Libmonster ID: U.S.-1332
Author(s) of the publication: T. S. DENISOVA

T. S. DENISOVA

Candidate of Historical Sciences Institute of Africa, Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: Nigeria, presidential elections, political leadership, interfaith contradictions, Islamism, terrorism, Boko Haram

On March 28, 2015, presidential elections were held in Nigeria, as a result of which a retired Muslim soldier, Mohammadu Buhari, came to power in the largest (by population) country in Africa, replacing Christian Goodluck Jonathan as head of state. This is the first time in Nigeria's history that an incumbent president and a ruling party have lost an election and peacefully handed over the reins of power to the opposition.

The elections were held in a difficult economic (due to the fall in world oil prices - the main export product of Nigeria) and political (as a result of the intensification of terrorist activities of the Islamist sect "Boko Haram") environment.

The rise of violence in the north - east of the country in the run-up to the elections and the launch of an anti-terrorist operation in February 2015, carried out by the Nigerian army in conjunction with military units from Niger and Cameroon, forced the authorities to postpone the date of voting for presidential candidates from February 14 to March 28, 2015. However, the elections were relatively calm and were recognized by international observers of the EU, the African Union, the Commonwealth of Nations and the Economic Community of West African Countries (ECOWAS) as "transparent and fair".1

According to the results of the vote, in which 29.4 million people participated, the candidate from the opposition Congress of All Progressive Forces party, Mohammad Buhari, received 53.96% of the vote (15.4 million voted for him); the incumbent president, the candidate from the ruling People's Democratic Party (NDP), Goodluck Jonathan, received 44.96% (12.8 million). (The remaining votes went to 12 other contenders. 2)

The 2015 electoral campaign in Nigeria was unique in its own way in a number of ways. First, in Africa, and indeed all over the world, the incumbent head of state usually has enough material resources and a number of associates to ensure victory. Thus, according to research conducted by the British political scientist Paul Collier, in developed countries, the re-election of the head of state for a new term occurs on average in 45% of cases, and in developing countries, despite the fact that voters have significantly more reasons for complaints and discontent, this figure reaches 74% 3.

Secondly, immediately after the results were announced, the losing president congratulated his opponent on the victory and did not question the accuracy of the vote count. This has never been seen before in Nigeria.

Third, despite the terrorist attacks that continued until the very day of voting, Boko Haram's demands not to participate in the elections, and threats from them to residents of the north-eastern states, about 30 million people came to the polls, i.e. slightly less than half of all registered (67.4 million) 4, which is possible qualify as a sufficiently high level of participation.

Fourth, despite Nigerians 'fears that the election will lead to numerous clashes and turn into a "bloodbath", about 50 people were killed in several attacks on polling stations, while in 2011 about 1,000 Nigerians were killed in scuffles between supporters of the same candidates - G. Jonathan and M. Buhari.

Fifth, never before have the results of elections so clearly demonstrated the desire of the country's citizens for change.

Since 2009, terrorist attacks carried out by the Islamist sect Boko Haram and armed clashes between its militants and regular army units have not stopped in Nigeria. The number of victims of the confrontation, according to various estimates, reaches 10-15 thousand, the number of refugees from the northern regions of Nigeria, Niger, Cameroon and a number of other countries affected by the conflict exceeds 1 million people.

Political instability, armed clashes, economic problems, and social divisions provided the backdrop for the 2015 elections.

It seemed that the chances of G. Jonathan and M. Buhari were equal: the former had state resources, access to the media, and the reputation of a person who was actively involved in resolving the conflict in the Niger Delta*5 and conducted research in this area.


* The conflict arose in the 1960s and continues to this day due to the unfair distribution of income from the extraction and export of "black gold", environmental degradation in the region as a result of the activities of foreign oil companies, etc.

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a series of successful negotiations with rebel members of the Movement for the Liberation of the Niger Delta (MLD)organization* Who has taken certain measures to counter Boko Haram.

