S. V. KOSTELYANETS

Candidate of Political Sciences

Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Yemen, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Sudan, Morocco, Senegal, external intervention, civil war, international coalition

The rise in tensions in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) in recent years is accompanied by an unprecedented level of open military intervention by global and regional actors - as part of temporary international coalitions of various configurations - in internal conflicts that have flared up in a number of countries in the region. The main difference between such temporary coalitions and military-political blocs is their limited time and space limits and the specific tasks assigned to them. In this regard, it is important to consider the reasons and the process of creating military coalitions, the determining element of which is to compare the costs of attracting and retaining States in the coalition with the military, political, and image advantages obtained from their participation. It is also important to legitimize military intervention, which is more easily solved by a broad coalition.

Currently, in this region, military coalitions are involved in civil wars in Libya, Syria, Iraq and Yemen. The international coalition also operates in neighboring Afghanistan. From the point of view of analyzing the parameters of African countries ' participation in military coalitions, the Saudi-led operation in Yemen is the most interesting. Although this is not the only international military operation in which African countries are partners, it is here that they are most widely represented.

The current civil war in Yemen, which began in the summer of 2014, is another round of conflict between the Shiite - Zaydi* living in the north of the country and demanding autonomy or even the creation of a theocratic state in Yemen, and the Sunni majority government. It is believed that the Zaydites are supported by Iran, as well as the Shiites of other countries.

The Zaydites dominated Northern Yemen for over a thousand years until 1962. As a result of the 1962-1968 civil war, they effectively lost control of the country's government. The armed confrontation between 2004 and 2010 ended with a truce that provided guarantees of civil rights to Yemeni Shiites.

2011-2012 Yemen was plunged into a political crisis triggered by the events of the Arab Spring in other MENA countries, but the main cause of which was its own socio-economic difficulties.¹

In 2014, the Zaydites, who did not benefit from regime change in Yemen, took advantage of the government's failures in economic reforms and the fight against corruption, as well as the removal of fuel subsidies, and in a wave of popular discontent took control of several provinces in the north of the country and moved to the capital, Sanaa. By the spring of 2015, the Houthis had almost the entire west of Yemen under their control, and their forces were close to Aden, the former capital of South Yemen and the stronghold of President Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, who was overthrown and fled. The success of the Houthis greatly alarmed the monarchies of the Persian Gulf, who feared the emergence of a Shiite state in their "soft underbelly" in the context of the escalating confrontation with Iran.

The international military operation in Yemen against the Houthi rebel movement and its supporting units of the Yemeni army began in March 2015. Following the American model, it received high-profile names-first "Storm of Determination", then - "Revival of Hope". The first stage involved the Koali armed forces-

* The Zaydites are adherents of a branch of Shi'ism, named after the Islamic theologian Zayd ibn Ali (695-740). They formed the Zaydite state in Yemen in 901.

* * The Houthis are a militant group of Zaydi Shiites, named after its founder, Hussein al-Houthi, who was killed by the Yemeni army in September 2004 during the suppression of the Shiite uprising. author's note).

There are 9 Arab States, including three African States - Egypt, Morocco and the Sudan. It quickly became clear that air attacks on the Hu-Sith alone would not turn the tide of the civil war. With the expansion of the ground operation, the armed forces of Senegal were officially involved in the pei, and unofficially-a number of other African countries.

To date, 10 countries formally participate in the coalition. In addition to the four African States listed, these are Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and Jordan. According to UN and international press reports, Eritrea and Somalia, in addition to providing the coalition with their ports, also sent up to half a thousand of their military personnel to Yemen. Another possible participant in the operation, Mauritania, negotiated with the coalition in October 2015 to send soldiers to the Arabian Peninsula. Djibouti is also indirectly involved in the operation. Although the republic declined an offer to join the Saudi-led coalition, it hosts the only U.S. military base in Africa from which the Americans provide assistance to their allies.

The specific task of the operation is to support Yemeni President Mysore Hadi and regain control of the country.

There are three main features of this coalition::

- first of all, this is the first time since the Arab-Israeli wars that such a broad coalition of Arab and African countries has operated without the direct involvement of the US armed forces;

- Secondly, Saudi Arabia, the leader of the coalition, and its closest allies needed to attract significant diplomatic and financial resources to create it: after all, they involved not only their traditional partners in the coalition, but also countries that had recently helped the Houthis and maintained good relations with Iran; for this, the Gulf monarchies had to resort not only to their traditional partners, but also to to promises of financial injections to the countries participating in the coalition, but in some cases to threats of economic sanctions;

- third, African countries play an extremely important role as suppliers of manpower against the background of the Gulf Arabs ' unwillingness to bear heavy losses in a ground operation.

