In recent years, there has been a noticeable increase in the interest of Mongolian historians in developing problems of their country's historiography based on the revision of previous, traditional approaches, largely borrowed from Soviet historiography. In this regard, the monographs of well-known contemporary Mongolian historians J. Boldbaatar "Mongolian Historiography: Renewal and Trends (1990s - present)" [Boldbaatar, 2008], N. Altantsetseg "Studies and concepts of Great Powers in relation to Mongolia (Russia, USA, China)" [Altantsetseg, 2008B. Punsaldulam and N. Hishigt "Revolutions of 1911 and 1921 in Mongolia (Review of foreign historiography)" [Punsaldulam and Hishigt, 2008], collective monograph " Historiography of the Khalkhingol War "[Khalkhyn golyn dainy tuukh bichleg, 2009] , etc.

In modern Mongolia, there is not a single military or civilian historian who studies the history of his country and its place in international relations in the XX century, who would to one degree or another not study the problems associated with the events on Khalkhin Gol, Mongolia's participation in World War II, and the international recognition of the MNR as an independent, independent state. The results of these long-term studies are reflected in dozens of books, individual and collective monographs, collections of documents, hundreds of articles, reports at international and national conferences and symposia, memoirs of event participants, reference books, illustrated albums, etc. According to rough estimates of Mongolian historians, over the past 70 years only about the Khalkhingol War in Mongolia, Russia, Japan, China, the United States and other countries, more than 450 major works, monographs, collections of articles, documents, memoirs of war participants have been published, including about 260 in the Mongolian language, and more than 130 in Russian, There are about 100 books in Japanese and Chinese, and more than 20 in English [Khalkhyn golyn dainy tuukh bichleg, 2009, pp. 268-270].

The Khalkhingol war lasted for more than 4 months - from May 11 to September 16, 1939, more than 130 thousand people, more than 1000 tanks and armored vehicles, more than 800 combat aircraft and many other military equipment took part in it on both sides (Soviet-Mongolian and Japanese-Manchurian). According to Russian sources, the Japanese losses in manpower amounted to about 61 thousand killed, wounded, missing and captured. Soviet-Mongolian troops lost more than 25,000 killed, wounded, and missing in action [Khalkhin-Gol: 1939, 2009, pp. 69-70].

Since 1990, new theoretical and methodological approaches that have become widespread in modern Mongolian historical science have also been reflected in the works of military historians. Military historical science in Mongolia is developing intensively: new research centers are emerging and being formed, archival documents are being published, new and interesting works of researchers of the older, middle and young generations are appearing, and international relations and cooperation are expanding. All this contributes to an in-depth study of the events on Khalkhin Gol. In recent years, articles have been published by military historians D. Gombosuren "Historiography of the battles on Khalkhin Gol" [Gombosuren, 2005, pp. 273-285], S. Ganbold "Study of the history of the Khalkhingol War in Mongolia", "Some issues of a methodological approach to the study of the history of the Khalkhingol War" [Ganbold, 2004; Ganbold,

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2006, p. 18-24], N. Hishigt "Reflection of the problems of the Khalkhingol war in modern Mongolian and Russian historiography" [Hishigt, 2006, p. 35-41] and others.

To mark the 70th anniversary of the victory of the Soviet-Mongolian troops in the Khalkhin Gol war (2009), Mongolian historians, with the participation of Chinese colleagues, prepared and published a collective monograph "Historiography of the Khalkhingol War" [Khalkhyn gopyn dainy tuuh bichleg, 2009]. It is the first attempt to summarize the experience of studying this war in different interested countries within the framework of one collective monograph, to give their own view on the history and current state of studying the events on Khalkhin Gol in Mongolian, Russian, Japanese, American and Chinese historiographies. In my opinion, this monograph is a valuable contribution to the world historiography of the events on Khalkhin Gol. It clearly demonstrated the remarkable growth of modern Mongolian historical science. Undoubtedly, the translation and publication of this collective monograph in Russian, English, Japanese and Chinese will serve as a new incentive for further research and convergence of the positions of historians of Mongolia, Russia, Japan, China and the United States.