In the political baggage of M. Bukhari-stay in 1983-1985. as Nigeria's military leader, strong but somewhat effective governance to "restore order in the house" (the outcome of the last election showed that this is what many Nigerians now want), close contacts with the military elite, which is becoming especially important in the fight against terrorism, and the belief of many Nigerians in the ability of a retired military officer to do this. the general wants to end Islamic extremism.

Since the achievements and failures of both main contenders roughly equalized their chances, on the one hand, it was not easy to predict the outcome of the vote, on the other hand, the results did not come as a complete surprise to either Nigerians or Nigerian scholars.

BACKGROUND TO THE 2015 ELECTORAL PROCESS

In 2015, Jonathan** (Christian, ijo), an NDP candidate, ran for president for the second time. Earlier, he won the 2011 elections, and M. Buhari (then a candidate from the Congress for Progressive Change party) turned out to be his main rival during that election campaign.

In 2011, the election of G. Jonathan to the highest state post was not unexpected, because due to the illness and subsequent death of the previous head of state (2007-2010), a Muslim, Umaru Yar'Adua, on May 5, 2010, Vice-President Jonathan actually served as president,and on May 6, 2010, in accordance with the Constitution, he was sworn in as head of state. But his claims did not suit Yar'Adua's inner circle - Muslim politicians of the North, who did not want a southerner to become head of state, thus violating the principle of alternating southerners (Christians) and northerners (Muslims) in the highest state post established in the country: Yar'Adua's term of office had not ended by the time of his actual removal from office., and the presidential chair was supposed to belong to the Northerners for more than a year 6.

The announcement of the voting results in 2011 was accompanied by a rise in violence in the northern and central regions of the country. However, in that election, Buhari, despite his religious affiliation and reputation as a consistent anti-corruption campaigner, received only 12.2 million votes (32%) against 22.5 million (59%) cast for Jonathan 7, who was mostly supported by southern states and the federal capital Territory.

What did Jonathan promise his voters in 2011, i.e. for the period that was supposed to pass before the next election? According to the ruling NDP's election manifesto, the party's goals were to ensure minority rights and freedom of conscience in order to preserve Nigeria as a "multi-religious State"; to diversify the economy, increase investment in agriculture; and to modernize the social and economic structure.8 As well as political stability and security.

What has the state come to after 4 years?

I must say that macroeconomic problems should not have been a matter of particular concern to the government from the very beginning: By the time Jonathan was elected President in 2011, the economic situation in Nigeria was relatively good. GDP increased from $356.7 billion. (PPP) in 2009 to $387.8 billion in 2010 and $414.5 billion in 2011 (although mainly due to the growth of oil exports), per capita - from $2.3 thousand in 2009 to $ 2.5 thousand in 2010 and $2.6 thousand in 2011. GDP growth in 2010 it was 8.7%, in 2011-6.9%9.

Thanks to the export of hydrocarbons** * (even despite the noticeable political destabilization) GDP continued to grow strongly during Jonathan's administration (6.22%), reaching $522.64 billion in 2014 and $2.7 thousand per capita. 10 In 2014, Nigeria ranked first in Africa in terms of economic growth, surpassing South Africa.

In other words, the macroeconomic indicators under Jonathan even improved, the average standard of living of the population increased.

Meanwhile, the dynamics of economic development that has developed over many decades, determined by extensive industrial development of hydrocarbon resources, has led to a decline in other sectors of the economy. Nigeria has lost its role as one of the world's leading suppliers of some agricultural raw materials - peanuts, cocoa beans, rubber, palm oil and cotton-to the world market, although cocoa beans and natural rubber still play a significant role in non-oil exports (5% of the total). Thus, the monocultural nature of Nigerian exports is replicated and, in fact, even worsened. For certain types of products, such as rice, wheat, sugar, and fish, the country has long been in a state of stable food dependence on imports. The share of food in imports remains at 10%.