WITHOUT THE US, BUT WITH THE HELP OF THE US

Undoubtedly, without the support of the United States, the Arab coalition in Yemen would hardly have taken place. From the very beginning of the operation, the United States sharply increased the supply of weapons to the Gulf countries, including the aerial bombs used by the coalition. The Americans provide logistical, intelligence, search and rescue support, as well as implement an embargo on the supply of weapons to the Houthis by water.

The Obama administration's desire to relinquish leadership in intervention wherever possible was evident as early as 2011 in Libya, where the United States ' European allies assumed this role.² If in Libya the United States formally participated in the coalition, then in Yemen its role was reduced to the minimum necessary for the American allies. Against this background, Saudi Arabia had an opportunity to prove to Washington and the whole world the ability of Muslim (more precisely, Sunni Muslim) countries to independently protect their interests.

It should be recalled that the countries of the region already had a relatively recent experience of independent coalition actions before the events in Yemen. In Bahrain, in 2011, the army and police units of Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan took part in the suppression of protests. In 2014-2015. Egypt and the United Arab Emirates conducted a low-intensity air campaign in Libya in support of the internationally recognized Libyan government based in the east of the country - in Tobruk.³ But the operation in Yemen is a different phenomenon, involving aircraft, naval forces, and ground forces, and the geography of participants is much broader.

Meanwhile, building a broad coalition proved to be a difficult challenge for the Saudis, and not always successful. For example, Saudi Arabia was seriously counting on Pakistan, which received $ 1.5 billion in grants from Riyadh alone in 2014. The alliance of Saudi Arabia and Pakistan dates back decades, and Pakistan has previously sent troops to Saudi Arabia to protect the Kingdom from external threats. However, Islamabad rejected the offer to participate in the current coalition, fearing worsening relations between Shiites and Sunnis inside the country and increasing tensions with its neighbor Iran, and limited the participation of two Navy ships in the blockade of the Yemeni coast solely in compliance with UN Security Council resolution No. 2216 of April 14, 2015 on the supply embargo. Weapons to Yemen! In many ways, it was Pakistan's refusal to provide a ground contingent that led to the fact that-

The participation of African States in the operation has become critically necessary.

EGYPT, MOROCCO, SENEGAL AND SUDAN: STRANGE ALLIES

Riyadh's most important African ally is undoubtedly Egypt. The current Egyptian government, led by Abdel Fatah al-Sisi, came to power in 2013, and the country's economy is buoyant thanks largely to financial assistance from the Gulf Arab monarchies.⁵

Shortly before the start of the operation in Yemen, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait promised Egypt an additional $12 billion. to stabilize the economy ⁶. The monarchies also sponsor arms purchases for the Egyptian army, one of the strongest and most numerous in the region: since 2014, Egypt has received only 4 corvettes, a frigate, 24 fighter jets from France and is awaiting delivery of two Mistral helicopter carriers originally intended for Russia. It's no secret that there are about 8 billion rubles. The amount of euros required to pay for arms contracts with France was provided by Saudi Arabia.⁷ Egypt also has a strategic interest in Yemen-ensuring the safety of maritime transport on the Red Sea. Against this background, it would seem that Egypt's contribution to the intervention in Yemen undertaken by Riyadh should have become tangible, but here history intervenes in geopolitical situations.

Egypt already participated in the Yemeni civil war in the 1960s and suffered, according to various estimates, heavy losses-over 10 thousand people. killed ⁸. Although the outcome of that war was the victory of the Egyptian-backed Republicans over the Zaydite monarchists, the price was too high. Sending a ground force to Yemen would be extremely unpopular among the Egyptian population, which, as Hosni Mubarak once put it, suffers from "Yemen syndrome"⁹, and the government could not ignore this factor.

As a result, Egypt's participation in the coalition, according to Cairo, was limited to sending a few warships to the coast of Yemen. These ships, however, were directly involved in the bombardment of the Houthi positions. According to Reuters, 800 Egyptian troops with tanks and armored personnel carriers landed in Yemen in September 2015.10 On ^the one hand, this means that Egypt to some extent yielded to the persuasions of its Arabian sponsors. On the other hand, it is obvious that this is not the number of soldiers that can seriously change anything in the balance of forces in Yemen. For comparison, in the 1960s. Egypt sent a 70-thousandth contingent to this country.

