A. SAPUNTSOV, Candidate of Economic Sciences

Chad became an oil exporter in 2003, and transnational capital played a crucial role in the development of the oil industry. In order to ensure the country's economic development and fight poverty, the World Bank (WB) tried to create effective mechanisms for redistributing oil revenues, but Chad followed the "resource curse"path typical for a number of African countries.

Information about possible oil reserves in Chad appeared in the second half of the 60s. The economic backwardness of this poorest African country prevented the establishment of its own oil companies to organize exploration activities. ¹ The oil industry of Chad, which maintained close relations with Western countries, was created by major multinational corporations( TNCs), which, through foreign direct investment (FDI), organized the oil business.

In 1969, the Government of Chad granted a concession for oil exploration to the American TNK Konoko. A little later, an international consortium was formed consisting of: Konoko (the project operator and owner of a 12.5% ownership stake in the consortium), Anglo-Dutch Shell (37.5%), as well as American Exxon and Chevron (each with 25%).

In the period 1973-1975, the consortium identified the Doba and Doseo oil-bearing basins in southern Chad, as well as to the north of the island. Chad-Sedigi, Kanem, Kumia deposits. Operation of the Sediga was started in 1977, with production volumes of only 1,500 barrels. drilling of wells in other fields has shown that oil reserves are insignificant ². At the same time, exploration in Doba identified the relatively oil - rich Miandum field in 1975 and the Kome field in 1977.

In the mid-70s, serious armed conflicts took place in Chad, and due to the escalation of the conflict, plans for the accelerated development of the oil industry had to be postponed: the construction of an oil refinery (refinery) operating on raw materials from the Sedigi field, the organization of the export of oil produced in the Doba basin. Moreover, the downward trends in world oil prices that took place in the 1980s reduced the attractiveness of oil production in this African country3.

CAMEROON'S" WAY " OF OIL

Following the restoration of political stability in Chad, the TNK consortium continued to operate, with Exxon buying out Conoco's stake and becoming the project operator. In 1986, the Government of Chad signed a memorandum of understanding with the consortium, and in 1988, a new agreement, under which TNCs received 30-year oil production concessions in the Doba basin with the right to organize export supplies. A year later, the Bolobo field was also discovered there (with oil reserves of about 1 billion tons). bbl.). The membership of the consortium has changed somewhat: Exxon has a 40% ownership stake, Shell has 40%, and the French firm Elf, which took Chevron's place in 1993, has 20% ^.4

In 1993-1996, the consortium conducted a comprehensive assessment of the Doba Basin field development project and the construction of an oil pipeline (see map on page 21) with a length of more than 1 thousand km through Cameroon to transport oil to the port of Kribi (Gulf of Guinea) with subsequent deliveries to the world market. In addition to the Cameroonian route, the option of the "northern route" of Chadian oil through the territory of Libya was considered, which had a number of advantages for export supplies to European countries. However, due to the international sanctions regime and confrontational US-Libyan relations, this pipeline route was rejected.

An agreement between the Governments of Chad and Cameroon was concluded in February 1996, and in September 1997 an international consortium reached agreements with these countries on the implementation of the project.

In the second third of the 1990s, the consortium faced a difficult dilemma. On the one hand, the companies positively assessed the profitability of the Chado-Cameroonian project. On the other hand, the risks of doing business in Chad, a country characterized by a rather authoritarian style of government, military and political instability, had a deterrent effect on the decision to invest several billion dollars of private capital.

The implementation of an oil project required the participation of a reputable international organization capable of managing investment risks , otherwise oil production was impossible. ⁵ The World Bank could act as such an institution, which received the following status:-

The work was supported by the Russian Foundation for National Research (project "Creating a Positive Image of Russia in the context of international efforts to combat money laundering and terrorist financing", No. 06 - 02 - 02082a).

project documentation from the Government of Chad in September 1997. In the past, the World Bank has promoted similar projects in developing countries with relatively high levels of political risk and a lack of experience in attracting large amounts of FDI. These include the construction of the Bolivian-Argentine and Bolivian-Brazilian gas pipelines, as well as an oil transportation system in Azerbaijan, Georgia and Turkey.⁶ In the event of a positive response from the World Bank, the international consortium was ready to finance 97% of the construction from its own funds.