The author's team includes well-known Mongolian military and civil historians G. Myagmarsambuu, D. Gombosuren, C. Batbayar, S. Ganbold, N. Hishigt, D. Dashdulam and others, as well as Chinese historians Shui Zhanjiang and Zhao Yuxia (Center for the Study of the Nomunkhan War of the Institute of Social Sciences, Harbin, China). The preface says that the authors tried to give an objective, free from political and ideological bias, scientific review of the largest and most significant works of Mongolian and foreign authors, to state their positions on some controversial issues of the history of these events. The very title of the monograph suggests that, after much discussion, Mongolian historians have come to a consolidated opinion that, from the point of view of Mongolia's national interests, the battles on Khalkhin Gol should be considered as a war, and not a border "Nomonkhan incident", as is commonly believed in official Japanese and some other historiographies. It is noteworthy that the mentioned Chinese researchers also call the battles on Khalkhin Gol "Nomunkhan War" (so in the text) [Халхын голын дайны тγγх бичлэг, 2009, с. 6, 230 и др.].

The monograph clearly states the main differences between the new approach of Mongolian historians to the assessment of historical events of that time and the approach that they traditionally followed before 1990: excessive ideologization, schematism, fitting facts to one well-established theory and ideology, Marxist-Leninist methodology, one-sidedness in the approach to the study of various historical phenomena. The authors, in particular, noted that earlier, with the appearance of a comprehensive study of the history of the war, Mongolian historiography clearly tended to study "only its bright sides, to glorify the merits of Mongolian and Soviet soldiers, to stick out themselves, to portray and condemn Japan as a weak, backward country in all respects. The same trend prevailed in Soviet historiography" [Khalkhyn golyn dainy tuukh bichleg, 2009, p. 4-5].

Since the late 1980s, Mongolian historians have begun to view this issue not only from the point of view of the war between Mongolia and Japan, but also in close connection with the general military and political situation in the region, with Soviet-Japanese relations, their mutual contradictions, with the foreign policy of the Soviet Union and Japan in relation to Mongolia, as well as with the also in connection with Japanese-Chinese, Soviet-Chinese, Mongolian-Soviet and Mongolian-Chinese relations. Thanks to this approach, Mongolian historians have opportunities to clarify a number of events and facts that previously could not be discussed or written about at all. Among the previously "closed" topics, in particular, are the geostrategic policy of the Soviet leaders in the region, in relation to Mongolia and other countries, political repression during the Khalkhingol war, the September battles in the Numrag River area, the loss of both sides in manpower, the Mongol-Manchu border negotiations, border and territorial issues [Khalkhyn golyn dainy tuukh bichlag, 2009, p. 61].

Establishing cooperation with Japanese scientists and holding regular international scientific conferences of Mongolian, Russian and Japanese researchers in Ulaanbaatar, Moscow and Tokyo became important incentives for further deepening research on the history of the Khalkhin Gol war. At the same time, the authors of the monograph note that to date, the positions of historians of Mongolia, Russia and Japan on a number of issues continue to be different, the facts and conclusions presented by them contradict each other, there is a tendency to interpret certain events only from their own positions and in their own interests, to deny the facts and arguments of the other side. Among the most difficult and controversial topics are named, in particular:-

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discussions around the "Tanaka memorandum", an assessment of the actions of the leadership of the 22nd cavalry regiment of the 8th Mongolian cavalry division, the case of the bombardment of a unit of this cavalry division by "planes with red five-pointed stars", etc.

Mongolian historians continue to pay great attention to further study of the causes and causes of the Khalkhingol War. At the same time, they abandoned the old cliched notion that "the Japanese imperialists provoked this war, intending to seize the MNR", and began to consider the causes of the war against the broader background of international relations in the world and the region, the geopolitics of the great powers, especially the USSR and Japan.

The second chapter of the monograph, entitled "The Study of the Khalkhingol War in Russia", is devoted to a review of the works of Soviet and modern Russian military and civilian historians. The chapter consists of two paragraphs: 1) Military and political analysis of the Khalkhingol War in Soviet historiography (author D. Gombosuren, pp. 139-156); 2) Research of the Khalkhingol War in modern Russian historiography (author N. Hishigt, pp. 156-187).

D. Gombosuren focused mainly on the evolution of Soviet historians ' views on the goals of Japan and the Soviet Union in this war, the reasons and reasons for the outbreak of the war, and on some issues of the history of the battles on Khalkhin Gol, on which Russian historians did not come to a single point of view. According to D. Gombosuren, these issues, in particular, include::

1. Discrepancies in determining the exact date of G. K. Zhukov's arrival in Mongolia. In his memoirs, G. K. Zhukov wrote that he arrived in Tamtsag-Bulak on June 5, 1939, however, according to archival documents, he sent his first message from Mongolia about the battles of May 28-30 to Moscow on May 30, 1939.