* ELN is a rebel group that emerged in 2006 in the Niger Delta. Its militants attack the facilities of oil companies, blow up pipelines, take hostages, and participate in armed clashes with units of the federal army.

** City Jonathan was born in 1957 in what is now Bayelsa State in the oil-rich Niger Delta region, graduated from university with a degree in zoology, worked as a teacher for the Environmental Protection Agency, became Deputy Governor of Bayelsa State in 1999, Governor in 2005, and Vice President of Nigeria in 2007.. author's note).

*** Nigeria is consistently one of the top ten oil-exporting countries, and in Africa it is the 1st largest exporter of "black gold". In 2013, the average production level reached 2.3 million barrels. in the day. Oil accounts for 95% of foreign currency revenues and 80% of budget revenues.

page 13

At the same time, although the type of crude oil produced in Nigeria requires very little processing, the country was unable to adjust the operation of its own refineries to the level necessary to meet the needs of domestic consumption, and was forced to import petroleum products.

Only a small number of Nigerians, including those living in oil-rich areas, benefit from exploiting the country's rich mineral resources. More than 70 % of the population lives below the poverty line, and the unemployment rate in 2012 reached 23.9%11. Growing income inequality, which primarily affects young people, including those who are educated and unable to find work, has become a serious factor of socio-political tension.

Thus, in the early 2010s, the government was able to ensure relative economic growth. However, it was during the reign of Jonathan that the level of security of the population in the country noticeably decreased.

SECURITY ISSUES

The main problem that the government of Jonathan had to face soon after he came to power was the danger of splitting the country into a Muslim North and a Christian South as a result of the emergence of the Islamist sect "Boko Haram"to the forefront of political life in Nigeria. It was the regime's failure to effectively counter Islamic extremism that largely determined the results of the 2015 elections.

However, the problems began long before Jonathan came to power. It can be said that if thousands of Nigerians lost their lives as a result of the sect's activities, then Jonathan paid the price (at least temporarily) with a political career and the huge income that Nigeria's highest public office brings. It was during the period of his rule that an unprecedented rise in Islamic extremism occurred both in the country and in the world.

Nigeria ranks first in Africa in terms of the number of adherents of Islam (about 80 million people), and Islamization remains a constant factor in the formation of Nigerian society. Muslims predominate in the northern states, with just over half of the population in the southwest and less than 1% in the southeast. Three-quarters of the country's territory is in the United States, where about half or most of its residents are Islamized.12

Since the 1980s, the Christian-Muslim rivalry has noticeably intensified, but until 2011, i.e., before Christian Jonathan came to power, Muslim religious riots and other unrest rarely spread beyond the northern states and mainly had the character of a struggle between individual sects and tariqas (brotherhoods). The situation has changed due to the sharp intensification of Boko Haram.

The group that formed the movement was formed in northern Nigeria in 1995. In December 2003 It has claimed responsibility for a series of attacks on intelligence officials in the states of Iobe and Borno. After temporarily seizing a police station in the small town of Kanamma, the militants hung banners with the word "Afghanistan" written on them in Hausa and called themselves the "Nigerian Taliban".13

However, this was more evidence of ideological similarities than real ties with the Afghan Taliban. Under this name, the group carried out attacks on law enforcement officers. In October 2004, 15 police officers were killed. A brutal organized response by the police of both states led to the exodus of militants to Niger, Chad and the capital of the Nigerian state of Borno - Maiduguri.

It was mainly from the rioters who found themselves in Maiduguri that one of the most famous Islamist leaders, Mohammed Yusuf (1979-2009), formed an armed group called Boko Haram (translated from Hausa - "Western education is forbidden").14. It should be noted, however, that members of the sect are not only "against", but also directly deny any right to the existence of Western education, Western culture and modern science.