THE WORLD BANK GIVES THE GO-AHEAD

The application process at the World Bank took some time. Shell and Elf announced their withdrawal from the consortium in November 1999, citing in particular the controversial environmental and political aspects of the Chad project.⁷ By this time, Exxon and Mobile had merged into ExxonMobil, which retained a 40% stake in the consortium and the role of operator of the Chado-Cameroonian project. The current structure of the consortium was formed in April 2000, when it included the Malaysian state-owned company Petronas (35% ownership) and the former participant Chevron (25%).

The inclusion of Petronas in the consortium was a manifestation of new trends in the globalization of the world economy in the 21st century, related to the improvement of the financial and economic condition of companies in developing countries and the increasing propensity of such firms to organize foreign business. The most successful TNCs based on the "semi-periphery" of the global economy accumulated sufficient financial, technological and managerial resources, began to transform into "world-class" companies and intensified the exchange of capital in the "South-South" direction.

June 2000 The World Bank officially announced its participation in the Chad-Cameroon oil project, which was a crucial step towards the start of construction work. The WB's share in the total project financing did not exceed 3%, but the very fact of the organization's participation, which acts as a kind of guarantor with a solid political weight in the international arena, significantly reduced the risks of capital investments, which made it possible to mobilize large-scale private foreign investment. In addition to investing in the project, the World Bank provides developing countries with financial assistance that can be frozen in conflict situations.

The World Bank's activities are not limited to protecting the interests of TNCs and their foreign ownership, but are also aimed at combating poverty and economic modernization of developing countries - this is the goal it declares as a priority. Having become a participant in the Chad-Cameroon project even before construction began, the World Bank assessed it as " an unprecedented basis for transforming oil wealth into direct benefits for the poor and socially vulnerable segments of the population."⁸. This made it possible to predict that Chad will be able to avoid the problem of the "resource curse", since the reputation of the World Bank is at stake. ⁹

The "curse of resources" refers to an inefficient situation in which, after the start of mining and exporting minerals in a developing country with an authoritarian style of government, relatively large amounts of foreign exchange earnings are appropriated by the political elite (oligarchically linked to national businesses) and TNCs, rather than directed to economic development, and the majority of the population continues to live in poverty.¹⁰ This problem has been repeatedly observed in the African oil industry and has been called the "curse of African oil".

The innovative nature of the project consisted in the developed plan for spending Chadian export foreign exchange earnings with a mandatory condition for financing the country's socio-economic development programs, legally formalized by Chadian Law No. 001 of January 11, 1999 and regulating the distribution of income from the operation of three deposits in the Doba basin: Miandum, Kome and Bolobo. In accordance with this law, indirect revenues from the oil project (tax and customs payments made by an international consortium) must go to the State treasury of Chad, while direct revenues (royalties and dividends) must be transferred to an escrow account* in the London branch of Citibank, and then distributed as follows::

10% - to form a fund for future generations, the funds of which can be used after the depletion of oil reserves in the country;

72% - to finance priority sectors: health, social security, education, infrastructure (including water supply), rural development, environmental protection;

4.5% - to finance oil-producing areas;

13.5% - contributions to the state treasury.

To monitor the implementation of the project, Chad established a Committee for Supervision and Control of Oil Revenues, an International Group of Advisers and an External Monitoring Group, as well as a Group of Environmental Specialists were formed. Researchers from Chad had high hopes for the development of the national oil industry, pointing to the unique institutionalization of mechanisms for monitoring and closely supervising the management of oil revenues inherent in the "new Chadian organizational and management model" ¹¹.

PROJECT IMPLEMENTATION

Construction works, the cost of which was estimated at

* Escrow (English escrow) in Anglo-American law-depositing a sum of money from a third party in the name of another person so that it is issued to him only after a certain condition is met.