Morocco, another long - time African ally of the Arabian monarchies, sent 6 F-16 aircraft to participate in the operation in Yemen. Morocco's participation in the coalition is conditioned by two factors: the economic assistance of the Arabian monarchies and their support for Rabat's position on the Western Sahara issue. Morocco has already received $3 billion. of the $5 billion in gratuitous aid planned for 2012-2017 from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait and Qatar, ¹¹ this allowed the North African kingdom to significantly reduce its budget deficit.

The political support of the Arab Gulf states for Morocco's position on Western Sahara is also very important for Rabat because of the policies of the African Union and many non-African countries that recognize the territory's independence. The Gulf monarchies have repeatedly supported Morocco in the UN, preventing the adoption of resolutions condemning Morocco in relation to Western Sahara, or softening their tone.¹²

In May 2015, one Moroccan F-16 crashed (or was shot down), but participation in the Rabat coalition was not questioned, and the Moroccan press has been actively discussing the prospects of the Moroccan army's participation in ground operations in Yemen since the fall of 2015. Moreover, in December 2015, some publications claimed that Moroccan soldiers were already in the zone of operation ¹^. We are talking about sending 1,500 soldiers from the elite formation of the Moroccan Armed Forces - the royal military gendarmerie-to Yemen.

The next member of the broad coalition is Senegal. The country sent 2,100 troops to Saudi Arabia in May 2015. Senegalese defend the Kingdom's southern border from Houthi attacks. In 1991, during the Iraq War, Senegal already sent 500 soldiers to participate in the operation to liberate Kuwait. As they did 24 years ago, Senegalese officials have expressed the need to protect the holy sites of Mecca and the historical ties between Senegal and Saudi Arabia. ¹⁴

However, there are much more prosaic reasons for sending the army for 7 thousand kilometers. Dakar recently announced that Riyadh is ready to invest a significant amount in the Senegalese Development Program, the total amount of which is supposed to be $17 billion.¹⁵ Although the size of Saudi Arabia's participation in the project was not announced, it can be assumed that we are talking about several billion US dollars.

Perhaps the most unexpected member of the coalition is Sudan. Back in 2014, Sudan's relations with Saudi Arabia were extremely complicated: according to publications in the Sudanese press, the organization of protests in Khartoum in September 2013 against the abolition of fuel subsidies could have been precisely the Saudi special services, who were preparing another "Arab" revolution. According to official figures alone, 84 people were killed in the crackdown on these protests.¹⁶ At the same time, the development of Sudanese-Iranian relations seemed to be a long-term strategy for Khartoum. Iran supplied weapons and military technology to Sudan and trained Sudanese military specialists. With Iranian help, Sudan has built the country's largest military-industrial complex, Yar Muk, and two air bases. In return, Iran freely used the ports of Sudan and was able to transport weapons through its territory to Palestine, Lebanon, Somalia and Yemen, including the Houthis.¹⁷

The reversal of the Sudanese foreign policy course began in October 2014, when, after a visit to Saudi Arabia, President Omar al-Bashir compared the Houthis to the Islamic State( IS), saying that the Houthis are even more dangerous than IS. Saudi Arabia not only threatened al-Bashir with severe economic sanctions if he supported the Yemeni rebels, but also offered significant financial assistance for breaking with Iran and participating in the war with the Houthis.

Obviously, the conditions proposed by Riyadh were acceptable for Khartoum, since in early 2015, the Sudanese authorities agreed to the initiative of Saudi Arabia to intervene in the Yemeni conflict, and in January 2016 they severed diplomatic relations with Tehran after Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.

In March 2015 Sudan officially joined the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, allocated 3 aircraft for the operation, and by the beginning of 2016 had already sent 900 soldiers there. ¹⁸ Khartoum said it was ready to provide more than 6 thousand troops to participate in the operation. military personnel with combat experience, including in mountain conditions ¹⁹.

Like most other African members of the coalition, Sudan attributed its participation in the campaign to Islamic solidarity in response to the threat to the mosques of Mecca and Medina.²⁰ But the financial component of his motivation is obvious: Riyadh and Doha have already placed $2 billion. on accounts with the Central Bank of Sudan ²¹. Negotiations are underway with investors from the UAE to sell them 1 million hectares of Sudanese agricultural land, which will entail investments in the Sudanese economy in the amount of $10 billion.²² Another $300 million. Saudi companies have allocated ²⁵ million rubles for Sudan's irrigation and hydraulic engineering projects.