At the same time, it would be an oversimplification to consider the group's goal only as opposition to Western education. Boko Haram rejects all forms of secular power and seeks to establish a State fully governed by Sharia law. The sect was not satisfied with the introduction of sharia law in 12 of the 19 Northern Nigerian states in 1999. To a certain extent, the introduction of sharia law was an attempt by the central government to appease those northern politicians who constantly called for the rejection of the secular nature of the state. But the introduction of sharia law was not enough to appease those elements who, while not joining the fanatics, do not stop them. This ambivalence is not due to a lack of faith in the Islamists ' goals: rather, it's a matter of different methods. Both are advocating the transformation of Nigeria into an Islamic State.

It should be noted, however, that the" purification of Islam " is increasingly becoming a formal goal of Islamists. Even M. Yusuf, who was killed in 2009 as a result of the police seizure of a militant base, denounced Western education and innovation as symbols of sin, bought and enjoyed using cars of the best Western brands, state-of-the-art medical equipment and communication facilities. As is typical of most African conflicts, in the Nigerian situation, the ideological and political confrontation between the North and the South is increasingly giving way to the desire of Boko Haram leaders and militants to use the impunity they enjoy in the areas they control for personal gain or profit.-

page 14

you would like to improve your financial situation.

As a result, their actions, contrary to the provisions of the Koran, take on a criminal character: kidnappings for ransom, primitive robberies and forcible seizure of other people's property, smuggling of weapons, drugs and other goods. Moreover, drugs in times of conflict and war perform several functions at once: the proceeds from their sale allow the rebels to purchase weapons, equipment and vehicles, increase the deposits of commanders in Western banks and, thus, stimulate the escalation of instability, and the widespread use of drugs by militants makes them fearless on the battlefield. The current" drug " situation in Nigeria is compounded by the fact that since the 1980s, the country has become a major importer of drugs, mainly heroin and later cocaine, from southeast and other parts of Asia and their re-exporter to Europe and the United States15.

Among other reasons and prerequisites for the activation of Islamists in the 2010s are the growing socio-economic inequality in the situation of residents of the industrially backward North and the rich, oil-producing South; dissatisfaction with the rapid growth of corruption; uneven distribution of "petrodollars" across the states.

From 2011 to 2015, a wave of terror swept through the country. The confrontation between the authorities and the militants reached its highest point in April 2014, when Boko Haram militants took hostage 276 schoolgirls aged 12 to 17 from a lyceum in the village of Chibok in north-eastern Nigeria. Islamist leader Abubakar Shekau offered to exchange some of them for the arrested militants. Mr. Jonathan's statements and actions in response to this challenge did not inspire confidence in Nigerians that the authorities would do everything possible to free the abductees. And so it happened. In Nigeria, protests began against the inactivity of the government.

In 2014, shortly before the elections already scheduled for February 2015, the militants managed to capture a large number of settlements in the states of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa in the north-east of the country*. In addition, the Islamists took control of a significant area of territory along the border with neighboring Cameroon. In the territories under their control, the militants established their own rules, carried out mass executions, took hostages, destroyed Christian churches and public buildings. Boko Haram's activities undermined the economy and hindered trade in the northern regions: southern merchants preferred not to conduct business in these territories.

Among the reasons for the effectiveness of the sect are good training of fighters, the participation of foreign mercenaries, the possession of modern weapons and communications equipment, strict discipline requirements, and support from local politicians and some local residents.16 Military and financial assistance to Boko Haram is provided by such terrorist organizations as Al-Qaeda, Al-Shabab, the Afghan Taliban, etc. Many of the movement's fighters received military sabotage training in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan, Somalia, Mauritania, Algeria, and other countries17.

On August 24, 2014, two months after the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) terrorist group declared the establishment of a caliphate in the territory under its control in Iraq, the current leader of Boko Haram, Abubakar Shekau, proclaimed the creation of an "Islamic Caliphate" with the aim of establishing a new state. center in Gvoza 18. In March 2015, he pledged allegiance to IS [19] and changed the name of Boko Haram to "Islamic State's West Africa Province".20.