2. D. Gombosuren expresses great doubts, which are shared by other Mongolian historians, about the accuracy of Russian data on the losses of both sides in manpower during the Khalkhingol War. Referring to the data published in the statistical study "The classification of secrecy is lifted" on the losses of the two sides, D. Gombosuren, in particular, writes: "In most cases, it is impossible that the losses of the Japanese army, which was engaged in defensive battles, only in terms of the number of killed, were three times greater compared to the Soviet Army, which was advancing" [Khalkhyn golyn dainy tuukh bichleg, 2009, pp. 153-154].

3. D. Gombosuren noted that some Russian media outlets published publications in which representatives of Mongolia still express resentment over the fact that as a result of the war, the Mongols were unable to return part of their territory in the Nomonkhan region. In this regard, he recalled that the head of the Soviet-Mongolian delegation at the negotiations of the mixed commission on the establishment of the Mongolian-Manchoug border in 1939-1940, Chief of Staff of the 1st Army Group Komkor M. A. Bogdanov firmly defended the need to return this part of the territory of Mongolia. The historical truth, writes D. Gombosuren, is that after the conviction of M. A. Bogdanov for 4 years, the way was opened for Molotov to sign the 1941 agreement on the Mongol-Manchurian border.

4. D. Gombosuren expressed regret that modern Russian historiography still covers the issues of arrests and punishments of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Comkor Ts. Luvsandonoy and other leaders of Mongolian divisions and regiments, including the leadership of the 22nd cavalry regiment of the 8th Cavalry Division, on charges of treason. In this regard, D. Gombosuren noted the lack of mutual interest and mutual information about the achievements of historical research and raised the question of the need to address at the political level the issue of training researchers in Mongolia with knowledge of the Russian language, and in Russia - with knowledge of the Mongolian language.

N. Hishigt, the author of the second paragraph, noted a number of factors that positively influenced the expansion and deepening of research on the Khalkhingol War in Russia after 1990: declassification of documents in some archives, publication of new documents, organization and participation in joint conferences and symposiums of Mongolian, Russian and Japanese researchers. As a result, in her opinion, the scale of research on the history of this war has expanded in Russia, and the revision of previous "narrow" assessments and conclusions based on one-sided facts has begun. According to N. Hishigt, the Khalkhingol War still occupies a worthy place in Russian military historiography. Russian scientists regularly take part in traditional scientific events dedicated to Khalkhin Gol.

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This section presents individual positions of a number of well-known contemporary Russian military historians of Khalkhin Gol, including V. A. Vartanov, A. A. Koshkin, V. P. Zimonin, Yu. A. Kirshin, I. P. Serebryannikov, Yu. N. Shvedov, N. I. Nikiforov, and others, as well as Mongolian historians S. K. Roshchin, S. G. Luzyanina, Yu. V. Kuzmina, E. V. Boikova, etc., on such topical issues as the origins, causes and causes of the war, the goals of Japan and the USSR, the policy of these countries in relation to Mongolia, the results and lessons of Khalkhin Gol, the critical attitude of Russian scientists to the positions of Japanese scientists, etc.

Among other major works of military historians, in which the Khalkhingol theme was reflected after 1990, I note: D. Gombosuren's monograph " History of the construction of the Armed Forces of Mongolia. 1921-1955 "Vol. I [Gombosuren, 1998], 3-volume collection of his selected works on the history of Mongolia [Gombosuren, 2005-2006], monographs by S. Ganbold" The Eighth Cavalry Division in the Khalkhingol War "[Ganbold, 1995], B. Davaasuren " Policy and activities of the MPRP for training military personnel. (1921-1940) "[Davaasuren, 1990], L. Zoriga "Tamtsagbulak hospital" [Zorig, 2008], joint monograph by Ts. Batbayar and D. Gombosuren "Mongol-Manchu border negotiations. 1935-1941 (Military and diplomatic history) " [Batbayar, Gombosuren, 2004] and others.