ERITREA, DJIBOUTI, MAURITANIA AND SOMALIA: "ON THE PICK-UP"

If the participation of Egypt, Morocco, Senegal and Sudan in the Saudi coalition is confirmed at the highest level, then a number of countries have not yet advertised their participation in the operation in Yemen. In October 2015, the UAE government-owned Khaleej Times newspaper published an article claiming that during the UAE Foreign Minister's visit to Nouakchott, an agreement was reached to send 500 Mauritanian troops to Yemen. The plausibility of this report is confirmed by the fact that the Deputy Minister of Defense of Saudi Arabia paid a visit to Nouakchott shortly after 11. ²⁴ Official Nouakchott has so far limited himself to stating his desire to join the anti-terrorist coalition of Muslim countries organized by Riyadh.²⁵

In April 2015, the Somali Foreign Minister announced that the Saudi-led coalition had been granted permission to use the country's air, sea and land space. ²⁶ In return, Mogadishu received assistance in the form of armored personnel carriers, SUVs, tractors and other equipment from the UAE.²⁷

At the same time, there is growing evidence in the press in Somalia and other countries about the participation of Somali soldiers in the operation in Yemen. Thus, in September 2015, the chairman of the Somali refugee community in that country stated that the Somali military is already fighting in the ranks of the UAE contingent ²⁸. Presumably, we are talking about 500 military personnel who have completed training organized in Somalia by the military of the Emirates. Official Mogadishu denies sending troops to Yemen, perhaps out of fear of popular discontent, demanding that the Somali terrorist group Al-Shabaab be defeated first. ²⁹ However, if this information is even partially true, it can be argued that the participation of Somali soldiers has cost the coalition millions of dollars.

The report of the International Monitoring Group OOI1 on Somalia and Eritrea, dated October 19, 2015, provides evidence of Eritrea's involvement in the Yemen operation. It follows from the report that Eritrea receives funds from Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for the use of its air and sea space, the deployment of military units, and

There is also the alleged involvement of the Eritrean military in the Yemen campaign. The UN Monitoring Group claims that the UAE has leased the port of Assab, located 60 km off the coast of Yemen, for ³⁰ years.

A report by the US-based analytical agency Stratfor cites satellite photos of landing ships of the UAE Navy moored in ^this port31. Moreover, it appears that Eritrea has committed itself to prohibiting the Houthis from operating in any part of its territory. According to the report, the UN Monitoring Group received reports that approximately 400 Eritrean soldiers were included in the contingent of United Arab Emirates forces fighting in Yemen.³²

Official Asmara categorically rejected the provisions of the UN report. It should be noted that UN resolutions on Eritrea strictly prohibit both the participation of Eritrean soldiers in operations abroad, and the receipt by Eritrea of funds from outside for the maintenance of its armed forces or for use in their interests. Therefore, official recognition of Eritrea's participation in the Saudi coalition should not be expected.

Another African country, Djibouti, plays a special role in the Yemeni conflict. On its territory, the only US military base in Africa is located, from which the Americans, in fact, support the actions of the coalition. At the same time, according to the same UN report, before the conclusion of agreements with Eritrea, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates tried to negotiate with Djibouti on the use of its territory as part of their military campaign, but the negotiations ended in nothing. Interestingly, shortly thereafter, Djibouti offered to host a Chinese naval base on its territory for $100 million a year, and Beijing accepted the offer.³³

WITH AN EYE TO CREATING A SUNNI MILITARY-POLITICAL BLOC

Considering only the African component of the military coalition in Yemen, we can say that its creation cost the Arabian monarchies tens of billions of dollars, and their diplomats did a good job. Moreover, the coalition-building process is still ongoing, with billions of dollars in new payments and difficult negotiations ahead. The example of Djibouti showed that, despite the seemingly limitless financial resources of the leading coalition countries, they are nevertheless not willing to pay too much for military bases if there is an alternative, even in the" rogue " country of Eritrea. It is much more difficult to find States that are ready to send their soldiers to war, and here the attempts to attract Pakistan to the coalition and convince Egypt to allocate a large ground contingent for the operation are indicative.