In turn, the security forces of Nigeria showed a permanent inability to track the emergence of terrorist organizations and criminal groups in the north of the country, which became a source for replenishing militant groups. There were also problems of poor intelligence funding, inadequate and untimely responses to incoming information, outdated tactics to suppress pockets of radicalism, and the unwillingness of state leaders to expose influential sponsors and patrons of fundamentalists who were supposed to have (and indeed did) significantly influence the course of the 2015 presidential election.

Mr. Jonathan's Government failed to take advantage of the situation in an era of growing terrorist threats and international outrage against extremist groups operating around the world to gain support in uncovering the international connections of Nigerian Islamists. The measures taken by the Nigerian authorities did not correspond in their parameters to the degree of influence of fundamentalists in the north of the country, nor to the level of threat hanging over the unity of the state.

During Jonathan's reign, the Nigerian army was also a big problem. Not only did high-ranking northern military personnel "share" information with Boko Haram leaders about the movement plans of regular troops, but soldiers also participated in terrorist actions during their off - duty time - for a certain reward. 21 The hasty, superficial and uncoordinated actions of government structures, along with the politicization of religion, hindered the fight against a powerful threat to national security.


* In the months since the election, some localities, including the capital of Borno State, Maiduguri, have been transferred several times from militants to government army units and back again (author's note).

page 15

It must be said that in 2009-2013, a significant part of the population of the northern states sympathized with the goals of Boko Haram22, otherwise how can we explain the "surprise" of militant attacks, the "inexhaustible" sources of replenishment of their ranks, their free retreat after terrorist attacks, the inviolability of shelters and the inability to identify the locations of hostages?

However, by 2014-2015, the "fatigue" of the northerners from constant instability, the displacement of the rebels ' religious goals by political and simply criminal ones, and the fear of getting caught in the crossfire every time they left their homes predetermined a change of priorities. The goals of "purifying Islam" in the eyes of ordinary citizens began to lose their value in comparison with the need to achieve security. Therefore, not only Muslims, but also a significant number of Christians in 2015 supported M. Buhari, who, in their opinion, has the necessary qualities to destroy Boko Haram.

Increasing corruption was another factor that worked against Jonathan, but it was the regime's inability to effectively counter Islamic extremism that primarily determined his defeat in the 2015 election.

NEW HEAD OF STATE

Mohammadu Buhari was born on December 17, 1942 in the town of Daura in the northern Nigerian state of Katsina (i.e., he is currently 72 years old), Hausa by ethnicity. He was the 23rd child of his father, but was raised by his mother - his father died when Mohammad was 3 years old. A career soldier, he graduated from several military educational institutions in Nigeria, England, the United States and India. In July 1966, he participated in the coup that overthrew and killed the first military leader of Nigeria (16.01.1966 - 29.07.1966), Agiyi Ironsi.

In August 1975, when another military coup brought General Murtala Mohammed (29.07.1975 - 13.02.1976) to power, Buhari became governor of the Northeastern State. In 1976, after Mohammed's assassination, the new military leader, Olusegun Obasanjo, appointed Buhari Minister of Oil and Natural Resources, and later Chairman of the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation. During the years of the civilian administration from 1979 to 1983, Buhari commanded an armored division, and on December 31, 1983, he was one of the leaders of the military coup that overthrew the civilian government. Buhari became the military ruler of Nigeria.

At that time, his activities at the highest state post began in the context of a serious economic crisis caused by falling demand and oil prices. Buhari began to implement a policy of austerity, which led to mass layoffs of workers and employees. Ties with the IMF were severed when the fund demanded a 60% devaluation of the national currency, the naira, but Buhari's own reforms were tougher than those demanded by the IMF.