I would like to highlight the works of one of the leading contemporary Mongolian historians, diplomats and orientalists Ts. Batbayar: monographs " Khalkhin-Gol: History and Modernity "[Batbayar, 1989], "Mongolia and Japan in the first half of the XX century" [Batbayar, 1998; Batbayar, 2002], "Mongolia and the Great Powers in the first half of the XX century" [Batbayar, 2006], as well as the above-mentioned book "Mongol-Manchu border negotiations. 1935-1941" [Batbayar, Gombosuren, 2004] and others. Works of Ts. Batbayars are written, as a rule, on the basis of long-term and painstaking collection and careful study of a wide range of various national and foreign sources, including archives of Mongolia, Russia and Japan, and are, in my opinion, one of the most thorough, reasoned and valuable studies on the problems of the policy of the great powers in relation to Mongolia, the history of events on Khalkhin-Gol, international recognition of the status of an independent state of the MNR in the first half of the XX century.

About the goals of Japan and the Soviet Union in the war on Khalkhin Gol, Ts. Batbayar, in particular, writes: "The Japanese side set itself the following military and diplomatic goals with these battles : to test the strength of the Soviets, to influence them in order to stop their assistance to China, and also to demonstrate its military potential to its allies - Germany and Italy. The Soviet side solved the following military-strategic tasks: to teach the Japanese the same hard lesson as on Khasan, and thereby prevent its repeated attack in the direction of the Soviet Far East and the MNR, as well as in the face of the emerging threat of war in Europe, to prevent the danger of being drawn into a war in Asia and avoid a war for two front " [Batbayar, 2006, p. 217].

In the period after 1990, the history of the Khalkhingol War and Mongolia's participation in World War II found new coverage in such large collective monographs as"A Brief History of the Mongolian Army". In 2 volumes. [Mongol tsergiin tuukhiin tovchon, 1996], " Mongolia in the XX century . Essay on History "[Khordugaar zuuni Mongol, 1995], "The Mongolian Army in the XX century" [Khordugaar zuuni Mongol tsereg, 2001], "History of Mongolia". In 5 tons. [Mongol ulsyn tuukh, 2003] and others.

The monograph "A Brief History of the Mongolian Army" thoroughly examines the causes of the Khalkhingol War, the course of military operations, the reasons for the urgent end of the war, its consequences and lessons, contribution to the art of war and other issues in a new way and from different aspects. The history of the Khalkhingol war is considered for the first time at the junction of two sciences - historical and military. The authors of the monograph, like most modern Mongolian historians, believe that the main reason for the outbreak of this war was the fact that in the 1930s the territory of Mongolia became a major object of contradictions between the spheres of political and military influence of the Soviet Union and Japan. The Soviet Army in the Khalkhin Gol war not only demonstrated its power to the Japanese, but also received good training for the coming war, tested a number of new types of weapons and equipment, new tactics and techniques of warfare.

One of the previously closed topics related to the Khalkhin Gol war, which became the subject of special and close study by Mongolian historians after 1990, is the topic of political repression in the Mongolian army that occurred before and during the war. Military historians D. Gombosuren, B. Davaasuren, S. Ganbold, S. Baatar and others, relying on reliable facts and documents, in their research showed how much damage was caused

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The Mongolian People's Revolutionary Army (MNRA) as a result of mass political repression in the 1930s, even before the start of the Khalkhingol War.

They came to the following conclusions. First, as a result of the political repressions that unfolded in 1937-1939, on the eve of the Khalkhingol War, the Mongolian army was severely weakened, almost decapitated, experienced an acute shortage of military personnel and largely lost its combat capability. Thus, in 1938-1939, almost 80% of the 1,100 new nominees for the positions of senior and middle command staff were middle-and lower-level commanders and even ordinary soldiers [Khalkh golyn dain, orchin ue, 1999, p. 100-101, 108]. Secondly, political repression in the Mongolian army, which was headed at that time by Marshal Kh. Choibalsan, continued during the Khalkhingol war: 8 of the 11 chiefs of staff of divisions, regiments and divisions of the MNRA who took part in the war were put on trial, and the deputy commander-in-chief, Komkor Ts. Luvsandonoy was arrested at the end of June 1939 and sent to the USSR, where he died. Currently, Mongolian military historians consider the repressive actions of the leadership of the 1st Army Group against the Tsars to be erroneous. Luvsandonoy and the leadership of the 22nd cavalry regiment. Third, J. Boldbaatar and other Mongolian historians believe that the Khalkhingol War was connected with Stalin's policy of organizing and justifying political repressions, including against "Japanese spies" and "counter-revolutionaries" in Mongolia (Khalkhin golyn dainy tuukh bichleg, 2009, pp. 99-100).