Table 1

Dynamics of Chad's oil export revenues (2003-2007)

* For the first 9 months of 2007

Источник: Chad-Cameroon Pipeline - Revenues and Allocations Table 2007 / World Hank (fio.worldbaiik.orji/61FPU7TRR0).

$ 3.7 billion, launched in October 2000. The level of production from the Doba fields was estimated at 225 thousand barrels. per day. The oil reserves were projected to last 30 years of production, during which Chad's revenues would range from $ 2.5 billion to $ 8.5 billion and Cameroon's from $ 900 million, including both foreign exchange export earnings and indirect income from resident salaries and purchases from national enterprises.

In the summer of 2003, one year ahead of schedule, TNCs commissioned an oil pipeline with a length of 1,070 km (85% of which runs through the territory of Cameroon), which allows transporting 250 thousand barrels. A terminal for pumping oil to tankers was built daily, as well as at a distance of 11 km from the coast. Due to inflationary trends and adjustments in the estimated documentation, the total project implementation costs were slightly higher than planned and amounted to $ 4.2 billion. ¹²

Oil from the Miandum field entered the pipeline in July 2003, and in October the first tanker carrying Chadian oil left the port of Kribi. In February 2004, oil production started at the Kome field, in September the Bolobo field was put into operation, in June 2005 - Niya, in March 2006 - Munduli, and in June 2007 - Mekeri.

At the beginning of 2008, cumulative production totaled 241.8 million barrels of oil, which was shipped in 264 tankers, and Chad's oil export revenues exceeded $ 2 billion. (see Table 1). In 2007, the average daily production volumes were at the level of 144 thousand barrels, which is clearly not enough to fully load the pipeline and encourages TNCs to conduct geological exploration. So, in 2007, 60 oil wells were drilled, and by the beginning of 2008 there were 488 of them.

Field development and oil production in Chad are carried out by Esso Exploration and Production Chad ("Essochad"), which operates on behalf of an international consortium and is a subsidiary of ExxonMobil. The Oil Transportation Company of Chad (the Government of Chad owns 8% of the company's capital) operates the section of the pipeline that runs through Chad, and the Oil Transportation Company of Cameroon (Chad's share in the company's capital is 3%, Cameroon's - 5%) operates the section in Cameroon.

SOCIO-ECONOMIC RESULTS

Despite the numerous statements made by the oil project participants about the objectives of the socio-economic development of Chad and the efforts made to form appropriate institutional mechanisms, the real nature of the oil business turned out to be an enclave. The scale of the Chadian economy is so small that construction organized by the TNK group has had a short-term upward impact on macroeconomic indicators, and this impact has become more noticeable with the start of oil shipments (see Table 2).

In 2001. The GDP of Chad, which was almost unchanged over the previous two years, increased by more than 10%, which was largely due to the implementation of the oil project, namely, the implementation of contracts by national companies (the volume of purchases of goods and services from Chadian firms amounted to $ 56.7 million), the use of residents ' labor in construction work

Table 2

Key macroeconomic indicators of Chad

* 2007-2008-estimates and forecasts.

Sources: World Economic Outlook Database / IMF. October 2007 (www.imf.org); World Investment Report / UNCTAD. N.Y.; Geneva: UN, 2007; World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Wash., D. C.: World Bank, 2007.

(by the end of 2001, the number of employed residents was close to 3 thousand people, and the annual salary fund was about $ 6 million), as well as payments of compensation for land use ($1.2 million for the specified year)¹³.

At the beginning of 2008, the international consortium employed 5,700 people in Chad, including 5,000 residents, and the cumulative volume of purchases from national firms was $ 1.1 billion. ¹⁴

The importation of capital and technology needed for construction into Chad led to a four - fold increase in FDI inflows and a three-fold increase in their accumulated volumes in 2001. In 2002, FDI inflows doubled to close to $ 1 billion, but then declined slightly and are now between $ 500 and $ 700 million, with a significant increase in the number of FDI inflows. investments primarily come in the form of ongoing capital investments in the oil industry and oil exploration ¹⁵.