In 1985, the government deported more than 700,000 people from the country. immigrant workers from Benin, Niger, Chad and Cameroon. Famine caused by the influx of large numbers of people is still called "al-Bukhari"in eastern Niger.23

The Government has introduced fees for primary education, increased college and university tuition, and taken a number of other unpopular measures. Thus, the security forces were granted the right to detain any Nigerian who allegedly could pose a threat to the country's security. Special military tribunals were imposed without trial, sentences were not subject to appeal, the opposition was severely suppressed, demonstrations and strikes were banned, and harassment of journalists spread.

Bukhari began to fight against indiscipline "in everyday life and at work." At bus stops, those waiting had to form a clear line under the supervision of military patrols; officials who were late for work were publicly insulted; students over the age of 17 could receive a prison sentence for cheating on exams.24

Austerity policies combined with a highly authoritarian leadership style then deprived the Government of any broad popular support. Moreover, the ethnic balance in the political structure was increasingly disrupted in favor of Northern Muslims, who occupied leading positions in the Supreme Military Council. There was also a sharp ethnic and political confrontation between senior officers in the army, and strong opposition sentiment spread among middle and junior officers. Buhari tried to strengthen his position through demagogic criticism of the country's former rulers and whipping up an atmosphere of nationalist psychosis. Mock trials of deposed civilian leaders of the Second Republic* were held, but the verdicts showed that the military administration sought to deflect the brunt from northern politicians and direct it against southerners.

The regime became increasingly discontented, and finally, on August 27, 1985, Buhari was overthrown by a group of military officers led by I. Babangida and placed (until 1988) in a prison in Benin.

However, Buhari went down in Nigerian history not only as the most authoritarian head of state, but also as a consistent fighter against corruption. During his 20 months in power in the 1980s, more than 500 politicians, officials and businessmen were imprisoned on corruption charges.25 The fight against corruption has become the second pillar of his election program-


* The first Republic-1960-1966, the Second Republic-1979-1983, the Third Republic-August-November 1993, the Fourth Republic-1999. author's note).

page 16

we are 2015-along with security issues.

In 2015, the majority of voters voted for him. First of all, this indicates that the majority of Nigerians are currently more concerned with achieving security and stability than with socio-economic problems, which Mr. Jonathan has been somewhat successful in solving. In addition, during the election campaign, Buhari said that he realized his "past mistakes", that respect for human rights would be given special importance, and that he would be able to defeat corruption and Boko Haram.26

Perhaps, as a former soldier, he will really be able to carry out the necessary reforms in the army, raise the morale of soldiers and officers and direct them in the right direction-against the terrorist activities of Boko Haram. By the way, immediately after the inauguration, which took place on May 29, Buhari announced the creation of a special command center in the capital of Borno State-Maiduguri, which is most susceptible to terrorist attacks, aimed at combating extremists. 27 It is somewhat disconcerting, however, that just a couple of years ago Buhari accused the government of violent actions and injustice against the sect. Now he has allegedly changed his attitude towards Islamists after the abduction of girls in Chibok. Then he condemned the action, and, according to media reports, Boko Haram even organized a terrorist attack against Buhari, planting a bomb in his house. However, neither he nor any of his relatives were injured, but the victims were bystanders 28.

Buhari was once a consistent advocate of Sharia law in Nigeria. During the 2015 election campaign, he declared respect for all faiths. However, Buhari remained out of big politics for 30 years, so he had time to think about the fate of Nigeria and Nigerians and adjust his views.

* * *

Since 1960, Nigeria has held several presidential elections, with the results regularly falsified and the processes themselves accompanied by a rise in violence. Therefore, even if many Nigerians are dissatisfied with the results of the 2015 election campaign and the way it was organized, the atmosphere of relative calm during its conduct - even against the background of Boko Haram's activities in the northern regions, the recognition of the fairness of the results by international observers and, most importantly, acting President G. Jonathan-indicates that Nigeria has taken the first steps important steps towards democratization or, more precisely, normalization of social and political life.

At the same time, it should be noted that the new President M. Buhari faces extremely difficult tasks of stabilizing the political situation and overcoming the confrontation along the North - South line, which even a retired general is unlikely to be able to solve in a fairly short time. Inter-regional and inter-confessional contradictions in the country are aggravated to the limit, so it is impossible to say that the threat of violence has passed.