Mongolian historians consider the issue of losses of the warring parties in manpower, including MNRA personnel, to be completely unresolved and debatable. S. Ganbold, as a result of many years of research, found that in the period from May 11 to September 16, 1939, the loss of MNRA personnel. They accounted for 895 people killed, wounded, and missing in action (Ganbold, 1994).

Mongolian historians have done a lot of work to collect, study and publish biographical information about historical figures who took part in the Khalkhin Gol war, to restore the good name and honor of many repressed commanders and soldiers, including komkorov G. Sambu, Ts. Luvsandonoy, etc. [Гомбосурэн, 2005; Хилсээр хэлмэгдсэн мянган зγрх, 2002].

In 1990, R. Bold published an article on the attitude of Emperor Hirohito of Japan to the Khalkhin Gol war [Bold, 1990, pp. 37-51].

The current views of Mongolian historians on the Khalkhin Gol events are reflected, in particular, in the published materials of two international scientific conferences held in Ulaanbaatar in 2009 in connection with the 70th anniversary of the Khalkhin Gol events [70 Years Since the Nomnhan Incident, 2010; for the symposium, see Graivoronsky, Luzyanin, 2010]. The symposium" The Battle of Khalkhingol (Nomonkhan Incident) in World History: Learning about the Past and Discussing the Future " (Ulaanbaatar, July 2-5, 2009) was attended by about 50 scientists from Mongolia, Russia, Japan, the United States, China, Great Britain, the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. The Mongolian historian Ch. Dashdavaa gave a brief general description of the state and actual problems of studying the Khalkhingol War in Mongolia [Dashdavaa, 2010, pp. 19-22].

Among the joint works of Russian and Mongolian historians of recent years, Ch. Dashdavaa noted the publication of collections of articles and memoirs "World War II and Mongolia" and "Khalkhin-Gol: 1939" [World War II and Mongolia, 2005; Khalkhin-Gol: 1939, 2009]. Work is underway on the joint project "From Khalkhin Gol to the cruiser Missouri". The monograph "Mongolia during the Second World War"was prepared at the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of Mongolia. The Defense Research Institute of the Defense University has published the monograph "Historiography of the Khalkhingol War".

In 2004, a collection of documents "The Khalkhingol War: Sixty years Ago" was published in Ulaanbaatar in Mongolian, prepared by a team of scientists from the Military Institute of the State Military University of Mongolia and the Institute of Military History of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation.

At the same time, in my opinion, it should be noted that in the 1990s, some Mongolian historians made separate attempts to radically revise previous assessments of international events in East and Central Asia in the 1930s, including the role of the USSR in the events preceding the events on Khalkhin Gol. So, in the textbook for universities "History of Mongolia (Problems of history, theory and methodology)" on the policy of the USSR towards Mongolia, in particular, the following was written:: "The Soviet Union, showing "special attention" to the security of the MNR territory, under the pretext that "there is a Japanese plan to seize

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MNR", in August 1937, carried out reactionary activities aimed at bringing the 30-thousandth Soviet Army into Mongolia, deploying it along the southern and south-eastern borders of Mongolia, and at the same time, under the guise of exposing the "Japanese intelligence organization Genden and Damid", carried out mass arrests and repressions against the highest party, state and military leadership and tens of thousands of citizens of Mongolia" [Mongol ulsyn tuukh, 1999, p. 403].

Meanwhile, it is well known that units of the Soviet Red Army were introduced into the territory of the MNR in 1937 at the request of the MNR government in accordance with the Soviet-Mongolian Protocol on Mutual Assistance of March 12, 1936. In connection with the real threat of an attack by Japan, the Small State Hural and the Council of Ministers of the MPR adopted a special secret resolution "On the entry of Soviet troops into the territory of the MPR" on August 25, 1937, which set out the reasons for this decision. Given the threat of direct attack, the Government of Mongolia decided to: "To request the Soviet Union to send military units of various branches of the Red Army of workers and peasants as soon as possible (so in the text of the translation of the document - V. G.) in a number corresponding to the current situation and the threat of a direct enemy attack on the MNR" [Russo-Mongol..., 2008, part 1, pp. 41-41].

As the subsequent events at Khalkhin Gol showed, without such joint preliminary preparations for the future war, the MNR army would not have been able to repel the armed attack of the Japanese-Manchu troops in the summer of 1939 without the help of the Red Army.