Full-scale oil exports carried out throughout 2004 made the greatest contribution to economic growth, when the country's GDP increased by 1/3, and according to Esso-Chad - by 40% ^.16

In subsequent years, when oil production and prices stabilized, the positive dynamics of GDP almost stopped, as the expected multiplicative effects in the national economy did not follow, and a significant part of foreign exchange earnings was withdrawn from circulation by a limited group of individuals. As a result, Chad's economic growth rate declined sharply in 2005, to only 0.5% in 2006.

The benefits of economic growth for Chadians are much more modest, particularly when measured in terms of GDP at PPP per capita. In 2000-2006, this indicator increased by 90% against a four-fold increase in GDP per capita, which was caused by changes in currency PPP.

During the project implementation period, Chad "lost" its positions in the ranking of countries on the "human development index" (HDI) The United Nations Development Programme has moved from 166th place in 2000 to 170th in 2005, and the index value has decreased from 0.397 to 0.388. ¹⁷ The average life expectancy has slightly increased, but, according to the latest data, it is only 50.4 years, infant mortality is very high - 124 deaths under the age of one one year per thousand live births. According to various estimates, from 1/2 to 3/4 of the population is illiterate, 64% of the population lives below the poverty line ¹⁸. Chad's rating on the corruption perception index is extremely unfavorable - 172nd out of 179 countries in 2007. Chad's rating on the failed States index is constantly deteriorating: in 2005 - 7th place (100.9 units out of 120 units), in 2007 - 5th place (108.8 units) ¹⁹

The unidirectional nature of Chad's integration into the global economy is confirmed by the fact that between 2000 and 2006, the volume of FDI accumulated in the Chadian economy increased 8-fold to $ 4.5 billion, while the accumulated direct investment of Chadian companies abroad was consistently $ 70 million. ²⁰

Economic studies allow us to state that the implementation of the oil project in Chad not only did not contribute to the achievement of the country's socio-economic development goals set by the World Bank and declared by all project participants, but on the contrary, it was manifested in " Holland-

disease"*. There has been a shift of capital and labor from industries that produce traditional Chadian exports (cotton and livestock products, which accounted for 66% and 17% of all export revenues in 1998, respectively) to the more profitable oil sector. As a result, the competitiveness of Chadian agricultural products in the global market has declined, but the agricultural sector continues to occupy an important place in the Chadian economy and employs about 80% of the workforce.

A sharp contrast between the oil-producing industry and other sectors of the Chadian economy was observed during the construction of the Baza Kome facilities , an engineering city equipped with the latest technology, from which oil production and transportation are managed. For example, Esso-Chad has installed 4 electric generators with a combined capacity of 120 megawatts, which is four times the total capacity of Chad's ²¹ power plants. At the same time, there are many rural localities (for example, villages located in the area of the Miandum field) still not connected to the power grid.

International observers and representatives of human rights organizations stated that the damage caused to the nature of Chad by the oil project was more extensive than previously expected. The facts of exploitation of Chadian citizens engaged in construction work mainly on a shift basis and poor living conditions of workers were also revealed.²²

Nevertheless, the international consortium of TNCs strives in every possible way to create a positive public opinion about the oil project and "advertise" the benefits derived by the Chadian population. Information about the project's special environmental monitoring system is actively published, including information about oil leaks, projects to combat malaria and AIDS, as well as measures to prevent occupational injuries and train Chadian workers. Since 1993, the consortium has held more than 21,000 consultations with the residents of Chad and Cameroon on the oil project, which was attended by about 300,000 people. Essochad granted the Chadian side access rights to the fiber-optic communication cable that is part of the pipeline infrastructure, which is likely to contribute to the development of Chad's telecommunications, especially international communication channels.

PROBLEMS OF FOREIGN INVESTORS

It is natural that the Government of Chad, unable to create the necessary institutional environment and effectively spend its export foreign exchange earnings, will not be able to do so.