Of course, the specifics of creating a coalition for operations in Yemen can and should be considered outside the framework of this conflict. Almost simultaneously with the outbreak of hostilities, negotiations were held in Riyadh, Cairo and a number of other Arab capitals on the creation of an all-Arab army, among the tasks of which would be to support the ruling regimes of the participating countries in internal conflicts.³⁴

In December 2015 Saudi Arabia announced the creation of an anti-terrorist coalition, which allegedly included 34 Muslim countries and whose headquarters will be located in Riyadh. (However, some of the countries listed by Saudi Arabia as members of this coalition reported that this issue was not even discussed with them. ³⁵) In this context, it was extremely important to show the effectiveness of a broad coalition of Arab and Muslim countries fighting on the side of the legitimate (in the eyes of the world community) Yemeni President Hadi. The unsatisfactory results of the air campaign and the actions of limited Arab contingents required the involvement of thousands of soldiers from other countries, mainly African.

A successful solution by the Saudi-led coalition to its task in Yemen would be very useful for the image of the Saudis, would help the reputation of the ruling dynasty, which considers itself the leader not only of the Arab, but also of the entire Muslim (Sunni) world. The ability of Saudi Arabia, following the example of the United States, not only to project military force beyond its borders, but also to coordinate the actions of a motley coalition of allied forces, would confirm its claim to such a status.

Although all current coalitions (with the exception of the US and its allies ' campaign against ISIS in Syria) operate at the invitation of internationally recognized governments, the legitimacy of these regimes is often controversial. Yemen is no exception, where the two-year mandate of President Hadi, who was elected in 2012, has long since expired.

They say that " winners are not judged." But will there be winners in Yemen?

¹ For more information, see: Kirichenko V. P. Yemen: Factors of political instability // Asia and Africa today.

2013. N 3. (Kirichenko V.P. 2013. Yemen: faktory politicheskoi nestabilnosti // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 3) (in Russian)

^{Fituni L. L., Abramova I. O.} 2 Aggressive non-state participants of geostrategic rivalry in "Islamic Africa" / / Asia and Africa Today. 2014. N 12. P. 10. (Fituni L. L., Abramova I. O. 2014. Agressivnie negosudarstvennie uchastniki ... v "islamskoi Afrike" // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian)

³ UAE and Egypt behind bombing raids against Libyan militias, say US officials // The Guardian, 26.08.2014 -http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/26/united-arab-emirates-bombing-raids-libyan- militias

⁴ Pakistan's Yemen Dilemma // The American Interest, 17.04.2015 - http://www.the-american-interest.com/2015/ 04/17/pakistans-yemen-dilemma

⁵ For more information, see: Vasiliev A.M., Korotaev A.V., Isaev L. M. Are the military back in power? // Asia and Africa today. 2014. N 10. (Vasiliev A.M., Korotaev A.V., lsaev L.M.

2014. Voennye vnov u vlasti? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 10) (in Russian)

⁶ Gulf States Pledge Aid to Egypt, U.S. Balks // The Wall Street Journal, 13.04.2015 - http://www.wsj.com/ articles/gulf-states-pledge-additional-12-billion-in-aid-to-egypt-1426262660

⁷ 950M Euro Mistral Ships Make Egypt France's Biggest Arms Customer // Defense-Aerospace.com, 12.10.2015 -http://www.defense-aerospace.com/articles-view/ feature/5/167716/with-mistral-contract, -egypt-becomes-france's-biggest-arms-buyer.html

⁸ How Yemen was once Egypt's Vietnam // The Washington Post, 28.03.2015 - https://www.Washington post.com/news/worldviews/wp/2015/03/28/how-yemen-was-once-egypts-vietnam

⁹ Rumsfeld's Rules - http://library.rumsfeld.com/doclib/ sp/2020/11 - 17 - 1983. Cable. Rumsfeld Mission - Meeting with President Mubarak, November 16.pdf

¹⁰ Egypt sends up to 800 ground troops to Yemen's war -Egyptian security sources. 9.09.2015 - http://uk.reuters.com/ article/uk-yemen-security-idU К KCN0R911720150909

¹¹ Morocco backs Saudi coalition in Yemen. 27.03.2015 -http://www.reuters.com/article/us-yemen-security-morocco-idUSKBNOMNI 9120150327#AiUTX9J Bin lyexikQ.97

¹² Why Morocco's Participation in Saudi-Led Coalition in Yemen is Justified. 26.05.2015 - http://www.morocco worldnews.com/20 15/0 5/1 59 387/why-moroccos-participation-in-saudi-led-coalition-in-yemen-is-justified

¹³ Fayalik al-darq al-harbi fi tariqiha ila al-yaman (Military Gendarmerie Corps on the way to Yemen) / / Assabah, 3.12.2015 - http://www.assabah.press.ma/index. php?option=com_content&view=artic]e&id=82460%3A201 5 - 12 - 03 - 17 - 32 - 14&catid=37%3Acat-laune&ltemid=782