It is noteworthy that the same textbook gave a different assessment of the role of the USSR in protecting the independence and territorial integrity of the MNR: "As for Mongolia, it should be noted that its national interests - the protection of its state independence and territorial integrity-coincided with the position of the Soviet Union, which defended its strategic interests in Khalkhin Gol interests... the victory of the Soviet Army at Khalkhin Gol contributed to increasing the international prestige of the MNR, and when Molotov and Togo re-defined the border between the MNR and Manchukuo in June 1940, the border line was established to the east of the Khalkhin Gol River, i.e. exactly as the MNR considered it fair" [Russo-Mongol..., 2008, part 1, pp. 403-404].

Mongolian historians who write about World War II focus primarily on the issues of the MNR's participation in the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet people against German fascism, as well as in the war against militaristic Japan at the final stage of World War II [Mongol tsergiin tuukhiin tovchon, 1996; Delhiin II dainy ..., 2001; Gombosuren, 1998; Gombosuren, 2005-2006].

After 1990, both Russia and Mongolia continued to work actively to identify and publish new archival materials on Soviet-Mongolian military and combat cooperation during the Great Patriotic War and at the final stage of World War II. I would particularly like to note the publication of a large joint work of Russian and Mongolian archivists and historians-the collection of documents "Russian-Mongolian military Cooperation (1911-1946)" in 2 parts [Russian-Mongolian..., 2008]. For the first time, it reflects all the main stages and directions of military cooperation in the period under review, including the issues of financing and supplying weapons and equipment for the MNRA, training personnel for the Mongolian army in Red Army universities, joint combat operations during the Khalkhingol War in 1939 and the Trans-Baikal Front and Group of Forces of the MNRA in 1945. In addition to a large array of documents from Russian archives, the collection also includes new documents from the central national archives of Mongolia - the Main Archive Department of Mongolia, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia, and the Archive of the Armed Forces of Mongolia.

A separate group consisted of documents about the assistance of the Mongolian people to the Red Army and the Soviet people in their struggle against Nazi Germany in 1941-1945. According to Mongolian sources, in 1941-1945, the workers of the MNR provided material assistance to the Red Army and the Soviet people (livestock, meat of domestic and commercial wild animals, other types of food, warm clothing, sheepskin coats, mittens, felt boots, etc.) totaling 435 million rubles. 300 kg of gold was transferred, 32 thousand horses were donated and 485 thousand horses were sold [Mongolulsyn tuukh..., 2003, vol. 5, p. 234; Khishigt, 2005, p. 65].

The collection of documents "Russian-Mongolian military Cooperation" also includes summary materials on awarding soldiers of the Red Army and MNRA, top leaders

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The USSR and the MNR, respectively, received Soviet and Mongolian orders and medals for their participation in the fighting on Khalkhin Gol and in World War II.

Until 1990, assistance to the Red Army and the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War was always one of the central and popular themes in the works of Mongolian historians [Eh orny aguu ih dain ba mongol ard tumen, 1970; 1945 ony dain oroltsogchdyn durtgal, 1975; Jamsrangav, 1977; Dashtseren, 1972; Semenov, Dashtseren, 1971; Delhijn hoerdugaar dain, 1985; Combat Commonwealth..., 1983; ..., 1985; Delhijn II dainy ueijn BNMAU'..., 1989] and others.

Since 1990, the number of papers on this topic has noticeably decreased. Many military historians have switched to developing topics related to the history of the Mongol army in the Middle Ages, in the era of the Mongol Empire, the military art of Genghis Khan, his associates and successors. At the same time, Mongolian historians continue to study the military construction of the MNR during World War II, its participation in the defeat of the Kwantung Army and the liberation of Inner Mongolia and Manchuria at the final stage of the war against Japan in 1945, and the history of relations between the great powers participating in the anti - Hitler coalition on the issue of international recognition of the status of the MNR.

Many leading modern historians and politicians, including J. Boldbaatar, D. Gombosuren, C. Batbayar, O. Batsaikhan, R. Bold, Baabar, S. Damdinsuren, C. Dashdavaa, L. Haisandai, N. Hishigt and others, pay great attention to the study of various aspects of the policy of the great powers in East Asia, including foreign policy policies of the USSR and the role of I. Stalin on the issue of recognition of the international status of the MNR.