* "Dutch disease "(deindustrialization) - an inefficient situation when the development of industries engaged in the extraction and export of minerals leads to an outflow of resources from traditional export sectors of the economy and causes their decline. It was observed during the degradation of the Dutch engineering industry as natural gas fields were developed in the 60s-70s of the XX century.

It was also able to claim an adequate share of oil revenues, most of which went to foreign investors.

Relations between the Chadian authorities and the international consortium began to deteriorate in October 2004, when President I. Deby* stated that TNCs had violated the 1998 agreements and were selling oil produced in Chad at low prices. Indeed, in 2004, Doba crude was sold at $ 35 per barrel versus $ 45 per barrel for Brent crude, but the price difference is due to differences in the physical and chemical characteristics of the raw material.

A series of articles were published criticizing N'Djamena's decision to spend $ 5 million on arms purchases out of the $ 25 million listed by the consortium as a bonus for signing the contract in 2000. The facts of spending 478 thousand dollars were revealed. to import cars for members of the ruling elite and provide $ 41,000 for personal needs to the head of the National Assembly (Parliament) of Chad ²³. A strike by Chadian State civil servants who had not received their salaries for several months, as well as discontent among pensioners who had not been paid their pensions for more than a year, were evidence of poor budget spending.²⁴

After several months of "wrangling" with the World Bank, in January 2006 I. Deby signed a bill on amendments to Law No. 001: military expenditures are included in the article "priority sectors of the economy", the future generations fund is abolished, and the share of oil revenues to the state treasury is increased from 13.5 to 30%. The President explained his decision with budget restrictions and the aggravation of national security problems. In response to these legislative initiatives, the World Bank accused the Chadian Government of failing to meet its obligations to finance social projects in petrodollars and froze $ 125 million in a London escrow account received from oil exports, as well as reducing financial assistance by $ 124 million. ²⁵

Presidential elections were scheduled for 3 May 2006 in Chad. Just before the election, I. Deby, who was planning to run for re-election, threatened to stop oil shipments, and the World Bank announced an "interim agreement" with Chad, partially resuming financial assistance. In July, a memorandum of understanding was signed, which actually approved a new system for distributing indirect oil revenues: 70% go to finance priority sectors in an expanded interpretation, and the rest goes to the state treasury.

Trying to strengthen his position in the confrontation with foreign investors and get additional funds, I. Debi, who retained his post, continued the "offensive" and in August 2006 made a statement to the media: "Due to non-payment of taxes, the activities of Chevron and Petronas companies in Chad will be discontinued." He added that these firms thrive at the expense of Chad and have underpaid $ 450 million to the state treasury. "In less than three years of field operation, the consortium has made a profit of $ 5 billion with an investment of $ 3.5 billion, while Chad's profit was only $ 500 million," the president noted^..

According to the World Bank, the consortium exported 133 million barrels between October 2003 and December 2005. Chad's revenues from these operations amounted to $ 307 million, i.e. only 12.5% of total revenues, while the share of other African Governments in oil export revenues (for example, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Nigeria) ranged from 60 to 80%²⁷.

However, Chevron and Petronas have not received any official termination notices and have declared that their financial policies are fully compliant with Chadian tax laws. Moreover, during the negotiations, Chevron and Petronas managed to reduce the amount of Chad's financial claims to $ 289 million, which they paid in ^{October 2006.28}

Experts criticize the activities of the Chadian Committee for Supervision and Control of Oil Revenues, especially pointing out the family ties of the committee members with the head of State, the low representation of public organizations and the inability to participate in real decision-making. Specially established international monitoring bodies also played a non-essential role in the project and failed to influence N'Djamena's implementation of its recommendations.²⁹