1 http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2015/03/opposition-party-decla-res-victory-nigeria-election-1 50331135603507.html

2 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_general_election._2015

Collier P. 3 Wars, Guns and Votes. N. -Y., 2009, p. 36.

4 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nigerian_presidential_election, 2011

5 For more details, see: Gheorghi D. G. Ecological conflict as part of the ethnopolitical crisis in Southern Nigeria / / Asia and Africa Today. 2014, N 7. (Georgy D.G. 2014. Ekologicheskiy konflikt kak chast etnopoliticheskogo krizisa v South Nigeria // Azia i Afrika segodnya. N 7) (in Russian)

Denisova T. S. 6 Nigeria after the presidential elections of 2011 / / Year of the Planet: yearbook. Issue 2012: ekonomika, politika, bezopasnost', Moscow, 2012, p. 429. (Denisova T. S. 2012. Nigeria posle prezidentskikh vyborov 2011 goda / / God planeti: ezhegodnik. M.) (in Russian)

7 Nigeria. Reference and monographic edition, Moscow, IAfr RAS, 2013, p. 122. (Nigeria. Reference book. М., 2013) (In Russian)

Geveling L. V. 8 Vybory v Nigerii: vremya politicheskikh paradoksov // Asia and Africa today, 2011, N 8, p. 39. (Geveling L. V. 2011. Vibory v Nigerii: vremya politicheskikh paradoksov // Azia i Africa segodnya, N 8) (In Russian)

9 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2836.htm; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ni.html

10 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/gdp

11 http://www.tradingeconomics.com/nigeria/unemployment-rate

12 Nigeria.., p. 29.

Waldek L., Jayasekara S. 13 Boko Haram: the Evolution of Islamist Extremism in Nigeria // Journal of Policing, Intelligence and Counter Terrorism. L., 2011. Vol. 6, N 2. P. 168.

14 Crisis Group Africa. Northern Nigeria: Background to conflict. Report N 168, 2010, December 20.

15 UN Concerned about Drug Trafficking // The Inquirer, 5, 7 March 1995.

16 http://www.google.ru/url?q-http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/ world-africa-16373531&sa

Alli Y. 17 Revealed: Boko Haram Leaders Trained in Afghanistan, Algeria // The Nation. Lagos, 2009, 2 August, p. 1; Oyegbile O., Lawal A. Shielding Patrons of Boko Haram // Tell. Lagos, 2009, 17 August, p. 69; Soboyede A. The Boko Haram in All of Them // The Punch. Lagos, 2009, 13 August, p. 14.

18 http://www.irinnews.org/report/101159/boko-haram-takes-aim-at-nigeria-apos-s-elections#at_ pco-smlwn-1.0&at_si=54flb4bb38eb42 79&at ab-per-2&at_pos-0&at_tot-1

19 https://ru.wikipedia.org/wiki/%D0%91%D0%BE%D0%BA%D 0%BE%D1%85%DO%BO%D1%80%DO%BO%DO%BC

20 http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/boko-haram-renames-itself-islamic-states-w est-africa-province-iswap-as-militants-launch-new-offensive-against-government-forces-1020 4918.html

Adesoji A.O. 21 Between Maitatsine and Boko Haram: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Response of the Nigerian State // Africa Today. 2011, N 57 (4), p. 101 - 102.

22 Ibidem.

23 http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2015/04/02/muhammadu-buhari-novyj-prezident-nigerii-32555.ht ml

24 Ibidem.

25 http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/01/africa/nigeria-presidential-election/

26 Ibidem.

27 http://www.bbc.co.uk/russian/rolling_news/2015/06/150602 _rn_nigeria_new_blast

28 http://www.fondsk.ru/news/2015/04/02/muhammadu-buhari-novyj-prezident-nigerii-32555.ht ml


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