Zh. Boldbaatar, in his short but very informative monograph "Historiography of Mongolia: Renewal and Trends (from the 1990s to the present)", summarized and analyzed the main stages, trends and features of the development of Mongolian historiography over the past almost 20 years and proposed a new approach to the study and periodization of the history of Mongolia from ancient times to the present. modernity. In accordance with his proposed new periodization of the history of Mongolia in the 20th century, J. Boldbaatar examines Mongolia's participation in World War II in the chapter "Activities aimed at creating prerequisites for building socialism in the country". In particular, he writes:: "During the Second World War, the MNR, being a satellite of the Soviet Union, joined the call "Everything for the front" and helped the Soviet people with all its strength and capabilities. The decision to preserve the status quo of Outer Mongolia, made at the suggestion of the USSR at the conference of heads of government of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain, held in Yalta in February 1945, became the main link in recognizing Mongolia's independence at the international level" [Boldbaatar, 2008, p.84]. As you can see, Zh. Boldbaatar generally gave an objective assessment of the role of the USSR and the historical significance of the Yalta Conference for the recognition of the MNR. In principle, this assessment does not differ from the one that was generally accepted in Soviet and Mongolian historiography before 1990.

At the same time, a new significant point is that, unlike in the past, J. Boldbaatar used the expression "MNR-satellite of the USSR", which was introduced into the political and scientific lexicon by the well-known American sinologist and Mongol scholar O. Lattimore back in the 1930s and was firmly rooted in the Western historiography of Mongolia (Golman, 2004).. Until 1990, Soviet and Mongolian official documents and scientific literature generally did not use this expression in relation to MNR. In the Soviet Union, both under Stalin and after him, it was officially accepted to call the MNR a friendly, union state. One of the first Mongolian authors to widely use the expression "MNR - a puppet state, a satellite of the USSR" was and still is Baabar 1, the author of several major works on the history of Mongolia, including the monograph "From the World Empire to the Soviet satellite", in which he claims to have a new, original interpretation of the history of Mongolia and The history of Mongolian-Soviet relations in the XX century [Baabar, 1996; Baabar, 1999].

Based on the above data and the statements of some Mongolian historians, it can be concluded that among some of them there is a tendency to further revise the role of the USSR/Russia in the historical destinies of Mongolia in the XX century.

D. Gombosuren in his article "The participation of the MNR in the Second World War, its political significance and results" came to the following conclusion: The Second World War is over-

1 Baabar is the literary pseudonym of the famous Mongolian statesman and party leader of modern Mongolia, one of the leaders of the Democratic Party, a member of the Great State Hural of Mongolia B. Batbayar.

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It was the unconditional surrender of Japan and the victory of the democratic forces. The hopes of the MNR government and Marshal Choibalsan for the annexation of Inner Mongolia to the MNR were not fulfilled, since the great powers were not interested in this. The MNR has faithfully fulfilled its obligations under the protocol concluded with the Soviet Union in 1936 and has made its contribution to the United Nations. As a result, on February 13, 1946, the MNR established diplomatic relations with the Republic of China. On February 27, 1946, the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance between the MNR and the USSR was signed. Thus, the independence of the MNR was first recognized by China and the Treaty of Friendship and Mutual Assistance with its great northern neighbor, the USSR, was signed for the first time. The status quo of the MNR was also recognized by the victorious allied powers-the United States and Britain [Gombosuren, 2005, p.260].

Another well-known Mongolian historian, O. Batsaikhan, assessing the role of I. Stalin's contribution to the defense of the interests of the USSR and the MNR in 1945, in the monograph "The Mongolian Nation on the Way to a Sovereign state (1911-1946)", wrote: Stalin, first of all, defended the interests of the Soviet government in the Far East, including in Mongolia, he was also a successful implementer of the military-political policy directed against Japan, for him the question of Mongolia's independence was secondary. However, the military-political policy that Stalin pursued in the Far East provided the Mongols with an excellent opportunity to defend their independence and, moreover, become a nation-state "[Batsaykhan, 2006, p. 328]. It seems that this is an interesting, generally reasonable, but not indisputable interpretation of Stalin's role in the international recognition of the MNR. If the question of international recognition of the MNR's independence, according to O. Batsaikhan, was secondary for Stalin, then it is not clear why, when putting forward the conditions for the USSR's entry into the war against Japan at the Yalta Conference of the heads of the three powers of the USSR, the United States and Great Britain in February 1945, he put the point of recognizing the status quo of the MNR in the first place? Apparently, at different stages of history, depending on the specific international situation, Stalin, based primarily on the national and state interests of the USSR, had different views on the question of ways to finally determine the international status of the MNR.