THE SEDIGI PROJECT

Unlike the Doba oil basin, the Sedigi field development project has not yet been implemented. Its reserves are estimated at 15 million barrels. high-quality oil, the supply of which has long been planned to be organized on the domestic market, which would ensure the supply of petroleum products for 15-20 years ³⁰. Paradoxically, even after the start of Chadian oil exports, the country's needs for these raw materials and refined products are met by imports (including through unorganized channels) from Nigeria and Cameroon, since there are no refineries in Chad. Meanwhile, self-sufficiency in petroleum products would solve the problem of supplying power plants with fuel, as well as reduce electricity tariffs, which are a "brake" on the economic development of Chad.³¹

In 2000, the Chadian Government suspended world-class TNCs from participating in the Sedigi investment project and signed a contract with the Sudanese firm Concorp

* Idris Deby was born in 1952, the head of state since 1990 Came to power as a result of an armed uprising, 1991-appointed President, 1996, 2001 and 2006. - he was elected president. At the initiative of I. Debi, amendments to the Constitution were adopted, allowing him to be re-elected president an unlimited number of times.

contract for the construction of a 331-kilometer oil pipeline linking the Sedigi field with N'Djamena. In its suburbs, it was planned to build an oil refinery "Farsha", the contract for the construction of which was transferred to the" Oil Company of Chad", as well as a power plant.

However, Concorp performed poorly and the pipeline was rendered unusable; the company's management was charged with misappropriation of $ 1 million. In turn, the "Oil Company of Chad" was unable to organize the construction of the refinery, and the investment project turned into a corruption scandal. The director of this company, who was also a member of the Sudanese Parliament, was killed in 2003 in N'Djamena by a member of the board of directors of Sudanese origin, who was soon put on trial and executed.

In recent years, Chinese entrepreneurs have shown increased attention and implemented investment projects in the oil industry of Algeria, Sudan, Angola, Nigeria and other countries. In September 2007, the Government of Chad entered into an agreement with the Chinese company Sinopec, under which it is planned to revive the Sedigi project, establish a joint venture and start work on the construction of an oil refinery.

Unfortunately, Russian oil companies do not pay due attention to the organization of investment cooperation with Chad. Meanwhile, with the Chadian Government and a consortium of TNCs at loggerheads, Russian firms could compete with Chinese multinational capital in the Chadian oil industry.

* * *

The Chad-Cameroon oil project as a whole has fallen short of the World Bank's lofty poverty reduction goals for Chad. In the official document of the World Bank, in" dry " language, it is noted:"...It remains to be seen whether the economic growth generated by the organization of oil exports has had a significant impact on the poor in Chad, particularly in rural areas. " ³² The Essochad executive stated in January 2007: "We should never have called the Chad-Cameroon project a 'development project'." According to the German parliamentarians, " the construction of the pipeline has not solved the real problems in Chad, but only worsened them; the living conditions of the population of Chad and Cameroon are not improving, but on the contrary, there are signs of gradual degradation."³³

The experience of recent years has shown that fundamental political reform based on the development of institutions of democracy, parliamentarism and civil society is necessary to ensure mechanisms for the transformation of natural rents into real benefits for the population of Chad . These processes are mostly evolutionary and require a long period of time.

¹ In the 1960s, Chad's GDP per capita averaged only $ 118.2, compared to the global average of $ 568.8 (World Development Indicators CD-ROM. Wash., D. C.: World Bank, 2007.)

² Countries of Africa 2002. Moscow: Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2002, p. 601.

³ For example, in 1985-1986, the world price of Brent crude oil fell from $ 27.56 to $ 14.43 per barrel. (ВР Statistical Review of World Energy. London: BP, 2007, p. 16.)

⁴ Chad-Cameroon Pipeline. Center for Energy Economics. Houston, TX: University of Texas at Austin, 2004, p. 2.

^{Krasner S. D.} 5 The Case for Shared Sovereignty // Journal of Democracy. 2005, Ms 16(1), p. 69 - 83.

⁶ Cross-Border Oil and Gas Pipelines: Problems and Prospects. Wash., D.C. UNDP; World Bank, 2003, p. 27 - 51, 110 - 118.

^{Ford N.} 7 Pollution Worries Mount // African Business. January 2001, p. 33.

