Institute of International Studies (CSIIS). Beijing, China - http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cbceun/eng

¹⁸ ITAR-TASS. April 30, 2008

^{Akwe Amosu.} 19 China in Africa. It's (still) the governance, stupid // Foreign Policy in Focus. March 9, 2007.

²⁰ People's Daily online. 27.10.2006 - http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/4967290.html

²¹ ITAR-TASS. 12.03.2008.

²² China's Position on the Issue of Darfur...

^{Malakunas Karl.} 23 China feels rising cost of interests in Africa // Mail and Guardian Online. 25.04.2007 - http://www.mg.co.za/articlePage.aspx

²⁴ China's Position on the Issue of Darfur...

²⁵ http://www.rol.ru/news/misc/newssng/07/01/24.012.htm

²⁶ African Union: Speed troop development, insist on rights provision. December 2004 - http://hrw.org.english/docs/2004/12/10/sudan.9818 txt.html

²⁷ UN News Service. 16.11.2006- http://www.un.org/russian/news/fullstorynews.asp?NewsID=6498

²⁸ Plan leading to hybrid UN-African Union Mission in Darfur accepted - Annan. UN News Service. December 27, 2006 -www.allAfrica.com/stories/printable/200612280003.html

²⁹ African force to stay in Darfur. BBC News. 11.30.2006 -www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk/mpapps/pagetools/print/news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6197166

^{Gabuev A.} 30 Novaya politika Pekina v Afrika [Beijing's New Policy in Africa]. 2007, N 6. P. 5.

^{Fisher Thompson.} 31 Top US diplomat cites Chinese cooperation on Darfur // News US Department of State. Wash. D.C. April 11, 2007 - allAfrica.com

^{Gabuev A.} 32 New policy of Beijing in Africa...

³³ The Christian Science Monitor. 02.02.2007.

³⁴ China, Russia, South Africa oppose UN sanctions on Sudan. United Nations. April 18, 2007 - http://www.sudan.net/news/posted/14508.html

³⁵ China opposes new Sudan sanctions, defends oil cooperation // Africa. May 29, 2007 - http://news.monstersandcritics.com/Africa/news/article13105551.php

³⁶ China's Position on the Issue of Darfur...

³⁷ Beijing calls on the conflicting parties in Darfur to return to the negotiating table. 25.02.2008 - http://www.gfs.com.ua/news/phpid=11796

³⁸ China's Position on the Issue of Darfur...

³⁹ Kommersant. 19.06.2007. N 104 (3680).

⁴⁰ Report of the Secretary-General on the deployment of the African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur, S/2007/759, 24 December 2007, and S/2008/659, 17 October 2008 - http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN. http://daccess-ods.un.org/TMP/720132.4.html

⁴¹ Views. Business newspaper. 6.10.2009.

⁴² Security Council. 6112^th Meetting...

⁴³ Darfur, Sudan. No end in sight to violence. 10 June, 2009 OCHA -http://ochaonline.Un.org/News/Features/Darfur/Sudan/10June2009.

⁴⁴ People's Daily online. 06.03.2009 - http://russian.people.com.cn/31521/6607862.html

⁴⁵ Ibid., 29 April - 25 May, 2009 OCHA - http://ochaonlinc. Un.org/News/Fcatures/ Darfur/Sudan/ 25 May 2009.

⁴⁶ Rossiyskaya gazeta. 7.10.2009.

^{Blanchard Ben.} 47 China defends its role in Africa ahead of G8 // Mail and Guardian On line. Wash. 04.06.2007 - http://www.mg.co.za/article

⁴⁸ China is helping resolve Darfur issue // People's Daily Online, September 12, 2007 - http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/6260551.html

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