C. Batbayar, who carefully studied the history of the formulation and solution of the question of why J. Stalin at the Yalta Conference specifically raised the question of recognizing the status quo of the MNR as one of the conditions for the Soviet Union's participation in the war against Japan, came to the following conclusions: "During the Second World War, the authority of the USSR and its leader grew enormously Stalin in the international arena. That is why, after the war, the question of ensuring the security of the Soviet Union was vital for Stalin. And then Stalin in February 1945, as one of the conditions for the entry of the Soviet Union into the war against Japan, put a clause on "preserving the status quo of the MNR" "[Batbayar, 2006, p. 316]. Trying to get into the secret plans of And. Stalin's attitude to Mongolia in the spring of 1945, Ts. Batbayar interprets the logic of his thoughts and actions in the following way: "It can be said that Stalin's decision to separate the MNR from China, make it a subject of international law, and then link the MNR to the Soviet Union in a long-term military treaty was an answer to a question that bothered him for many years, from the 1930s to 1945. Q: How can the security of the Asian part of the Soviet Union territory be guaranteed? In other words, the main point of all the questions was the geographical location of the MNR. In this sense, the policy and actions of Japan, which since the 1930s has constantly posed a military threat to the Soviet Far East, were one of the decisive factors that led the Soviet leadership, led by Stalin, to the need to seek the independence of the MNR. In addition, it was necessary to finally put an end to the dual, contradictory international status of the MNR, which emerged in 1924, and to free Mongolia from the permanent legal burden called "Chinese sovereignty "" [Batbayar, 2006, p.317].

A similar interpretation of Ts. Batbayar assessed the historical significance of the very fact of including the clause on recognizing the status quo of the MNR in the text of the Yalta Agreement as follows: "The clause" On the status quo of the MNR", which was reflected in the Yalta Agreement, was extremely important. the road for the continued existence and recognition of the MNR at the international level. This was the first international agreement under which the great powers of the United States and Britain, in addition to the Soviet Union, recognized the MNR as a subject of law." In this, according to Ts. Batbayar, was the main significance of the Yalta Agreement for the MNR.

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One of the important topics that was not emphasized until 1990, mainly for foreign policy reasons, but now invariably attracts the attention and interest of modern Mongolian historians, is the question of the possibility of annexing Inner Mongolia to the MNR after the defeat of the Japanese Kwantung Army and the liberation of Inner Mongolia in the fall of 1945.

Your position on this issue Ts. Batbayar expressed as follows: "This clause of the Yalta Agreement (on preserving the status quo of the MNR.-V. G.) spoke of" preserving the status quo " only of the MNR, and, thus, it rejected the plan of the then leaders of Mongolia to unite Outer and Inner Mongolia. It can be said that the transformation of the MNR into an independent state was of paramount importance for Stalin, but the question of uniting the Mongol tribes (ethnic Mongols of Mongolia, China, and Russia) into one state was never relevant for him. Therefore, the goal that the Mongolian side set when entering the war against Japan on August 10, 1945 - "to unite the Mongolian tribes into one family" - turned out to be unattainable and closed after the recognition of the MNR "within its current borders" by Kuomintang China under pressure from the Soviet Union [Batbayar, 2006, pp. 317-318].

Summarizing the above, we can conclude that the history of the restoration and preservation of Mongolia's state independence and territorial integrity before and during World War II is still in the focus of attention of Mongolian historians. At the same time, many of them have moved away from the previous, largely ideologized, one-sided, apologetic assessments of the place and role of the Soviet Union and its leadership, primarily I. Stalin.

At the same time, it seems that some Mongolian historians, under the slogan of restoring historical truth, exposing crimes related to mass political repressions in the MNR in the 1930s, the place and role of the Soviet Union and its advisers in these cases, willingly or unwittingly go to the other extreme, focusing mainly on the negative aspects of the Soviet-Mongolian relations. They do not fully take into account the totality of complex and contradictory external and internal factors of that time, the peculiarities of the historical development of Russia and Mongolia and their relations, and try to apply modern criteria, assessments and norms of international law to the special, non-standard relations that historically developed and existed between the USSR and the MNR in the 1920s and 1930s.

The continuation and further strengthening of fruitful cooperation between historians and archivists of Russia and Mongolia will help establish the historical truth and avoid cases of falsification of the history of Russian-Mongolian relations in the XX century.

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