⁸ Accountability at the World Bank: The Inspection Panel 10 Years On. Wash., D.C: World Bank, 2003, p. 90.

⁹ The Economist. 12.12.2002.

^{Pegg S.} 10 Can Policy Intervention Beat the Resource Curse? Evidence from Chad-Cameroon Pipeline Project // African Affairs. 2005, N 105(418), p. 1 - 25.

^{Umaru A.M.} 11 Upravlenie ekonomicheskimi sistemami i ego modernizatsiya v Respublike Chad [Management of Economic systems and its modernization in the Republic of Chad]. sciences'. Voronezh, 2005, pp. 96-97; Abderman M. L. Sovershenstvovanie upravleniya i povyshenie effektivnosti ispol'zovaniya prirodnykh resursov v Respublike Chad [Improving management and improving the efficiency of using natural resources in the Republic of Chad]. ekon. nauk, Moscow, 2006, pp. 81-82.

¹² Data on actual costs were published by ExxonMobil in October 2004 (Gray I., Reisch N. Chad's Oil: Miracle or Mirage? Following the Money in Africa's Newest Petro-State. Wash., D.C-Baltimore, MD: BIC; CRS, 2005, p. 6.)

¹³ Chad Export Project Report. N'Djamena: EssoChad, 2001, N 5, p. 59, 68, 79.

¹⁴ Ibidem, 2008, N 23, p. 57, 65.

¹⁵ Growth of foreign investment receipts in the least developed countries of Africa / / BIKI. 2007, N 139.

¹⁶ ESSOCHAD President R. Royal's speech at the World Bank seminar in N'Djamena. 10.10.2005.

¹⁷ Human Development Report. N.Y.: UNDP, 2002, p. 152; Human Development Report. N.Y.: UNDP, 2007, p. 232, 237.

¹⁸ Human Development Report 2007.., p. 240.

¹⁹ For the assessment of Chad by this index, see: Abramova I. O., Fituni L. L., Sapuntsov A. L. "Emerging" and "failed" states in the world economy and politics, Moscow: Institute of Africa of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 2007, pp. 90-93.

²⁰ World Investment Report // UNCTAD. N.Y.; Geneva: UN, 2007, p. 256.

²¹ Chad has no Electricity to Meet its Own Power Needs // Alexander's Gas and Oil Connections: News and Trends: Africa. 28.10.2003.

^{Horta K., Nguiffo S., Djiraibe D.} 22 The Chad-Cameroon Oil & Pipeline Project. A Project Non-Completion Report. Moreton-in-Marsh: FPP, 2007, p. 17.

²³ Chad Sees First Trickle of Cash From Pipeline // Los Angeles Times. 26.12.2003.

^{Polgreen L., Gugger C. W.} 24 Chad's Oil Riches Meant for Poor are Diverted // New York Times. 10.02.2006.

²⁵ Problemy inostrannykh investorov v Chade [Problems of foreign investors in Chad].

²⁶ Chad Tells Two Oil Firms to Pack up // The International Herald Tribune. 27.08.2006.

^{Gray I., Reisch N.} 27 Op. cit., p. 39.

^{Gloud J., Winters M.} 28 An Obsolescing Bargain in Chad: Shifts in Leverage between the Government and the World Bank // Business and Politics. 2007. Vol. 9, issue 2, p. 23.

^{Horta K., Nguiffo S., Djiraibe D.} 29 Op. cit., p. 8.

³⁰ Marche Africains. 20.04.2000.

³¹ Currently, electricity tariffs in N'Djamena are among the highest in the world. See: Massey S., May R. Dallas to Doba: Oil and Chad, External Controls and Internal Politics / / Journal of Contemporary African Studies. May 2005, p. 255.

³² Implementation Completion Report No. 36560-TD. Wash. D. C: World Bank, 2006, p. 36.

³³ See the report presented in Berlin to the Parliamentary Commission for Economic Cooperation and Development. (Koszy U., Kofler B. Bericht - Informationsreise Tschad und Kamerun. 19 - 27.01.2007.)

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