¹⁴ Why Senegal is sending troops to help Saudi Arabia in Yemen // The Washington Post, 5.05.2015 https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/20 15/05/05/why-senegal-is-sending-troops-to-help-saudi-arabia-in-yemen

¹⁵ Why is Senegal sending troops to Saudi Arabia? 5.05.2015 - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-32589 561

¹⁶ Sudan raises death toll in fuel subsidy protests to 84 // Sudan Tribune, 05.11.2013 - http://sudantribune.com/spip. php?article48705

^{17. Kostelyanets S. V.} Regional'naia politika Sudana v kontekste arabskogo krizisa [Regional policy of Sudan in the context of the Arab crisis].

2015. N 7. (Kostelyanets S.V. 2015. Regionalnaya politika Sudana v kontekste arabskogo krizisa // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 7) (in Russian)

¹⁸ 400 more Sudanese soldiers arrive in Yemen // The Express Tribune, 9.11.2015 - http://tribune.com.pk/story/ 988098/400-more-sudanese-soldiers-arrive-in-yemen

¹⁹ Sudan Joining Saudi Campaign in Yemen Shows Shift in Region Ties. 27.03.2015 - http://www.bloomberg.com/ news/articles/2015 - 03 - 27/sudan-joining-saudi-campaign-in-yemen-shows-shift-in-region-ties

²⁰ Sudanese army says ground troops to join Saudi-led coalition in Yemen // Sudan Tribune, 27.03.2015 -http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article54415

²¹ Saudi Arabia deposits $lb in Sudan central bank // Gulf News, 13.08.2015 - http://gulfnews.com/news/ mena/sudan/saudi-arabia-deposits-lb-in-sudan-central-bank-1.1566103

²² UAE corporation to invest $10 billion in agricultural land in Sudan // Sudan Tribune, 8.06.2015 - http://www.su dantribune.com/spip.php?article55272

²³ Saudi companies to launch agricultural projects in Sudan's Northern state // Sudan Tribune, 9.10.2015 -http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php7article56662

²⁴ 500 Mauritania troops will join Yemen coalition // Khaleej Times, 20.10.2015 ' - http://www.press reader.com/uae/khaleej-times/20151020/281496455 131718/TextView

²⁵ Mauritania Backs Saudi-Led Anti-Terror Coalition -Presidential Adviser. 15.12.2015 - http://sputniknews.com/ world/20151215/1031794184/coalition-saudis-comment-terrorists.html

²⁶ Somalia finally pledges support to Saudi-led coalition in Yemen. 7.04.2015 - http://www.raxanreeb.com/ 2015/04/somalia-somalia-finally-pledges-support-to-suadi-led-coalition-in-yemen

²⁷ UAE delivers armoured vehicles to Somalia Police. 11.06.2015 - http://horseedmedia.net/2015/06/ll/uae-delivers-armoured-vehicles-to-somalia-police

²⁸ Are Somali forces fighting alongside the Emirates in the war in Yemen? // Somali Current, 9.09.2015 -http://www.somalicurrent.com/2015/09/09/are-somali-forces-fighting-alongside-the-emirates -in-the-war-in-yemen

²⁹ For more information, see: Ivanova L. V. Al-Shabab in Somalia: hope for peace or threat to peace? // Asia and Africa today. 2013, N 12. (Ivanovo L.V. 2013. Ash-Shaabab v Somali: nadezhda na mir ili ugroza mini? // Aziya i Afrika segodnya. N 12) (in Russian)

³⁰ Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, 19.10.2015 - http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/ view doc.asp?symbol=S / 2015/802

³¹ The Emirati Navy Arrives in Eritrea. 29.10.2015 -https://www.stratfor.com/analysis/emirati-navy-arrives-eritrea

³² Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea...

³³ Why are there so many military bases in Djibouti? 16.06.2015 - http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-3311 5502

³⁴ A United Army for the Arab World? // The New York Times, 3.05.2015 - http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/04/ opinion/a-united-army-for-the-arab-world.html

³⁵ Two countries had no idea they were in Saudi Arabia's Muslim coalition to fight terrorism // Independent, 18.12.2015 - http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/ middle-east/saudi-arabia-announces-34-strong-coalition-of-rnuslim-nations-to-fight-terrorism -but-two-countries-a6779186.html

Permanent link to this publication: